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Abstract 
 
This study contributes to the contemporary debate about external citizen oversight 
(ECO) of police by taking up the challenge of assessing the extent to which such 
oversight agencies or their procedures are associated with lower levels of police 
misconduct. More specifically, the research consists of a case study of the Police 
Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), an example of ‘holistic’ ECO – i.e. an agency that 
combines a reactive (complaint investigation) function with a proactive (policy 
recommendation) function. It is the first such evaluation of police governance and 
oversight in Kosovo, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Importantly, it adds to a small but growing body of research into the perceptions of 
police officers about the impact of ECO on police conduct. It triangulates 
documentary evidence - including legislation, procedures, PIK reports and statistical 
data – with primary data obtained through a questionnaire survey of junior-ranked 
police officers and semi-structured interviews with senior-ranked. 
 
The findings reveal that the PIK meets the main criteria of ECO, as indicated 
in the literature. Although the documentary evidence fails to provide clear indications 
that PIK activity (or procedures) are associated with improved police conduct, the 
primary data offers evidence that there might be such a link. A significant proportion 
of over 500 questionnaire respondents expressed positive views about ECO, albeit 
also expressing positive views about police investigation of complaints. In conclusion, 
the study offers evidence of a link between ECO activity and improved policing 
conduct that warrants further investigation. It confirms the findings of other authors 
that future research into police perceptions ought to focus on fairness and process. 
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Chapter One 
Purpose and background to the research 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The contemporary debate about police accountability centres primarily on two main 
themes: external oversight agencies and alternative remedies to misconduct, under the 
broader umbrella question of police governance (or political accountability). In the 
context of England and Wales the debate about governance had been locked for some 
time into the language of the tripartite system, shifting weight toward one governance 
dynamic at the expense of the others (Mawby & Wright, 2005, p. 10), before a fourth 
accountability dimension arrived with the IPCC. The period leading up to 2012 has 
been characterized by a transition from the era of New Public Management and the 
police performance culture demanded by central government (Fleming & 
McLaughlin, 2010, p. 199; Fletcher & Stensen, 2009, p. 15), to the brave new world 
of Police and Crime Commissioners and local governance restored and renewed. Yet 
the crises continue and public trust remains the casualty.  
 
In Britain media voices have sounded concern with the new brand of local 
governance, pointing out that greater local control in London has been accompanied 
by politicians (of all persuasions) reducing accountability to collated statistics, and 
competing in calls to provide the police with “more money, more staff, more powers 
and more weaponry” (Wood, The Guardian, 2012; Fletcher & Stensen, 2009, p. 13). 
Another commentator warned that the newly elected commissioners would “blur 
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further the already complicated lines of accountability in relation to police leadership” 
(Richards, 2012). So complex has police accountability in the UK become that its 
many layers have been likened to the London Underground (Markham & Punch, 
2007a, p.301). All this occurs against the backdrop of a perennial lack of public 
enthusiasm for local accountability measures (Docking, 2003, p. 6). Commenting on 
the election of the first Police and Crime Commissioners, one observer summed up 
the problem whimsically as a case of the electorate having acquired “a habit of 
blowing a raspberry in the face of [Government] local democratic innovations” (BBC, 
2012a). This governance dilemma is relevant far beyond the shores of Britain: the 
quandary is about how to interpret and measure public confidence as the key criterion 
in a debate in which ‘the public’ is becoming an increasingly hollowed out concept in 
multi-pluralist, consumer societies (Fleming & McLaughlin, 2010, p. 201; Holdaway, 
2010, p. 259). Other research points to the complex task of interpreting what people 
believe the police should do to increase confidence (Stanko & Bradford, 2009, p.328). 
In a claim that relates to the tripartite regime before the Police and Crime 
Commissioners, Millen and Stephens (2012, p. 262) state that the tripartite structure 
of accountability “implicitly denied the place and importance of the citizen” might be 
more accurately stated as a failure to access the interest of the citizen.  
 
Moving away from the shores of Britain, the debate has centred on the rapid 
growth of external citizen oversight (ECO) agencies, particularly in North America 
(De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, p. 652; Walker, 2006, p. 2) and increasingly in Europe 
(European Partners Against Corruption, 2011, p. 6). In Australia, a pioneering state in 
this approach to accountability, policing scholars are calling for a further extension of 
the concept and the introduction of agencies that will tackle misconduct across the 
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entire public sector (Prenzler and Faulkner, 2010, p. 258). The growth in external 
oversight bodies has been characterized by a surprising degree of diversity of 
structure and methodology (Wells & Schafer, 2007, p. 4), and an equally bewildering 
absence of research into the efficacy of these expensive tools (Walker, 2006, p.3). The 
vulnerability caused by this research deficit is made perhaps all the more pronounced 
by the growing interest in alternative strategies to achieving reduced misconduct and 
higher standards. These alternative remedies, such as early intervention systems (EIS) 
(Walker, 2006, p. 2) and local complaint resolution and informal resolution systems 
(Porter & Prenzler, 2012, pp. 9-10; De Angelis, 2009, p. 229; De Angelis & Kupchik, 
2007, p. 656), carry a conviction based on research that has challenged the more 
expensive and less scientific oversight agency approach. 
 
It is arguable that the convergence of these themes – the governance dilemma 
and emergence of alternative remedies – present a looming challenge to the 
conceptual foundations of external oversight bodies, as they spread across the 
democratic world. Beneath the question of the best structure and methods for ECO 
agencies lie a host of barely explored or understood issues about the nature and 
purpose of police governance and accountability. It is vital that the present study 
places clear markers on these issues as it navigates a path toward increased 
understanding of the benefits of external citizen oversight of police. 
 
1.2 Forging the question 
An effective system of dealing with complaints against the police has come to be 
recognized as both a benefit to individual complainants and a core component of 
democratic and accountable policing (Smith, 2010, p. 59). Whilst the police in many 
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ways guarantee the protection of fundamental freedoms in liberal democracies, they 
have also shown a potential for abuse of those freedoms (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 
1996, p. 187). Whilst there is agreement that the police should be held to account, 
there is a surprising lack of consensus about how it should be done and to whom the 
police should be held to account (Adams, 2010, p. 234). Much of the dispute centres 
upon the inadequate research evidence to support the claims of those who advocate 
methods and agents that lie entirely beyond the control of the police (Eijkman, 2006, 
p. 426).  
 
The proposition that the only safe and secure route to police accountability is 
through a non-police agency might seem intuitively correct and persuasive; yet 
without firm evidence to support the claim and – perhaps even more importantly – 
consensus about how accountability is achieved, the matter remains far from resolved. 
As Alexander and Burgess (1999, cited by Prenzler and Lewis, 2005, p. 77) point out, 
it is important that oversight agencies are themselves held to account, and can 
demonstrate that they are effective. Whilst the 2008 National Audit Office (NAO) 
review of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) provided a viable 
example of how this might be done, it revealed doubts about the efficacy of the 
IPCC’s proactive recommendations (National Audit Office, 2008, par. 31).  
 
In spite of the inexorable growth of external police oversight agencies in 
countries across the globe, the argument concerning their efficacy - relative to purely 
police-centric systems – remains largely unresolved. It is a point readily and 
regretfully acknowledged by leading proponents of ECO in the literature (Brereton, 
2000, p. 123; Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 95; Walker, 2001, p. 94; Buren, 2007, p. 39) 
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and it has resulted in calls for more research into specific cases. For example, Walker, 
a key advocate of ECO, has encouraged research that might answer the following 
question:  
 
“Are external citizen oversight agencies or procedures associated with 
lower levels of officer misconduct?” (2007, p.21). 
 
The research will seek to critically explore Walker’s (2007, p. 21) question and 
look at a possible approach to an answer. Civilian oversight of police remains 
controversial and the focus of heated debate, in terms of its efficacy in tackling police 
misconduct. During the 1990s and later the debate has become yet more contentious 
as some researchers (Lewis, 1999; Brereton, 2000; Walker, 2001) have argued in 
favour of a ‘holistic’ approach to police oversight, inspired by the Criminal Justice 
Commission in Australia and similar models. The holistic approach combines the 
traditional ‘reactive’ functions (i.e. tackling cases of individual misconduct) with 
‘proactive’ functions designed to promote organisational changes that might reduce 
individual misconduct. These advocates have gone so far as to suggest that policy 
review and change - the preferred proactive function - can achieve police reform and, 
perhaps most importantly, restore public confidence in police organizations that are 
deemed to be unfit for purpose.  
 
It could be argued that the progressive evolution of ECO, from purely reactive 
to proactive, reflects the growth of public awareness of police performance issues – 
particularly in liberal democracies - and its impact on public trust or confidence in the 
police. There is a strong case for the connection between police performance and 
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public confidence and trust (Godfrey, 2007, 495). Yet, for most of the people, most of 
the time in these countries, the police are part of the background fabric of society that 
is largely taken for granted. Points of personal contact with the police are infrequent 
and usually perfunctory transactions in the bureaucracy of crime recording (e.g. 
reporting a theft from a car). Such infrequent contacts rarely generate complaints or 
anything more than modest emotions, for or against the police. Public perceptions of 
the police – whether good or bad – are more often formed by or in response to media 
revelations about more alarming misconduct cases or performance failures, rather than 
the result of personal interaction. Yet, these media-related responses – like those 
induced by personal interaction – generate strong perceptions of the police as either 
trustworthy or not. Public trust or confidence in the police is often shaped by the more 
spectacular failures and episodes of apparent incompetence that Savage calls ‘system 
failures’ (2007, pp. 33, 36). As Reiner adroitly made the point, people only take an 
interest in policing “when the wheel comes off” (2000, p. 9). 
 
Confidence in the police is an important ingredient of political stability, 
whether in the liberal democracies or other societies (Fleming & McLaughlin, 2010, 
p. 200; Goldsmith, 2005, p.449; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 516). A deficit of public 
trust is said to be a common feature in deeply divided, post-conflict and post-
authoritarian societies (Goldsmith, 2005, p. 444). The necessity of public trust links to 
the role and function of police in modern democracies: the police exercise 
extraordinary and inherently offensive powers over ordinary citizens (Waddington, 
1999b, p. 298; Gianakis and Davis, 1998, p. 487). Research has established a link 
between public trust in the police and police effectiveness and the perceived 
legitimacy of police actions (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, p. 522). If the public view the 
police as legitimate (or trustworthy) then public co-operation with the police is more 
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likely, thereby enhancing police effectiveness. Public trust, moreover, is linked to the 
capacity of the police to provide citizens with a sense of security (Goldsmith, 2005, 
p.449). Some argue that the public belief that agents of criminal justice act 
appropriately and justly is pervasive, profound and grounds the sense of legitimacy of 
the police (Tyler 2006, cited by Jackson, 2009, p. 495); moreover, that trust is built at 
the level of individual interaction and based  on relationship, familiarity and 
experience (Audit Commission, 2003). However, public trust is recognised as a 
“complicated and demanding concept to get to grips with” (Fleming & McLaughlin, 
2010, p. 201). In spite of these difficulties, it is well argued that confidence and 
legitimacy allow citizens to engage in law-abiding behaviour, cooperate with police 
initiatives, and more readily accept police tactics (Jackson, 2009, p. 495). Research 
suggests that procedural justice – fair and respectful treatment of citizens – is 
associated with trust in the police and viewing the police as legitimate. Legitimacy, in 
turn, is associated with greater willingness to cooperate with the police and assist in 
preventing and responding to crime, and greater compliance with the law (Myhill & 
Beak, 2008, p. 1).  
 
Bovens (2005, p.192) points out that trust and confidence in the police form 
part of a larger social contract, in which police accountability to the public is not just 
the hallmark of democratic governance, it is also a sine qua non for democratic 
governance. What is meant by the social contract is an agreement between the 
governed and the government in a democracy: trust in the police forms an essential 
part of that agreement. Citizens transfer their sovereignty to political representatives 
who, in turn delegate most of their powers to the thousands of public servants who use 
discretionary powers to execute public policies, impose fines, and lock people up 
(Bovens, 2005, pp. 192-8). There is an implied contract of trust that those powers will 
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be exercised properly and in compliance with law. Thus, the question of police 
oversight and its efficacy must be viewed - from the very outset – within the broader 
context of police governance, and the contingent relationship between public 
confidence (or trust) in the police and police effectiveness. Whilst complex and not 
fully understood, formal accountability mechanisms are recognized as having an 
effect of building or preserving public confidence (Goldsmith, 1991, p. 24; Reiner, 
1991, p.221). Where confidence is lost, it can only be restored if the police are 
answerable for their acts, and act responsively to the concerns of the public at large - 
two important elements of police accountability (Maguire, 1991, pp.178-9). 
 
1.3 Research aim and objectives  
The overall aim of this dissertation is to answer the question of whether external 
citizen oversight (ECO) agencies or their procedures are associated with lower levels 
of police misconduct. In other words, the aim is to examine the extent to which there 
is a causal relationship between the activities of the entities that have the core 
characteristics of ECO in the literature, and instances of improved police performance 
and/or lower levels of police misconduct. The overall aim of the research is not 
approached as a purely academic pursuit, one that is remote and detached from my 
full-time work. On the contrary the object of the study – the Police Inspectorate of 
Kosovo – and the question of its actual and potential role in the reduction of police 
misconduct, lay at the very heart of my work as Programme Manager (Police) with 
EULEX – the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. It is important to 
identify the exact links between the research objectives and the nature of my past and 
present employment with police-related development organizations in Kosovo. 
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The research question is answered by addressing four key objectives that deal 
with specific aspects of the research. These objectives, whilst distinct from each other, 
are not pursued in isolation, as the outcome of each objective interlinks and influences 
subsequent phases of the research strategy. The first objective is to critically examine 
the broader landscape of police governance in the literature, and the competing 
dynamics of accountability within the debate. Theories of ECO have evolved within 
the contentious framework of a much older and largely unresolved discussion about 
how the police should be governed and by whom. It is an important first step to 
identify the main issues of this broader debate in order to fully contextualize what 
follows in the study. 
 
The second objective is to critically evaluate the theories that argue that ECO 
is a means of improving policing standards and reducing misconduct in the literature. 
The growing corpus of literature related to police misconduct and, more specifically, 
the alternative methods of tackling such misconduct will be critically reviewed and 
analysed, with a view to assessing the main issues in the contemporary debate. This 
task will include a critical examination of the links between conceptual models of 
oversight and the evidence to support the claims that are made for them. 
 
The third objective will explore the broader hypothesis that ECO is associated 
with improved performance and/or reduced misconduct, by critically examining the 
Police Inspectorate Kosovo (PIK) as a case study, comparing its legal and political 
framework with the theoretical principles that find consensus in the literature. It will 
also examine the available secondary evidence to support a link between the PIK and 
reduced levels of misconduct and/or improved performance among Kosovo Police 
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employees. In order to extend the PIK case study further, the fourth objective will 
explore the largely unknown patterns of beliefs, attitudes and perceptions
1
 about 
external oversight (i.e. the PIK) among Kosovo Police officers, and evaluate the 
implications for improved police performance and reduced misconduct.  
 
1.4 Significance of the research 
This research represents an important contribution to the wider international literature 
on external citizen oversight (ECO), and provides important insights into the 
oversight performance of Kosovo’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, the PIK, and also the 
quality of police accountability in Kosovo. For these entities the question of the 
efficacy of ECO is not merely academic: the ability of Kosovo’s Government to 
ensure a credible system of police accountability has been central to its ‘conditional 
independence’ (Article 147, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008), 
particularly in relation to the fledgling state’s ability to recognise and defend the 
human rights of all its citizens. Just as the PIK model of oversight exhibits some 
features advocated in the literature, it has also been troubled by similar doubts about 
its efficacy. The findings of this study have assisted the process of diagnosing PIK 
weaknesses and informed the process of developing a more effective system of 
oversight in Kosovo. 
 
Since joining the police in 1987 my career has moved - by an unusual series of 
twists and turns – from operational policing, to police training and, finally, to the 
business of police reform in the former Yugoslavia and the Republic of Albania. Over 
the course of the years my work came to focus increasingly on the police 
                                                 
1 These terms are used in that sense described by Oskamp, & Schultz (2004, p. 9) as a “cognitive component” – i.e. 
ideas and beliefs one has about an object. 
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accountability measures, and the potential role of ECO as a means of achieving police 
reform. At the end of 2005 I was appointed by the OSCE to manage a three-year 
programme to implement the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), an ECO agency 
that combined a traditional ‘reactive’ approach to oversight with more proactive 
methods (Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, 2006f). Since completing the PIK project I 
have worked as a Programme Manager with EULEX – the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo. My EULEX work involved developing and coordinating the 
implementation of jointly agreed projects to develop the capacity of the Kosovo 
Police, in terms of the aims and objectives of EULEX (EULEX, 2009, p. 8 - 9). Two 
of those principal aims are increased accountability and freedom from political 
interference (EULEX, 2009, p. 6). In January 2013 I was appointed as ICITAP
2
 
advisor for police accountability development to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Republic of Albania. 
 
This work has allowed me to continue a process of transformative learning 
through critical reflection, reflective discourse, and action (Mezirow, 2000, p. 24). All 
the EULEX projects were based in the workplace and required KP officers – with the 
assistance of EULEX police advisers - to develop realistic and sustainable solutions to 
organizational weaknesses. My work with EULEX and ICITAP sustained and further 
stimulated my interest in academic study, as well as reinforcing my conviction that I 
am operating as what some policing scholars would describe as a ‘knowledge worker’ 
in the effort to move police reform abroad toward a new work order (Lee, Green, & 
Brennan, 2000, al, p. 117). EULEX represented the largest and most ambitious 
mission of the European Union’s Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP, 
                                                 
2
 International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, US Government 
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formerly the European Security and Defence Policy), and, in a break from the past, it 
gave much greater emphasis to the process of learning from experience rather than 
simply repeating failed strategies in security sector reform (Witney, 2008, p. 49 – 50). 
All this placed me on the edge of an exciting period of development as the CDSP 
began to enter a more global process of transformative learning, based on its practical 
work on the ground in Kosovo.  
 
Although mainstream policing in the English-speaking world has forged 
increasingly fruitful links to university research as a means of developing professional 
knowledge and competence, the same is not true for what Bayley calls “changing the 
police abroad to promote democracy” (2001, p. 75). For some policing scholars, this 
tension between university and profession-oriented perspectives on knowledge 
represents the major theme of professional knowledge and competence (Eraut, 2003, 
p.8). Some writers claim that mainstream policing (in the UK) means that officers 
have become “knowledge brokers” and “expert advisers” (Ericson, 1994, p.152). 
Developing policing abroad has so far fallen into that category of professions that 
have seen little investment in specialist courses (Eraut, 2003, p. 10). The world of 
policing in international development remains impoverished by the piecemeal and 
fragmentary approach adopted, preventing the formation of a cohesive and structured 
corpus of expertise and knowledge. The large international organisations that have 
been involved in this field, by their own admission, have been slow to set in place 
mechanisms whereby they learn from experience - whether at the corporate or group 
or individual level (Bayley, 2001, pp. 6, 44).  
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Why, one might argue, pursue a professional doctorate research project in such 
an uncertain area of endeavour? More to the point, is there a sufficient basis of 
‘professionalism’ in the world of overseas police reform? Clearly the business of 
developing democratic police abroad is on the periphery of mainstream policing and 
represents relatively new terrain in the world of academic research. Yet it is the very 
absence of substantial research in this area that not only justifies but urges the 
proposition that more practitioners in this area consider advanced studies. As 
observed by scholars in policing and police reform, there has been a remarkable 
dearth of literature that reflects upon the experience of reforming (and forming) police 
organisations in post-conflict societies (Deflem, 2002, p. 9; Bayley, 2001, pp. 5-6). 
Moreover, the holistic approach to ECO of police and its link to reduced police 
misconduct and police reform – my specific area of interest - is an area that the 
policing scholars readily acknowledge to be in great need of further research (Luna & 
Walker, 2000, p. 90; Brereton, 2000, p. 119, 123; Walker, 2007, p. 17).  
 
A professional doctorate research project might contribute to resolving what 
some writers have observed as a dislocation of professional education from the real 
problems of practice (Evetts, 2003, p. 397; Schön, 1983, p. 49). Much of the emphasis 
in police capacity-building abroad is what Eraut (2003, p. 52) calls the “what ought to 
be done” environment of the practising professionals. I believe that the present study 
has made a significant contribution to the effort of bridging that gap between 
professional education and the problems of practice. Moreover, it has done so in 
respect of a critical feature of policing in a democratic society.  
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis follows the pattern of the research objectives described 
above. Chapter 2 explores the contemporary debate about police governance in the 
literature, setting out the conceptual parameters of the more focused critique of ECO 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 seeks to clarify the relationship between the more traditional 
dynamics of police governance - and the means by which they govern - and the 
proposed role of holistic oversight. It is argued that police governance can be analysed 
in terms of the interaction of three key dynamics (police independence, local 
governance control, and central governance), propelled by either a ‘subordination and 
control’ approach or, conversely, by an ‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach. This 
analysis reveals the considerable difficulty in some political contexts of securing 
effective local governance.    
 
 Chapter 3 explores the meaning of ECO in the literature, noting the lines of 
convergence toward the idea that such agencies can effectively combine a more 
traditional ‘reactive’ (complaint investigation) role with a more ‘proactive’ (policy 
interventionist) function. This approach, policing scholars argue, can achieve changes 
to the police organization and culture, such as to reduce levels of misconduct and 
improve performance. At the same time the Chapter reveals significant gaps in the 
arguments of advocates: notably, there is a lack of detailed explanation and research 
data regarding the best method whereby ECO agencies can achieve these results.  
 
Chapter 4 confronts the methodological problems of answering the question 
about the link between ECO and improved conduct and standards, and argues for the 
use of the PIK as a case study, using a mixed method approach to explore secondary 
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and primary sources of data. The use of the PIK in a case study presents a rare 
opportunity to test the hypothesis; yet, as in other cases in the literature, it also creates 
substantial challenges in terms of finding causal links between the presence of the 
agency and the impact on the police organization. It is argued that a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods could provide strong indications, for or against 
Walker’s proposition. 
 
Chapter 5 and 6 gather data and provide a detailed analyses in regard to the 
case study, the PIK. Chapter 5 examines its legal and political structures and 
compares them with the theoretical principles proposed by policing scholars in the 
literature. It is found that the PIK exhibits those ECO characteristics advocated in the 
literature, whilst deviating from the preferred autonomy from government 
admistration and policy recommendation role that is based only on complaint and 
complaint investigation data. This Chapter also examines the available secondary 
evidence to support a link between the PIK and reduced levels of misconduct among 
Kosovo Police employees. In purely numerical terms it is found that the PIK has 
successfully investigated a credible propotion of the recorded complaints between 
2008 and 2012, as well as bringing forward numerous recommendations concerning 
KP performance; however, no independent evidence could be found to demonstrate 
that PIK has achieved reduced levels of misconduct or improved KP performance. 
 
Chapter 6 continues to explore the PIK case study by examining the findings 
of the primary data. Information gathered from over 500 questionnaires and 10 semi-
structured interviews is used to explore the patterns of beliefs, attitudes and 
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perceptions
3
 about the PIK among Kosovo Police officers. This important body of 
evidence has demonstrated that the majority of respondents acknowledged positive 
characteristics of the PIK in reducing misconduct and improving performance. 
Although the evidence revealed that majority of officers preferred a police role in 
complaint investigation, there is nevertheless recognition of the value of a fully 
independent and civilian agency in complaint investigation. Moreover, the study 
pointed to the need for further investigation of police perceptions, with more emphasis 
on exploring beliefs about fairness and methodology. 
 
In Chapter 7 the study moves to a critical analysis of the various data drawn 
from the case study, evaluating the implications for improved policing standards and 
reducing misconduct. It extends the findings of other researchers, pointing to the 
potential benefits of further research into police perceptions, albeit with a shift in 
emphasis toward beliefs about fairness and process. It also discusses the implications 
of emerging research about the nature of police misconduct and alternatives to the 
ECO proactive approach that might be more cost effective.  
                                                 
3 These terms are used in that sense described by Oskamp, & Schultz (2004, p. 9) as a “cognitive 
component” – i.e. ideas and beliefs one has about an object. 
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Chapter Two 
Patterns of police governance 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The deceptively simple question of who should hold the police to account (Quis 
custodiet ipsos custodies
4
) has triggered an extensive debate in the literature that, 
whilst creative in conceptual models and theory, has arguably failed to substantiate 
the proposed solutions of the policing scholars with sufficient research evidence. In its 
most basic terms, the debate has evolved from: (a) the intuitively attractive claim that 
complaints against police are better dealt with by a largely non-police group; to (b) 
the less intuitively reassuring proposal that the same (or similar) non-police group 
could tackle the underlying causes of police misconduct; to (c) the arguably non-
intuitive claim that the only satisfactory way of dealing with police misconduct is 
through a combination of (a) and (b). After 1995 advocates of (c) began to suggest 
that such an agency could go beyond police officers and ensure the accountability of 
all public sector employees in a given geographical area.   
 
In fairness to the advocates of proposal (c), this particular social terrain is both 
difficult and dangerous for any exponent of traditional research-based theory. Whilst 
(a) might seem intuitively correct, any attempt at proving the point runs up against 
apparently insuperable barriers to quantitative research: how does one demonstrate – 
                                                 
4
 The dictum of Roman poet Juvenal, Satire VI lines 347 - 8, is normally translated as ‘Who will guard 
the guards themselves?’ and is applied to the contemporary debate about is best placed to resolve 
complaints against police officers. 
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in numerical terms - that a non-police group is more effective in dealing with 
complaints than a police group? Propositions (b) and (c) seem to be even further 
beyond the scope of quantifiable evidence. Yet none would deny the importance of 
the debate: police accountability is a matter of great public interest and it warrants 
greater investment from the academic community and stakeholders. Moreover, it links 
to the complex issue of public participation as a key component of accountability, as 
echoed in Arnstein’s (1969) provocative and still relevant article. To that end, the 
present Chapter will critically examine the wider landscape of the police governance 
debate in the literature, with a view to exploring the critical themes that link to the 
success or failure of civilian oversight agencies.  
 
External civilian oversight (ECO) is a subset of a much broader yet arguably 
less frequent debate about police governance. As will be discussed in the next 
Chapter, civilian oversight evolved from a narrow concern to ensure that instances of 
individual misconduct are properly resolved, and progressed to a much broader 
ambition of tackling the causes of misconduct, and systemic incompetence and poor 
performance. This progression mirrored the shifting concern in some societies, from 
allegations that cases of serious misconduct were not properly investigated or 
resolved, to revelations of gross incompetence and failures to act. This pattern is 
tracked by Savage (2007) and other authors who would argue that police governance 
has tended to be shaped, perhaps unevenly, in response to these public concerns. Prior 
to exploring this pattern of police governance and others in the literature, it is 
important to clarify what is meant by the terms ‘police’ and ‘misconduct’. 
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The current study will set aside the otherwise legitimate and laudable debate 
about how the rapid evolution of private policing (see, for example, Stenning, 2009, 
pp. 23-25) has not been adequately reflected in the arguably more lethargic 
development of governance and accountability mechanisms. Whilst the existence of 
newly emerging, dispersed, inter-organizational policing networks is beyond dispute 
(Newburn, 2008b, p. 827), it is argued here that there remains a specificity of public 
policing as an organized social practice and a strong residual sense of the state as a 
significant instrument of its governance (Loader, 2000, p. 330). Public police is used 
to mean state policing – done in the public (rather than private) interest and 
employing state use of force to preserve the peace (Johnston & Shearing, 2003, p. 58; 
Shearing, 1992, pp. 406, 408). This study will, therefore, focus exclusively on the 
debate that concerns ‘public policing’ and ignore the broader and more complex 
debate about governance across the full range of policing, private and public.  
 
It seems that there has been a traditional reluctance - even in liberal 
democracies - to allege that the police, on occasion, act incompetently. Complaints 
tended to be about misconduct rather than omissions or malfeasance, a fact that was 
perhaps reinforced by laws that only concerned ‘discipline offences’. However, some 
authors have questioned the narrow focus of the meaning of police misconduct. 
Lustgarten points to the inadequacy of the traditional characterization of police 
misconduct as “negative, individualistic and orientated toward sanctions” (1986, p. 
127). He argues strongly that the traditional approach gave insufficient attention to the 
organizational context that might have stimulated misconduct, and consequently did 
nothing about “changing ethos and working atmosphere, career rewards and 
disincentives” (Lustgarten, 1986, p. 127).  
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The 1980s saw a growing awareness of a broader, organizational dimension to 
police misconduct: Shearing (1981) talked of the concept of ‘organizational police 
deviance’; and Reiner referred to an “operative police subculture” (2010, p.210). In 
his review of various accountability mechanisms in the pre-2012 era of Police and 
Crime Commissioners, Lustgarten found that they could not reach “organizational 
policies or structures which in some instances may stimulate or sustain misconduct” 
(1986, p. 159). These developments have led some policing scholars to call into 
question the received ways of thinking about policing and its governance (Loader, 
2000, p. 324). This Chapter will, therefore, look at the way in which the emergent 
concern with police ‘misconduct and incompetence’ has shaped much of the argument 
about police governance in the literature. First, however, there is a need to impose 
some conceptual order on a seemingly ‘messy’ debate. 
 
2.2 Grappling the slippery snake 
Governance is recognised as a deceptively slippery term. The literature of governance 
reveals a confusing range of meanings (Lynn et al., 2000, p. 234; O’Toole 2000, p. 
276), and an eclectic and relatively theorized concept (Jessop, 1995, cited by Stoker, 
1997, p. 35). Some researchers have concluded that there are almost as many ideas of 
governance as there are researchers in the field (Björk & Johansson, 2000, p. 1). The 
term is often used to mean ‘governing’, or exercising power or authority over others - 
the process aspect of government (Mayntz, 2003, p. 27). Moreover, it is said that good 
governance for many western politicians means a legitimate and democratically 
elected government modelled on liberal democratic lines (Stoker, 1997, p. 36). Yet 
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when this general concept is applied to the contentious business of policing it ceases 
to be straight forward.  
 
As will be discussed in this chapter, the meaning of governance in the context 
of policing has come to take on a determinedly political nuance. It is largely an 
argument about political control. It is about deciding the degree of control that is 
necessary; it is a matter of deciding who exercises control; and it is a question of who 
is represented by the one that exercises power over the police. The effort to evaluate 
the arguments about these vexed questions seems akin to grappling with a slippery 
snake. In an effort to manage the information and weigh the arguments, it will be 
helpful to place the various advocates and their points of view within a conceptual 
framework that will help the process of analysis and evaluation. An appraisal of the 
various arguments might be facilitated by focusing on a framework that highlights the 
key conceptual features of police governance, their inter-relationship and the way they 
evolve.  
 
Such a framework is offered by organizational change theorists. If it is 
accepted that the police governance and accountability debate is arguably about the 
control of police organizations (Sanders, 1993, p. 106; Lewis, 1999, p. 13; Reiner, 
2000, p.169) – in the sense of having the authority, means and will to potentially 
change them – then it might be usefully interpreted through the language of 
organizational change. The policing scholars in the governance literature are 
essentially building arguments in favour of particular theories about the most 
appropriate and justifiable agents and methods of influencing change in police 
organizations and police activities.  
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 33 
 
Organizational change scholars offer a potentially useful conceptual model, 
one that offers a framework of understanding the dynamics of planned change 
(governance) and the forces of unplanned change that threaten to undermine 
governance. Figure 2.1 is based on a chart by Senior (2002, p.27) and provides a 
visual depiction of the various external and internal forces that interact in 
organizational change. According to Senior (2002, p. 5) organizations can be best 
understood as ‘systems’ that evolve and change in response to factors in their external 
and internal environments. It is argued that organizations change in a symbiotic 
relationship with their environments (Senior, 2002, p. 16). Such change can either 
occur in an unplanned and almost unconscious manner, or as a result of a conscious 
effort to react to governance or other environmental forces (Burnes, 2004, pp. 291-2, 
& 267-8). It is arguable that an important feature of police governance and 
accountability is concerned with the latter type of change – planned change. In other 
words, governance and accountability can include a requirement to change and reform 
structures and behaviours. This type of change – particularly in a large police 
organization – is complex in terms of process and predictability of outcomes.  
 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, there are a number of forces or dynamics that 
operate upon and influence a police organization, for better or for worse. Changes in 
its external and the internal environments can be occasionally dramatic and explosive, 
but they are more often small and almost imperceptible changes that have a long-term 
impact. Those forces that operate in the external environment are perhaps the more 
obvious agents of change in a police organization and, amongst the most obvious, are 
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the politico-legal forces. These will be the main focus of the Chapter, as it critically 
assesses the police governance debate in the literature. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Environmental influences on the police organization 
(Based on a chart published by Senior, 2002, p. 27) 
 
Equally important to that debate – although poorly addressed in the literature – 
are the forces that operate within a large police organization and either facilitate or 
defeat the external forces of governance. The scholars identify internal forces as being 
clustered into two distinct subsystems: the formal and the informal (Burnes, 2004, pp. 
264-5; Senior, 2002, p. 4-5). The former subsystem consists of the more obvious and 
‘visible’ elements of an organization: organizational goals, structure, core operations, 
strategy and management. Management is the formal decision making, coordination 
and control element that can be found in all organizations, whether public or private 
sector, and whether it is spread throughout the organization or focussed on just a few 
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means of achieving goals through operational activities (e.g. the provision of services 
or the manufacture of goods).  
 
Whilst elements in the formal subsystem are essential features of any 
organization - providing structure, direction and purpose to its activities - there is 
much more to organizations than these formal elements. Within the tangible and more 
visible elements there is always a 'shadow system' (Stacey, 2000) that contains 
equally important yet more intangible and less predictable elements in the life of an 
organization. These elements include values and norms, power and influence, 
leadership and patterns of communication (Nadler, 1988; Nadler & Tushman, 1988). 
The degree of influence that these elements have varies from place to place, but in all 
cases they are sufficiently potent to command recognition in an analysis of police 
governance. Scholars point to the problems associated with not fully recognizing the 
distinction between the formal and informal cultures of a police organization in a 
reform programme (Coliandris, Rogers & Gravelle, 2011, p. 206-7). These 
subsystems and the elements they contain are not static and unchanging. Although 
they must remain relatively stable if the organization is to continue to exist, there is a 
constant and dynamic interaction of subsystems over time. This interaction has a 
direct and important influence on the organization’s activities and outputs. 
 
What occurs in the process of governance (as organizational change), 
therefore, is a dialectic of forces or dynamics, reacting with each other, resolving into 
a changed organization or way of delivering police functions. As in Fichte’s 
philosophical dialectic, the process is one of interaction between thesis (police 
organization), antithesis (external forces of governance, internal forces), and final 
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synthesis (changed organization) (Fichte, 2010, pp. 113-4). As applied to the present 
study, the literature search will be characterized by an effort to analyse the dialectic 
that of the three main police governance forces or dynamics: i.e. local government 
dynamic; central government dynamic; and police independence dynamic. Each 
dynamic will be explored in terms of what advocates explicitly or impliedly claim for 
its specific “world view”: i.e. those abstract beliefs that shape the values, attitudes, 
perceptions, and behaviour associated with the preferred approach to police 
governance (i.e. purpose, policy, priorities, procedures, and structures) (Levy & 
Merry, 1986, p.10).  
 
First, however, it is important to briefly consider that external force or 
dynamic that operates alongside political forces in a police organization’s external 
environment: legal accountability. This force, closely related to political control, has a 
significant role to play in controlling and changing many police organization’s in 
liberal democracies. 
 
2.3 Governance and legal accountability 
A recognised feature of governance – in the sense of exercising control – is the power 
to hold to account. Like its parent concept, governance, the term accountability has a 
many-layered significance, as applied to police organizations and other public sector 
entities. For example, Schedler identifies no less than seven types of accountability, 
five of which are relevant to the police: political accountability (concerning policies 
and policymaking processes); administrative accountability (concerning the 
expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts); professional 
accountability (concerning ethical standards); financial accountability  (concerning 
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use of public money by state officials); and legal accountability (monitoring the 
observance of legal rules (1999, p. 22). These categories overlap with the five types 
listed in the Patten Report: legal accountability, by which the police are held to 
account if they misuse their powers; financial accountability, by which the police are 
held to account for value for public money; internal accountability, by which officers 
are accountable within a police organization; transparency, by which the community 
is kept informed; and democratic accountability, by which the elected representatives 
of the community tell the police what sort of service they want (Patten, 1999, para. 
5.4).  
 
It is arguable that the last two categories in Patten’s list (i.e. transparency and 
democratic accountability) form part of a single whole that equates to Schedler’s 
political accountability: the authority of elected officials to seek to influence policing 
policy and hold senior officers and their organization to account for what has been 
done or failed to be done. Much of the parameters of what should be done and not 
done by the police are determined by the law, and there are strong areas of overlap 
between compliance with the law and the function of political accountability. At the 
heart of legal accountability stands the principle that the police are subordinate to the 
law, just as other citizens are subordinate to the law, and “there should be robust 
arrangements to ensure that this is so, and seen to be so” (Patten, 1999, para. 5.3). The 
relationship between law and policing has become central to the very idea of 
democratic accountability: the creation and regulation of police powers evolved into a 
distinctive means of police governance in the last three decades of the 20
th
 century 
(Dixon, 2004, p. 617). In the English-speaking democracies this development has 
taken the form of statutory regulation of police powers and case law pertaining to civil 
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litigation, with the result that routine policing in England and Wales has “become 
substantially more accountable to legal rules” (Jones, 2008, p. 714).  
 
Other policing scholars, however, paint a deeply gloomy picture of police 
excess in their abuse of powers and the impotence of laws and complaint systems to 
control it (Sanders and Young, 2008, p. 303). Indeed, the same authors – in spite of 
their initial admission that the extent of police abuse of legal powers is not known - 
conclude that there are no effective remedies for police abuse of powers and that the 
police are a law unto themselves (2008, pp. 301 & 304). Dixon is dismissive of this 
“persistent concentration on failures and misconduct” as a distraction from the 
positive impact of the development of police governance through the authorizing and 
regulating of police powers (2004, p. 617). It is self-evident that the presence of 
regulation – as a proactive means of imposing constraint and control, as well as a 
reactive means of legal remedy – is preferable to an absence of such regulation. 
Moreover, the occurrence of misconduct and abuse of powers in such a heavily 
regulated police world calls for more research to fill the lacuna that Sanders and 
Young acknowledge (2008, p. 301). 
 
Whilst legal accountability is identified as an increasingly potent dynamic in 
the external environment of many police organizations – one that demands more 
extensive research – this study must move to the more controversial role of 
governance per se. This Chapter will now move to its objective of making a critical 
evaluation of the police governance debate in the literature. 
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2.4 Police governance dialectic 
As pointed out by Loader, police organizations present a unique paradox in modern 
democracies as both guarantors of the security upon which the exercise of liberty 
depends, and a potent, ever-present threat to those same liberties (2000, p. 325). This 
may in part explain the sentiment among some authors that there are “demonstrable 
inadequacies” in the current arrangements for the governance of the police (Loveday, 
2000, p. 229). A critical review of the literature reveals that those inadequacies are the 
product of a range of governance systems that rely upon one or more distinct but 
overlapping dynamics: (a) locally elected government; (b) centrally elected 
government; (c) police independence (or self-governance). Each of these dynamics or 
forces will be explored, as well as the dynamic process of interaction that is depicted 
in Figure 2.2.  
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What follows will be a search for an answer to those two key questions posed 
by Waddington: “To what kind of body should the police be responsible? For what 
range of decision-making should such a body have responsibility?” (1999a, p. 195). 
 
Local governance dynamic. In certain areas of the world - particularly North 
America, England and Wales – there is a long-standing primacy of local government 
as a provider of policing services. Although in England and Wales that primacy has 
been diminished with the emergence of other governance dynamics since World War 
II (Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 32), it remains a potentially potent source of 
police governance. Some argue it is firmly based on a fundamental principle of a 
democratic system of government (Waddington, 1999a, p. 184). It was in the early 
part of the 19
th
 century that modern ‘public’ policing emerged under the exclusive 
control of locally elected authorities (outside London).  The Municipal Corporations 
Act, 1835, brought ratepayer democracy to the several hundred self-governing towns 
of England and Wales and each newly-elected council selected a watch committee 
with complete power over the activities and composition of their police forces 
(Williams, 2003, p. 2). By the end of the same decade counties were given power to 
introduce police forces, each controlled by a police authority that was comprised of a 
bench of magistrates.  
 
There is evidence that the local authorities in the early decades could exercise 
an extensive authority to direct policing policy and practice. Williams (2003, p. 2) 
refers to an interesting example in which the Watch Committee for Liverpool City 
Council in 1890 ordered the Chief Constable to close brothels in the city, after he had 
earlier refused on the grounds that such a measure would displace the problem into 
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other areas and make policing the problem worse. This approach - which Marshall 
would call ‘subordination and control’ (2005, p. 633) – would be depicted in Figure 
2.2 as the local dynamic heavily eclipsing the independence dynamic in an upward 
motion. However, this early development was not to last: the increase of the central 
and independence dynamics eroded this early confidence. 
 
 The evidence suggests that the local dynamic had been fragmented and in a 
tense relationship with the central dynamic prior to the 1964 Police Act (Jones, 2008, 
p. 697) brought the hope of a carefully crafted interplay of checks and balances 
between three competing but equally legitimate sources of governance - local 
authority, chief constable, and Home Office (Lustgarten, 1986, p. 113) in forces other 
than the Metropolitan Police. What was envisaged was a balanced interaction of the 
three spheres in Figure 2.2, combining the two approaches to control over police 
independence. Although the so-called ‘tripartite system’ had a persuasive logic and 
pragmatic allure, observers have noted the “progressive neutering” of the local 
dynamic (Godfrey, 2007, p. 496), and its tendency toward non-intervention 
(Newburn, 2008a, p. 110; Lustgarten, 1986, p. 181). It is a moot point, however, 
whether that decline was the result of losing ground to the other, more aggressive 
dynamics, or a failure to exploit the statutory power to actively govern the police.  
 
In England and Wales the reality of the local dynamic appears to have been 
quite different in the post-1964 era. Here a noted weakness of the local dynamic is 
that there was “little possibility of policy direction, performance monitoring and 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by local authority” (Lustgarten, 1986, p. 181). This 
fact is, according to some researchers, illustrated by the failure of locally elected 
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representatives to remove a single chief constable from his/her post since the World 
War II (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 196; Jones. & Newburn, 2007, p. 156). By 
2000 researchers had found that the Home Office (rather than HMIC/Audit 
Commission or local authority) was mainly responsible for determining policy 
(Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 44). Unlike their American counterparts, these 
local authorities have tended to be passive and hesitant, rather than acting on their 
potential to influence policing as a political key to election success. As Loveday 
(2000, p. 229) sagely records, local police authorities have proved unable to fulfil the 
political role that has been traditionally ascribed to them. It is tempting to suggest that 
the disappointing history of the local dynamic is the result of uncertainty about its 
underlying ‘world view’. What would the local governance dynamic look like if it 
was properly implemented in contemporary ‘public’ policing? As indicated in Figure 
2.2, policing scholars tend to gravitate toward either a soft, ‘explanatory and co-
operative’ approach (i.e. reducing the eclipse with police independence), or a more 
strong, ‘subordinate and obedient’ approach (Marshall, 2005, p. 633).  
 
In spite of its chequered history, the ‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach 
attracts wide support: it creates the possibility of policing styles and strategies based 
on community consultation. Some proponents suggest that this vision of the local 
dynamic offers a potentially attractive advantage of empowering the link between the 
providers of policing services and their intended customer – the local communities 
(Neyroud, 2008, p. 679; Tilley, 2008, pp. 373-4). It seems intuitively correct to assert 
the right of a paying customer to influence, if not dictate, the decisions about service 
delivery. Yet the police form part of a broader criminal justice system that has a 
customer base that is far from homogenous or unified in its views about policing. The 
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vision of police/community interplay – a vital aspect of this ‘world view’ of local 
dynamic advocates - has run up against difficulties in the business of measuring 
success. Some research in England suggests that police-community consultation (as 
envisaged by the legislation of the late 1980s) had apparently failed, due to a complex 
web of causal factors that resisted efforts to identify clear determinants (Savage, 
Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 46; Waddington, 1999a, p.84). This has led some to 
conclude that consultation does not necessarily amount to accountability (Bowling, 
Parmar, & Phillips, 2008 p. 629). 
 
Getting together groups of people at a local level to discuss policing policy is 
often an uphill struggle. Some researchers have questioned the assumption that there 
is such thing as a single, homogenous ‘community’ that can be readily consulted 
(Waddington, 1999a, p. 222; Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 195). The reality, 
particularly in urban areas, is quite different and it has to be realised that very 
different types of arrangements need to be negotiated, locally, for different areas and 
groups – some areas might set up participative mechanisms and others may not see 
the need for such mechanisms (idem). This problem is further compounded by a 
pervasive apathy or indifference to policing issues (Docking, 2003, p. 6), unless and 
until a crisis event occurs that calls into question police competence or discipline 
(Savage, 2007, pp. 12-14). Most of the time the issues are not salient enough to 
stimulate a continuing concern and commitment among a large number of people 
(Jones, et al, 1996, p. 193). As Reiner notes, often there is only an interest in policing 
“when the wheel comes off” (1992, p.4). This observation is echoed in the research 
findings that track patterns of police reform initiatives triggered by ‘system failures’ 
(Savage, 2007, pp. 12-4; Punch, 2003, p. 173): public interest must be stirred by an 
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event or events to the point of outrage before there is sufficient impetus to effect 
changes to the way the police operate. Moreover, what is voiced may prove to be a 
‘public appetite’ for toughness in policing and a law and order agenda that 
marginalizes minority groups (Waddington, 1999a, pp. 199-200).  
 
Perhaps because of its apparent failure in some political contexts, other 
authors reject the ‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach and advocate a shift 
towards the early days of local authority governance (Reiner, 1993, p.16; Reiner, 
2000, p.183; Godfrey, 2007, p.498). It is argued that the case for bringing the police 
firmly under the control of elected representatives is most compelling because of the 
police function as “custodians of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force” 
(Waddington, 1999a, p. 185). Jones, Newburn & Smith (1996, p. 190) discuss a 
number of democratic criteria (or values) for police governance and argue that 
‘redress’ is the strongest value in the theory of democracy as a competition between 
elite groupings. Redress means that the electorate has the ultimate sanction of removal 
of an incompetent or malevolent administration from office, and this means - by 
extension – that it should be possible to remove an incompetent or malevolent police 
management (Jones et al, 1996, p. 192). It would also mean that, if certain groups are 
unfairly targeted by policing policies, it should also be possible for those groups to 
have the policy reversed. All this accords with the ‘subordinate and obedient’ 
approach, which is clearly articulated in Reiner’s call for police control by locally 
elected officials (1993, p. 18; Sanders, 1993, p. 106; Lewis, 1999, p. 13; Reiner, 2000, 
p.169). This is the preferred approach in many jurisdictions across the USA, where 
police are subordinate to the local mayor and dependent upon him or her for 
employment (Waddington, 1999a, p. 189). 
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Some scholars have argued, however, that even if the police were brought 
under close control by elected representatives, this would not guarantee ‘democratic 
policing’ (Jones et al, 1996, p. 189) – experience suggests a real danger that it might 
harness support of a respectable majority for the oppressive policing of marginal 
groups (Waddington, 1999a, p.40-1). Evidence from the USA suggests that the 
policing policies of local government officials often work to satisfy the demands of 
the majority of voters (Jones & Newburn, 2007, p. 155; Waddington, 1999a, p. 198), 
and this often translates into crudely crafted and blunt ‘law and order’ policies, and 
overly simplistic remedies to complex social problems. An appetite developed among 
British police and politicians for importing some of the more controversial of such 
American policies (e.g. ‘Broken Windows’, ‘Zero Tolerance Policing’) and which 
Savage acerbically dubs “importing intolerance” (2007, pp. 60-7). As Pakes reports 
on the Australian context, the results can have damaging consequences for community 
relations in mixed neighbourhoods, creating an image of the public police as 
protectors of majority interests and often – ironically – failing to deliver the promised 
crime free society (2010, p. 54). Although political issues are generally resolved in 
partisan terms in liberal democracies, this would be inappropriate if applied to the 
police (Waddington, 1999a, p. 186). Traditional approaches to the local dynamic 
appear to have failed to overcome the complexities of contemporary urban 
populations, and some conclude that democracy should not be reduced to electoral 
control (Jones, 2008, p. 717). 
 
In spite of these difficulties, various efforts have been made and continue to be 
made to bring about a renaissance of the local dynamic. In the early 1980s, the Labour 
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MP Jack Straw introduced a private member’s bill designed to make police authorities 
entirely elected bodies, and give them enhanced powers over the framing of local 
policing policies. Similar reform measures were proposed in the later Labour 
campaign for criminal justice (Downes & Ward, 1986) and the recommendations of 
the institute of public policy research (Reiner & Spencer, 1993). The impetus for these 
proposals was a belief in the value and importance of local democracy and concerns 
about the limited democratic properties of the post-1964 system. The argument, 
however, appeared to lack detail about how this alternative would work in practice. 
There was talk of democracy flowing primarily from the fact of election, of the need 
for responsiveness to community expectations and the aspiration toward effective 
service delivery. Yet it was not made clear exactly how this might be achieved in 
practice.  
 
In England and Wales hopes of improvement were promised with the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act, which – it was claimed – would deliver “police 
forces that have greater freedom from Ministerial control…[and] much more 
accountable to the public they serve” (HM Government, 2010, cited by Bridges, 2011, 
p. 34; Coliandris, Rogers & Gravelle, 2011, p. 203). The Act echoes ideas that were 
first proposed by Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984, pp. 170-6): i.e. setting up of ‘police 
commissions’ that would be directly elected as such and would be able to issue 
instructions to local police chiefs on matters of policy (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 
1996, p. 189). The directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCComms) 
have a range of powers: setting out policing objectives for their areas, actively 
consulting the ‘people of the area’ and ‘victims of crime’ and, most crucially, 
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appointing Chief Constables, suspending them and requiring them to resign and retire 
(Maillard & Savage, 2012, pp. 372; Bridges, 2011, p. 34).  
 
There are parallels here with the favoured approach throughout the USA 
(Waddington, 1999a, p. 189), yet no indications of how the problems inherent in such 
a strong local dynamic might be overcome. Some counter the US import charge, 
arguing that there are many models of US police accountability and “none of them 
quite like Britain’s new one” (White, 2012). The Act envisages a system similar to 
Loader’s “policing commissions” and thereby raises the conundrum as to how they 
might “elicit and take account of the views of all individuals and social groups likely 
to be affected by their decisions” (2000, p. 337). As in the USA, the problem consists 
of striking a balance of majority and minority interests that, all too often, are not the 
same or are opposed. That means ensuring that all citizens are provided with a ‘fair’ 
share of available policing resources (Loader. 2000, p. 338). 
 
Police independence dynamic. Research in the literature suggests that the dynamic 
interplay depicted in Figure 2.2 involves the two outer spheres eclipsing (or retreating 
from) the more static central sphere of police independence. In other words, unless 
and until one or both of the other dynamics actively circumscribe or limit, or overtly 
direct police decision-making, the independence dynamic will automatically 
dominate. If we set aside those limitations imposed by law, the literature suggests that 
police decision-making ought to either reflect the expectations of citizens or result 
from the overt direction of their elected representatives. However, it is arguable that 
the considerable practical problems encountered by these propositions continue to 
strengthen the independence dynamic. This argument will be explored in more detail. 
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The doctrine of constabulary independence has become, over time, a 
distinctive constitutional feature of British policing (Waddington, 1999a, pp. 186–8; 
Jones & Newburn, 2007, p. 156). From the earliest days of municipal police forces in 
England and Wales, chief constables had significant power within the frame of local 
authority. As pointed out by Emsley (2008, p. 76), the early police committees 
appointed chief constables, who then ran the county force as they saw fit; they were 
far more independent than their borough counterparts. Although circumscribed by 
central government policies and budget allocations, police chiefs continued to 
exercise significant discretion in their decision-making about the focus, priorities and 
style of policing. Many would argue that even with the advent of the Police Act 1964, 
and the proposed checks and balances of the tripartite system, the independence – if 
not autonomy - of police decision-making remained extensive (Reiner, 1993, p. 18; 
Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 188; Oliver, 1997, p. 81). This was perhaps 
facilitated by the way the Act failed to resolve the ambiguous constitutional position 
of the police (Jones, 2008, p. 697; Waddington, 1999a, p. 187). Arguably it was the 
unrealized ambition of dynamic and proactive local authorities in the decades that 
followed the 1964 Act that fortified and emboldened what some researchers came to 
caricature as the “sacred cow of constabulary independence” (Savage, Charman, & 
Cope, 2000, p.50).  
 
Writing in the mid-1980s, Lustgarten (1986, p. 20) argued contentiously that 
the police - at that time - believed that ‘independence’ meant not being under the 
ultimate control of democratically elected representatives of the public. In other 
words, that no “political body” had the power to direct or command those in charge of 
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a police organization to adopt or reject a particular policy or practice, and that 
ultimate responsibility for policing should rest with the chief constable (Lustgarten, 
1986, p. 32). The idea of police independence as freedom from local political 
interference is   echoed by other scholars (John, Lewis, Read, & Rogers, 2011, p. 88). 
Over time the argument for the necessity of individual discretion in exercising police 
powers – elevated by decided cases - came to be extended to the broader sweep of 
operational decision-making, with all its latent policies and political implications 
(Dupont, 2003, p. 45). Yet how could this apparent inversion of Robert Peel’s 
principle of democratic policing (“the police are the people…”) have occurred? Was it 
a case of chief constables overtly resisting the effort of the other spheres in Figure 2.2, 
or simply getting on with the business of policing in the absence of policy guidance 
from the central or local dynamics? Although it is impossible to generalize about the 
attitudes of chief constables, there seems to be evidence that the independence 
dynamic flourished in the vacuum of a weak local dynamic. However, the central 
dynamic appears to have been a more potent source of governance. 
 
Some important policing scholars argue that most policing decisions are 
‘political’, in the sense of decisions that entail judgments about moral values, 
favouring some interests over others, and investing limited resources in certain areas 
rather than others (Lustgarten, 1986, p.20; Reiner, 2000, p. 8-9). This allows 
Waddington (1999a, p. 195) to beg the question: if war is too important to be left to 
the generals, then so too is policing too important to be left to police officers.  
 
Central government dynamic. In its most extreme form, the central government 
dynamic is the much-favoured and traditional approach of many eastern European and 
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former communist countries, often characterized by a general deficit of government 
accountability (Goldsmith, 2005, p. 449). Since this is the socio-political context of 
the Kosovo Police, the case study that will provide empirical data for the present 
study, it is important to consider the implications of the eastern European tradition of 
police governance. As observed in the Republic of Serbia (former Yugoslavia) 
(Downes, 2004, pp. 22-3) and countries of the former Soviet Union (Shelley, 1996, 
pp. 3-18) there has been a strong tradition of placing the police firmly under the direct 
control of the central government administration, where the parent Ministry (of 
Internal Affairs) and the police organization are coalesced and combined into a single 
entity. In this way, the distinction between the political realm and the operational 
policing realm is entirely blurred by a state-centric model that relies upon what 
Marshall terms the ‘subordination and control’ approach (2005, p. 634). Even in 
liberal democracies an overly powerful central dynamic can result in a corrupting 
influence on policing and policing policies (Waddington, 1999a, p. 196; Fitzgerald 
Report, 1989). 
 
 As visually represented in Figure 2.2, the above scenario would involve the 
central governance sphere fully eclipsing the police independence sphere, and the 
complete absence of the local governance sphere. At the opposite end of the scale in 
the central government dynamic stands what some suggest is the system that operates 
in England and Wales: the ‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach. As Marshall 
explains, the Home Secretary’s response to Parliament for policing throughout the 
country “is one that rests not on an ability to issue orders but on a capacity to require 
information, answers and reasons that can then be analysed and debated in Parliament 
and in the press (2005, p. 633). This model, in many ways the opposite of 
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‘subordination and control’, seeks to govern through ‘explanatory accountability’: a 
system that has no power to bind or reverse executive decisions, but rather provides 
“an avenue for challenge, for requiring a reasoned explanation and for advice and 
recommendation” (Marshall, 2005, p. 634). This would be depicted in Figure 2.2 as 
only a partial eclipse of the police independence sphere by central governance, and 
would not necessarily exclude the local governance sphere. 
 
The literature reveals a pattern of gradual growth of the central dynamic after 
the 1964 Act, increasing “its grip” over time and reaching a peak in the late 1990s 
(Newburn, 2008a, p. 102; Reiner, 2000, p. 194; Waddington, 1999a, p. 187). There 
are two aspects of this growth: the promotion of New Public Management policies by 
central government, and the proliferation of statutory provisions in response to system 
failures and related public enquiries. This development has been largely at the 
expense of the independence dynamic and the already weak local dynamic (Savage, 
2007, p. 191). Much has been said in relation to the emergence of the New Public 
Management phenomenon in policing in the 1990s, across Europe and beyond (de 
Maillard & Savage, 2012, pp. 365-77; Jones, 2008, p. 715; Savage, 2007, pp. 107-10; 
Rowe, 2007, p.280). Since the early 1980s the reform of police services has been part 
of a broad phenomenon that has engulfed the majority of public services in the 
western world (Dupont, 2003, p. 43). Accountability became a matter of measuring 
efficiency and effectiveness, with the result that the “principles of democracy and 
equity are slowly absorbed by market considerations” (Dupont, 2003, p. 44; Savage, 
2007, p. 149; Loader, 2000, p. 324; Reiner, 1993, p. 10), and, as a result, the police 
focus emphasized “national targets rather than local priorities” (Jones, 2008, p. 709). 
De Maillard and Savage identify an uneasy fit of the centralizing performance 
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management trend with the traditionally ‘local’ ethos of British policing, diminishing 
local variation and discretion (2012, p. 370). 
 
Although de Maillard and Savage’s comparative study of the impact of the 
performance management in France and Britain would caution against easy 
generalizations across nations, they are agreed on its centralizing effect on police 
governance in England (2012, p. 380). In 2010, however, the coalition 
(Conservative/Liberal Democrat) government announced an intention to shift the 
emphasis away from the central dynamic and toward a new interpretation of the local 
dynamic. It announced “the transfer of power away from government”, the abolition 
of central targets, and the introduction of “directly elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners (Great Britain. Home Office, 2010, p.3). The latter replace police 
authorities, set policing priorities, represent local community views, and appoint, hold 
to account and dismiss chief constables (Great Britain. Home Office, 2010, p.11).  
When first proposed these reforms to police governance met with vigorous opposition 
from senior police officers and the Association of Police Authorities, whose members 
warned of policing being driven by “politically motivated agenda” (Townsend, 
Doward, & Helm, 2010). Although some senior police officers voiced opposition, the 
original reform statement promised that chief constables would have “greater 
professional freedom to take operational decisions” (Great Britain. Home Office, 
2010, p.12). Perhaps the most potent criticism of the reform proposal was made by a 
US attorney with direct experience of a similar scheme in New York: she warned of 
an increased risk of corruption when the police are placed “directly under the control 
of an elected politician” (Townsend, 2011). The argument was not against localism 
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per se, but against the inherent dangers of focussing such authority in the hands of a 
locally elected individual. 
 
Voices in the media have sounded concern with the new brand of local 
governance, pointing out that greater local control in London has been accompanied 
by politicians (of all persuasions) reducing accountability to collated statistics, and 
competing in calls to provide the police with “more money, more staff, more powers 
and more weaponry” (Wood, The Guardian, 2012). In the background of this debate 
lies a perennial lack of public enthusiasm for local accountability measures (Docking, 
2003, p. 6). Commenting on the election of the first Police and Crime Commissioners, 
one observer summed up the problem as a case of the electorate having acquired “a 
habit of blowing a raspberry in the face of [Government] local democratic 
innovations” (BBC, 2012a). However, it might be argued that the apparent raspberry 
conceals a public apathy and indifference that is itself the problem rather than the 
means by which police (democratic) accountability is achieved.  
 
Will the ‘coalition’ reform measures fully unravel several decades of 
centralized control? An important concern for discussions about police accountability 
in England and Wales has been the implications of centralization for the distribution 
of power over policing policy. Some critics of the 2010 coalition government’s 
reforms have argued that the power balance had tipped too far toward the centre 
(Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 195). Already exposed to a new form of political 
control disguised as financial accountability, the theoretical independence of the 
police has been further eroded by the imposition of national performance indicators 
(Dupont, 2003, p. 48). Dupont talks of a ‘democratic deficit’, that is characterized by 
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a restrictive view of police effectiveness that is bounded by its budgetary meaning and 
fails to empower citizens (2003, p. 49). Police organizations had come to view 
accountability in terms of ‘performance measures’ and ‘best value’ (Loveday, 2000, 
228). As events unfolded in operational policing, it became clear that new public 
management systems in policing had not removed the potential for the ‘system 
failures’ that drained public confidence and triggered expensive enquiries and reform 
measures. 
 
It could be argued that those historic examples of ‘police reform’ that have 
been catalogued by Savage (2007, pp. 23-42) are instances of particularly decisive 
and well-focused police governance. The ‘system failures’ that result in 
recommendations for change in police organizations have an often unspoken agenda: 
the need for change in police governance, as well as change in its object (the police). 
This point is made by Lustgarten when he states that police governance in England 
and Wales has tended to be treated as a sub-problem of current political issues, 
notably race relations, rather than as a constitutional issue of fundamental importance 
in its own right (1986, p. 160). There is a sense, therefore, in which police governance 
rarely becomes an issue in its own right, only a subset of a greater concern about 
failures in police conduct and performance. 
 
The consequences of the growth of the central dynamic on the independence 
dynamic have not been the same everywhere. Research in Australia in the 1970s 
found that, although police chiefs were accountable to government at the policy level, 
they retained certain discretionary powers in the management of their daily operations 
(Dupont, 2003, p. 45). Since the 1980s the situation in Australia changed and 
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managerial reforms have strengthened “the grip of ministerial controls on law 
enforcement functions” (Dupont, 2003, p. 45). What seems to have emerged, across 
the literature, is a concern that either the independence dynamic or central dynamic 
(or both) have grown at the expense of the local dynamic. There is a pervasive sense 
of dissatisfaction among policing scholars with the way in which police organizations 
are governed, and increasing demands for shifts in the existing dynamics of police 
governance.  
 
2.5 Dynamic shifts and some conclusions 
It seems that an answer to Waddington’s (1999a, p. 195) questions about the body to 
which the police must be held responsible and its range of decision-making remain 
only partially answered. As Jones, Newburn & Smith (1996, p. 187) point out, the 
police have a unique relationship with the institutions of democracy and their 
legitimacy – they are there to protect the fundamental freedoms of citizens. Police 
organizations are, in a very real sense, one of the guarantors of democracy and good 
governance. Herein lies the apparently unresolved conceptual dilemma at the very 
heart of the police governance debate: how must one govern a police organization in a 
way that ensures that it remains an effective guarantor of democracy? Rather than 
focus on describing particular institutions, some authors suggest that a more helpful 
approach to examining the meaning of democratic governance is to analyze the range 
of values underpinning those institutions and processes (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 
1996, p. 186). Thus, a satisfactory resolution to the ‘guarantor of democracy’ dilemma 
would equate with the best formula for balancing police discretion (or independence) 
in decision-making with the disparate concerns and interests of citizens, or balancing 
independence and political accountability (Waddington, 1999a, p. 188). In other 
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words, the task is to find a way in which police organizations ought to be “rendered 
responsive to democratic audiences” (Loader, 2000, p. 324). 
 
The analysis under section 2.3 above has revealed various dynamic shifts in 
the ongoing effort to define the winning formula, as senior police officers, academics 
and politicians struggle with the principles of democracy and the interpretation of its 
values. Waddington characterizes the constitutional position of the police as shaped 
by a long-term struggle between the competing principles of political independence 
versus electoral accountability, and central versus local dynamics (1999a, p. 187). 
Referring back to Figure 2.2, the incongruent advocates suggest different ways of 
eclipsing the errant movements of the police independence sphere. In most 
jurisdictions the shifting of dynamics tends to be bipolar: greater (or lesser) police 
autonomy at the expense of either central or local control. In England and Wales the 
tripartite formula makes for a more complex dialectic of the three competing 
dynamics (Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 46). It is arguable that too much of the 
debate has centred on attempts to diminish the independence dynamic per se, rather 
than construct a positive model of democratic governance. The argument in favour of 
greater political control has been built on too much emphasis on identifying how the 
police have failed, rather than on how the local dynamic has succeeded (Waddington, 
1999a, p. 197).  
 
In the 1980s the debate seemed to be concerned with limiting independence 
and increasing the local dynamic. For example, Lustgarten, a local government 
dynamic advocate, urged the need to go further in curbing police independence but 
seemed uncertain about the way that the subsequent decision-making gap should be 
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filled (1986, p. 181). Throughout the 1990s the police independence dynamic 
continued to be a major cause of concern and resulted in calls to ‘deconstruct’ the 
principle of constabulary independence rather than emasculate operational decision 
making (Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 49).    
 
Waddington suggests that too much emphasis on the subordination of police to 
elected representatives as an exclusive democratic solution might at the same time 
exclude many areas of the liberal democratic world (1999a, p.191). Some research 
suggests that efforts to diminish the independence dynamic could have possibly 
unforeseen and deleterious consequences for police performance. Others suggest that 
the governance model should be graded: e.g. local policing (community-based units) 
require an ‘explanatory and cooperative’ approach and large-scale, national units 
require a ‘subordinate and obedient’ method (Markham & Punch, 2007b, p.492). A 
critical component of the independence dynamic is the capacity to effect changes 
within the police organization (Savage, 2007, p. 128-9), and there is evidence that this 
can be endangered by disenfranchising chief constables and excluding discretion in 
decision-making. It is crucial, therefore, that discussions about police accountability 
are not overly narrow in focus and that, in addition to the external structures, attention 
is paid to internal structures for ensuring that the service that is  delivered conforms to 
that laid down by policy makers (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 194). Dupont 
discusses the impact of the introduction of performance-related contracts for chief 
officers in the context of Australia: in addition to the fact that Commissioners who 
wish to pursue a career in policing will try to avoid at all costs a quarrel with their 
ministers, they are even more restrained by the performance clauses embedded in their 
contracts (Dupont, 2003, p. 50). The same author argues that the legal theory of the 
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operational independence of the Commissioner can no longer be sustained, as it is 
possible to discern a deliberate strategy from the political authorities to reassert their 
control over the police (Dupont, 2003, p. 50). 
 
The advent of the Patten Report and its examination of the “need for effective 
mechanisms of accountability” marked a new phase in the ongoing police governance 
debate (Loveday, 2000, p. 220; Savage, 2007, p. 70). This landmark document 
questioned the origins and legitimacy of what some researchers have called the 
‘sacred principle’ of police independence (Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 48). In 
a crucial step forward the Patten Report proposed that what underlies the police 
concern is not a need to protect the independence of senior police officers but a need 
to recognize their ‘operational responsibility’ (Patten, 1999: 6.20, pp. 32-3; Loveday, 
2000, 221; Savage, 2007, p. 74). The concept of ‘operational responsibility’ 
developed by the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland offered a 
promising alternative – it locates the root of the democratic deficit in the governance 
of policing in the legal theory of the operational independence of the police (Dupont, 
2003, p. 52; Jones & Newburn, 2007, p. 156). Operational policing is seen as too 
important  to be left under the control of either partisan politicians or unaccountable 
commissioners. The notion of operational responsibility resolves this dilemma by 
advocating the empowerment of the community through the creation of a board that 
could extend oversight to operational matters. However, talk of community 
empowerment implies a broad base of citizens who seek to be involved in decisions 
about policing and some research questions whether this is a realistic assumption on 
which to build a new approach to governance, given the failure of community 
consultative groups (Bowling, Parmar, & Phillips, 2008 p. 628). 
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It is arguable that the ‘explanatory and cooperative’ versions of the central and 
local dynamics must de facto provide greater authority to the independence dynamic. 
In the absence of a regime in which a police chief is required to target and resolve 
specific local problems, he or she will naturally concentrate resources and effort using 
as much discretion as permitted by law. In spite of the apparent growth of the central 
dynamic throughout the 1990s, Loveday expressed concern at the unchecked growth 
of the independence dynamic, arguing that “much policing activity remains highly 
discretionary, largely unrecorded and, as a result, ‘invisible’ to those who seek to 
monitor police performance” (Loveday, 2000, p. 229). 
 
One scholar has argued that the local dynamic can only operate if and when 
the central dynamic begins to withdraw (Godfrey, 2007, p. 499). Some renaissance 
models of the local dynamic seemingly fail to tackle what Jones calls the “democratic 
deficit at the local level” (Jones, 2008, p. 717) and find a way of reconciling disparate 
values and interests in modern urban populations (Millen & Stephens, 2011, p. 268). 
As noted by Newburn (2008b, p. 837) the question of police governance has become 
one of deciding how the public police can be held accountable in an environment in 
which ‘pluralism’ is encouraged. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
and similar remedies tend to give voice to the more majoritarian views, but it is not 
clear that “rights and civil liberties of less popular minorities will be protected in the 
process (Bridges, 2011, p. 35). As in the US, it is not difficult to envisage 
‘PCComms’ and ‘police commissions’ promoting policies for ‘zero tolerance’ and ‘no 
go areas’ that target certain activities or groups, and urging the use of blanket stop and 
search, arrest operations, or widespread use of anti-social behaviour orders, etc 
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(Loader. 2000, p. 338). For similar reasons, Bridges (2011, p. 35) dismisses these 
police reforms and argues that they will be a recipe for “fragmenting accountability” 
(idem). The path of greater political control also creates the graver risk of the abuse 
and corruption, as evidenced in a number of countries (Waddington, 1999a, pp. 196-
7).  
 
Although this Chapter has overtly steered away from the ballooning debate 
about the growth of private policing (Newburn, 2008b, p. 827), it must be 
acknowledged – if only in passing – that it has an important relevance to the issue of 
governance. Dupont indicates what he detects an inexorable path and direction of 
security and safety provision in increasingly complex urban societies. He notes 
gathering forces that would seek a radical shift in police governance, away from 
traditional forms of governance that rely on hierarchical public structures, toward 
alternatives that rely on market forces, policy networks and local communities 
(Dupont, 2003, p. 43). This new governance accepts a process characterized by 
materialist reforms that assume a belief in the superiority of the market over the state, 
the need for internal competition within government, and the fragmentation of public 
service providers (Jones, 2008, p.709; Waddington, 1999a, p. 246). In March 2012 the 
UK Government announced a scheme that would further extend the extant process of 
transferring parts of ‘public policing’ into the private sector (Prescott, 2012). A 
contract with a potential value of £1.5 billion over seven years would see private 
forces perform a range of police functions, including investigating crimes, patrolling 
neighborhoods, supporting victims and witnesses, managing forensics, and even 
detaining suspects (Khetani, 2012). Some politicians reacted to the announcement by 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 61 
pointing to the risk to the impartial and equitable provision of police services (BBC, 
2012b). 
 
These changes are undoubtedly the latest stage in the evolutionary chain that 
reaches back to the dawn of New Public Management in the early 1990s, albeit now 
spurred on by the crisis in public spending. As hinted at above, values that underpin 
and drive markets are not the same as those that we ascribe to democracy. It is 
arguable that transferring more policing functions to the private sector may 
considerably reduce the independence dynamic, by eliminating discretion and 
allowing the central dynamic to govern absolutely through the language of objectives, 
performance indicators and targets. If this is the case the consequences are likely to be 
an intensification of those seen in the last two decades, but with possibly lower cost to 
the taxpayer. 
 
Is the local dynamic, therefore, a lost cause? A possible factor in the apparent 
failure of the local dynamic is its traditional lack of technical capacity in monitoring 
police performance and providing more sophisticated feedback (Weatheritt, 1993, 
pp.28-9). Perhaps the answer lies in the reform of police authorities, rather than their 
replacement with commissioners or similar alternatives (Holdaway, 2012)? Modern 
police organizations in the liberal democracies of the world are both sophisticated and 
complex, dealing with the equally complex and sophisticated crime and public 
disorder events of contemporary society. Governance of such organizations must de 
facto include a sufficient degree of technical capability and expertise, “checks and 
balances, and the input of expert opinion” (Pyper, 1996, p.3, cited in Millen & 
Stephens, 2012, p. 262; Jones, 2008, p. 717). Among the multiple dynamics in 
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England and Wales stand two notable examples of what will be referred to as the 
technical/expert dynamic: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and 
the Audit Commission, introduced under the Local Government Finance Act 1982 
(Loveday, 2000, 213; Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, p. 32).   
 
The Audit Commission has had the objective of improving economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in local government, housing and the health service, 
directly through audit and inspection process and also through value for money 
studies. Its well-evidenced recommendations mean that, in a very real sense, it has a 
policy development function (Savage, 2007, p. 97). Whereas HMIC is a much older 
entity, dating back to 1856, and answers to the Home Office, and its structure and 
purpose has evolved and changed over time, and is currently authorized by the Police 
Act 1996 to report on the activities of the territorial forces of England and Wales and 
other law enforcement organizations (e.g. British transport Police, Civil Nuclear 
Constabulary). The rational, therefore, is more than a matter of ‘watching them while 
they are doing it’ (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 195); it is a set of managerial 
tools backed up by a regime of audit and inspection aimed at producing effective, 
efficient, ‘value-for-money’ police services that are attuned to the requirements of 
their ‘customers’(Loader, 2000, p. 326).  
 
Since these technical agencies act in support of the existing three dynamics 
(Oliver, 1997, p. 75) it would be inappropriate to position them as a new and distinct 
dynamic of police governance. They do not act in isolation, but work as an adjunct of 
the central government dynamic and/or the local government dynamic. As noted in 
the UK coalition government’s ‘Big Society’ concept (John, Lewis, Read, & Rogers, 
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2011, p. 65), democratic accountability and governance require information (Jones, 
2008, p. 696; Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 195) and this must reflect the 
complexity of police organization and its objectives. Moreover, the type of 
information offered must go beyond crude statistics to a qualitative level that properly 
informs the local policing debate (Jones, 2008, p. 717). It must go beyond the 
important role of the media in highlighting moments of failure, incompetence and 
misconduct, and provide detailed data about routine, daily and local performance. 
Without such detailed, objective and accurate data it is difficult to imagine how 
governance – as informed policy-making and strategic direction – can be carried out 
by local and/or central government.  
 
This Chapter has provided a broad conceptual context for the next stage of the 
study. Markers have been placed on the seminal themes and arguments in the police 
governance debate, and a framework for evaluating various positions has been put 
forward. The next Chapter will explore the literature relating to external civilian 
oversight (ECO), a sub-set of the evolving systems of police governance. It will 
examine the path whereby ECO evolved from a narrow concern to ensure that 
instances of individual misconduct are properly resolved, and progressed to a much 
broader ambition of tackling the causes of misconduct, and systemic incompetence 
and poor performance. It will assess the ECO move from the limited scope of legal 
accountability at the individual level, to the less certain realm of political 
accountability as a means of achieving organizational change. It thereby – in ambition 
if not in fact – moves fully centre stage of police governance. 
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Chapter Three 




3.1 Introduction  
The previous Chapter has set the stage for the complex task of the present: evaluating 
the arguments for or against External Citizen Oversight (ECO) as a remedy to police 
misconduct and poor performance. This agenda fully coincides with that of police 
governance, construed as the external power to influence organizational change. ECO 
is ineluctably subsumed into the dialectical interplay of political forces or dynamics - 
local, central and independence – that determine the scope and quality of change 
within the police organization. Whilst the exact constellation of forces will vary from 
one country (or region) to the next, the uncertainty about the best path to democratic 
accountability seems universal. This Chapter, therefore, will not only explore the 
veracity of the claim that ECO has the technical capacity to effect organizational 
change, but also the suggested source of its political power and the degree to which 
that power includes the quality of democratic accountability. 
 
3.2 Evolution of citizen oversight of police 
A growing cadre of policing scholars has mapped the various elements of the 
evolution of ECO of police complaints in a number of countries over the last several 
decades (Freckelton, 1991; Maguire, 1991; Petterson, 1991; Terril, 1991; Lewis, 
1999; Lewis, 2000; Beattie & Weitzer, 2000; Goldsmith, 2000; Manby, 2000; Neild, 
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2000; Milton-Edwards, 2000; Miller, 2003; Walker, 2006a, pp. 2–9; Buren, 2007, pp. 
29-30). Although drawing from experience of police misconduct in a growing number 
of democratic countries, the authors share a common conviction that the traditional 
approach to resolving citizen complaints (i.e. wherein the police investigate the 
police) is inadequate. These policing scholars argue that the system whereby only the 
police are competent and capable of investigating the police is patently flawed, 
unsatisfactory and contrary to public expectations (Waddington, 1999a, p.163; Jones, 
2008, p 711). What is required, they argue, is a system that can reassure complainants 
(and the broader public) that complaints about police misconduct will be dealt with in 
a fair and objective manner, to the satisfaction of the complainant (European Partners 
Against Corruption [EPAC], 2011, p. 3). A system can only hope to achieve public 
confidence if civilians (non-police) have control over the process.  
 
Whilst the exact form and substance of the alternative approach is debated in 
the literature, there is consensus concerning the need to replace – in whole or in part – 
the traditional police-controlled system of dealing with complaints, with a system 
controlled by non-police personnel and in the hope of creating or increasing public 
confidence (Prenzler, 2002a, p. 18; Petterson, 1991, p. 269; Walker, 2001, p. 12; 
Herzog, 2000, p. 140; Beattie & Weitzer, 2000, p. 58; Villiers, 2002, p. 236; Walker, 
2006a, p. 2). Such citizen oversight mechanisms are held to represent the most 
developed type of police complaints system (Smith, 2010, p. 64). However, it would 
be naïve to suggest that the mere fact that a complaint is exclusively or partially dealt 
with by non-police personnel will guarantee a just and equitable outcome. A 
seemingly endless host of unspoken assumptions would need to be examined, 
including: the legal status and qualifications of the citizen investigators; their exact 
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modus operandi and standard of proof; their powers to seize evidence and interrogate 
witnesses; the structure, composition and powers of the decision-making tribunal and 
appeal mechanism; and the existence of a statutory instrument that enacts all these 
matters. On virtually all these points there is surprising divergence in the literature. 
 
A bewildering diversity of oversight models emerged around the globe, 
reflecting the seemingly limitless variety of answers (or failures to answer) the above 
assumptions. Many of these models suffered partial or complete failure, due to a lack 
of political will (Freckelton, 1991, pp. 63-114; Terrill, 1991, p. 317; Luna & Walker, 
2000, p. 99; Neild, 2000, p. 252; Herzog, 2000, p. 140; Goldsmith, 2000, p. 190; 
Manby, 2000, p. 221), or a poor deterrent effect (Herzog, 2000, p. 129), low 
probability of conviction, low certainty of punishment and a long investigation 
process (Herzog, 2000, p. 140; Walker, 2006a, pp. 6-7). Although Kerstetter (1985) 
and Goldsmith (1988), cited by Lewis (1999, p. 60), and Walker (2001, p. 62) have 
attempted to reduce the multitude of such oversight models to a small number of 
categories, it will serve the purposes of this review to simply refer to all such models 
as forms of ‘reactive’ oversight’ (Lewis 1999, p. 76): i.e. concerned only with an 
adequate response to an instance of police misconduct. Complaints investigation and 
subsequent disciplinary sanctions - the core features of a purely ‘reactive model’ - are 
intended to improve police conduct by deterring or re-educating police who err, or by 
removing recalcitrant officers (Brereton, 2002, cited by Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, p. 
77). 
 
Undeterred by the recorded problems with the design and implementation of 
‘reactive’ oversight, a number of authors called for a further extension of ECO 
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powers, combining the reactive function with more proactive methods of deterring 
police misconduct (Lewis, 1999, p. 82; Lewis & Prenzler, 1999, p. 6; Brereton, 2000, 
p. 118; Auerbach, 1999, p. 8; Walker, 2001, p. 179; Maguire, 1991, p. 178; Newton 
Cain, 2002, p. 146). It is argued that, although a purely reactive system might – all 
other things being equal - deal well with individual misconduct, it nevertheless fails to 
cope with organizational underperformance (Lewis, 1999, p. 81; Goode, 1991, p. 147; 
Rowe, 2004, p. 132; O’Rawe & Moore, 2000, p. 292). It is also observed that the 
emphasis on complaints procedures has deflected analysis from other forms of police 
accountability (Landau, 2000, p. 64; Smith, 2004, p. 27; Bayley, 2006, p. 53). 
Although the proactive role is known variously as the ‘monitoring role’ (Walker, 
2001, p. 179; Bayley, 2006, p. 20), ‘auditor approach’ (Walker, 2006b, p. 11; Luna & 
Walker, 2000, p. 91), ‘deterrence-evaluation’ approach (Bayley, 1992, cited by Lewis, 
1999, p. 80), ‘inspection function’ (Police Inspectorate of Kosovo [PIK], 2006f, p. 2; 
PIK, 2007f, p. 3); “citizen’s watchdog” bodies designed to ensure integrity (Prenzler 
& Lewis, 2005,p. 77);  and ‘policy review’ (Walker, 2001, p. 62), this research study 
will adopt Lewis’ term ‘holistic’ oversight of police where an agency combines 
reactive and proactive functions (Lewis, 1999, p. 84). 
 
3.3 Citizen oversight and the causes of police misconduct 
From the initially modest claim that citizen oversight might better meet public 
demands for a complaint system that is fair and transparent, advocates have developed 
the more ambitious concept of citizen oversight as a means of tackling the causes of 
police misconduct. It is argued that the experience of police forces throughout the 
world shows that prevention through citizen review boards is likely to be more 
effective in achieving integrity (Bayley, 2001; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Mendes, 
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Zuckerberg, Lecorre, & Clark, 1999). Police misconduct, it is argued, is not a matter 
of “a few rotten apples but of failed organizations” (Walker, 2001, p. 5) and, 
therefore, the challenge of police accountability is not about how to get a few bad 
apples but how to fix organizations (Walker, 2001, p. 179; Herzog, 2000, p. 146; 
Lewis, 1999, p. 98). Advocates claim that the causes of complaint are the product (or 
at least influenced by) wider, systemic policies and practices within police 
organizations (Stenning, 2000, p. 158; Smith, 2004, p. 27; Landau, 2000, p. 75; 
Walker, 2006b, p. 19). Other policing scholars support this view (Cooper, 2012, p. 
169; Punch, 2003, p. 172; Waddington, 1999a, p. 173). 
 
The oversight debate forms part of a broadening interest in the causes of police 
corruption and misconduct (Pakes, 2010, p. 55-9; Waddington, 1999a, pp. 125-37). 
Police deviancy does not occur in a social, political and legal vacuum, but rather in a 
context that may potentially facilitate it or, in some cases, encourage it (Waddington, 
1999a, p. 173). Therefore, Herzog tells us that police oversight that only focuses on 
individual misconduct is “doomed” to failure, since it has neither the mandate nor 
means to intervene in police policy and other organizational patterns that serve to 
encourage misconduct (2000, p. 146). The ‘holistic’ approach provides police 
oversight with the means of achieving deterrence (Brereton, 2000, p. 118), improving 
the quality of the police organization (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 91) and is “more 
likely to create a self-sustaining culture of accountability” (Walker, 2001, p. 86). 
Moreover, such an approach understands the link between ineffective policing 
strategies and misconduct (Prenzler, 2000, p. 272). It is only when the reactive and 
proactive functions are combined in a holistic way that long-term change is made 
possible (Lewis, 1999, p. 82). The argument is essentially captured by Brereton’s 
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‘working hypothesis’: that oversight bodies which combine policy and investigative 
role are likely to be more effective in promoting [police] organisational and 
behavioural change than those which rely mainly on case-by-case investigation and 
review” (Brereton, 2000, p. 123). 
 
In its most general sense, therefore, holistic oversight is a conceptual model 
that seeks to adopt a more comprehensive approach to tackling police misconduct and 
performance failures. If it is the case that instances of misconduct are causally linked 
to the cultural ethos and/or organizational features of the police, it follows that a 
proper remedy should go beyond a system of merely investigating individual 
complaints (Punch, 2003, p. 173). Policing scholars point to a number of documented 
cases of police organizations – particularly large metropolitan organizations – where 
there appeared to be good evidence of links between individual cases of serious 
misconduct and a pervasive culture and/or organizational acquiescence (Walker, 
2001, pp. 19-31; Prenzler, 2009, pp. 8 – 14; Punch, 2009, pp. 56 – 88; Savage, 2007, 
pp. 23 – 45; Lewis, 1999, pp. 35 – 51; Waddington, 1999, pp. 125-37). Whilst these 
cases appear to belong to an extreme point on a scale of possible police misconduct or 
performance failure, the argument in favour of a more profound and comprehensive 
approach to tackling the causes of complaints seems incontrovertible.  
 
What remains to be made clear is the most effective formula for identifying 
the broader causal factors and dealing with them appropriately. Only a few features of 
that formula seem to have won consensus and unambiguous definition: that the 
oversight should be conducted by an agency that is civilian and independent of the 
police (Walker, 2001, pp. 61 – 67; Manby, 2000, pp. 212 – 213; Stenning, 2000, p. 
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156; Lewis, 1999, p. 68). However, much less agreement is found concerning the 
modus operandi of the agency. As Waddington (1999, p.167-8) points out there is an 
increasing involvement of non-police in complaints investigation and oversight. A 
shift toward greater civilian control of both ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ oversight 
functions is evident in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, with the creation of 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and Police Ombudsman for 
Northern Ireland (Savage, 2007, pp. 70-74, 193; PONI, 2011). Independent of interest 
groups, political parties and police control, the IPCC has a legal duty to oversee the 
whole of the police complaints system and proactively influence ‘policing excellence’ 
through its ‘guardianship role’ (IPCC, 2012; Jones, 2008, p 711-12; Markham & 
Punch, 2007a, p.304).  
 
Although the IPCC has attracted criticism, in terms of its claimed poor 
performance in investigating complaints (Davies, 2008; Robins, 2008; Rowe, 2004, p. 
132), particularly the potential of its ‘guardianship role’ in the holistic oversight 
debate, it is acknowledged to be an improvement on what went before (Jones, 2008, p. 
718). ‘Guardianship’ means that the IPCC should promote public confidence by inter 
alia “promoting policing excellence by drawing out and feeding back learning arising 
from the IPCC’s work” (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2012a).  
 
The European Partners Against Corruption’s stated in 2011 that ‘Police 
Oversight Principles’ reflect the growing interest in the development of ECO agencies 
across Europe, largely in concurrence with the requirements of the advocates (EPAC, 
2011). A survey of the 27 EU member states found that 59% employed the use of a 
specialist body to deal with complaints against police, albeit with very different 
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structures and compositions (den Boer & Fernhout, 2008, pp. 8-10). However, a 
number of European states have adopted an approach similar to the holistic model. 
Belgium’s Standing Police Monitoring Committee (or Comité P.), established in 
1991, is the longest serving citizen oversight body (Comité P, 2011). It is answerable 
to parliament and has the powers to inspect and monitor the police, and investigate 
complaints (Smith, 2010, p. 65). Portugal’s Inspecção-Geral da Administração Interna 
(IGAI) and France’s Commission Nationale de la Déontologie de la Sécurité (CNDS) 
have similar powers to the Comité but not the express powers to investigate 
complaints (IGAI, 2011; CNDS, 2011). Other examples include the Northern Ireland 
Ombudsman’s Office (Savage, 2007, pp. 70-74, 193; PONI, 2011), the Independent 
Authority for Investigation of Complaints and Allegations against the Police for 
Cyprus that became operational in 2007 (IAIACAP, 2011), and the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) for Ireland which started in 2007 (GSOC, 2011). 
Beyond Europe there are yet more examples of oversight agencies that are both 
civilian and independent of the police. The vexed question of whether any of the 
multiplying examples of ECO can demonstrate greater effectiveness remains open to a 
lively debate, largely led by Australian policing scholars (see section 3.9 below).  
 
3.4 Policy review as a means of reducing misconduct/performance failure 
The proposition, therefore, is that holistic oversight can go far beyond the ‘case-by-
case’ remedy of allowing the (exclusive or shared) investigation of complaints by 
non-police experts (reactive function), and introduce proactive non-police powers to 
intervene in police organizations. This marks a seismic shift in the original argument 
of advocates, such as Lewis, Prenzler and Walker. No longer simply the narrow case 
of ensuring that complaint investigation is seen to be fair and objective, the argument 
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has broadened to the far more ambitious agenda of obviating or ameliorating those 
organizational causes of police misconduct. How exactly might a non-police, external 
agency act in a way that could correctly identify and change factors within a police 
organization that have a causal link to patterns of misconduct? 
 
Advocates propose a number of proactive oversight activities to achieve the 
goal of organisational change: auditing the quality of complaint investigations, 
(Walker, 2001, p. 86); increasing public awareness through publication of reports and 
other information (Herzog, 2000, p. 143); public outreach (Stewart, 2006a, p. 148); 
external performance monitoring and auditing mechanisms (Chan, 1995, p. 8; Bayley, 
2006, p. 20); providing a ‘guardianship role’ (IPCC, 2012); mediation in policy issues 
(Quinn, 2006, p. 145); policy innovation, education and proactive problem solving 
(Walker, 2001, p. 86; Lewis, 1999, p. 82; Stewart, 2006b, p. 170); and monitoring and 
enforcing policing standards and learning lessons about policy and practice (EPAC, 
2011, p. 6). Although advocates of the holistic approach differ as to the exact 
methodology to be adopted, there is broad support for the proposal that change can be 
achieved by recommending revisions to police policies and procedures (Lewis, 1999, 
p. 85; Walker, 2001, p. 62; Neild, 2000, p. 253; Newton Cain, 2002, p. 146; Brereton, 
2000, p. 123; PIK, 2006f, p. 7; Miller, 2003, p. 33; Walker, 2006b, p. 15; Jerome, 
2006, p. 39; Buren, 2007, p. 111).  
 
The proposition that organization-related misconduct can be reduced through 
policy changes raises a host of technical and political issues that would need to be 
resolved. In most countries (or territories) an oversight agency with policy changing 
(or recommending) powers would not emerge within a political vacuum: it would 
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often have to find its place among other, more established, political entities that have 
authority to hold the police to account. There is a need, therefore, to clarify the 
position of the proposed oversight agency within the pre-existing political framework 
and its level of authority in relation to other, pre-existing entities. There is also a need 
to define the exact scope of the policy review role of the agency, consider any overlap 
with other entities, and its impact on the contentious issue of the independence 
dynamic. In addition, it is important to decide whether the oversight agency would 
adopt a restricted approach and simply base policy recommendations on issues that 
arise from particular instances of misconduct or adopt a more comprehensive review 
of policies and procedures. 
 
Is the agency an alternative or simply an extension of the existing 
arrangements? For example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and 
the Audit Commission can be viewed as extensions of the tripartite accountability 
system in England and Wales, although they entered the stage after the 1964 Police 
Act that brought the tripartite system (Oliver, 1997, p. 73; Rowe, 2004, p. 124). 
Although neither qualify as holistic (since they lack ‘reactive’ functions), they both 
act as ‘proactive’ oversight agencies and generate recommendations that are based on 
research and designed to inform those in the tripartite structure (local, central and 
independence dynamics) with authority to change policies and procedures (Oliver, 
1997, p. 75). Whereas, the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) of 
Australia represents an alternative to pre-existing, accountability mechanisms. 
 
In terms of policy scope, the literature reveals a mixture of views. Some 
policing scholars advocate a close link between proactive policy recommendations 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 74 
and the reactive functions of an oversight agency: in other words, recommendations 
should only feed off data derived from complaint investigation (Lewis, 1999, p. 98; 
Walker, 2001, p. 93; Walker, 2006b, p. 14). This restrictive approach is exhibited by 
agencies that are said to be more effective, such as the Queensland Criminal Justice 
Commission (CJC) in Australia (Lewis, 1999, p. 83) and those US agencies that 
Walker (2001, p. 62) categorises as Class III (or “auditor systems”), such as Portland 
Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) and San Jose Independent 
Police Auditor (IPA). Although a similar approach is envisaged in the ‘guardianship 
role’ defined by the legal framework of the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) (Savage, 2007, p. 72; Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, 2012a), more data is required on its efficacy to date. Available research 
points to revised policies derived from trends in misconduct that concern areas such as 
recruitment, training, assignment, supervision, and discipline (Walker, 2001, p. 183; 
Lewis, 1999, p. 84).  
 
However, other research in the US suggests that a number of oversight 
agencies tend to make recommendations on ‘any and all matters of police policy’ 
(Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 87). ‘Organisational and behavioural change’ is a complex 
process (Senior, 2002, p. 57) and not easily achieved in police organisations in 
developed democracies with well-entrenched constitutional traditions (Auerbach, 
1999, p. 3; Bayley, 2001, p. 34). The claim that “five to ten policy recommendations” 
annually can create a long-term impact on the operations and culture of the police 
(Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 95; Walker, 2001, p. 93) must be thoroughly tested and 
contrasted with more comprehensive reform programmes, such as Bayley’s 
“effectiveness, efficiency and rectitude” (1994, p. 79) proposal and the more practical 
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bases for police legitimacy (Walker, 1993, p. 142). In order to evaluate the argument 
that policy change can have a significant impact on conduct, it will assist if the term 
‘policy’ is properly understood. 
 
3.5 Meaning of policy as a vehicle for reducing misconduct 
If policy change is the golden key to sustainable reduction in police misconduct, it 
posits the critical question of the meaning of policy and how changes in policy link to 
behavioural change. What exactly is meant by the term policy in the context of 
policing? Sossin (2003, p. 14) captures the problem in a simple question: is the 
decision to create a hate crimes unit within a police organisation a policing decision, a 
policy decision or a political decision? The issue is not one of semantics. It draws the 
proposition that policy change can reduce misconduct into the eye of a long-standing 
debate in the literature concerning police ‘independence’ (Waddington, 1999a, pp. 
186 – 188), a discussion that Sossin (2003, p. 4) characterizes as concerned with the 
“policy/operation dichotomy”. 
 
Although often focussed in England and Wales on common law decisions 
(Lewis, 1999, p. 12) and the shortcomings of the 1964 Police Act’s ‘tripartite’ system 
of accountability (Reiner, 1993, p. 18; Oliver, 1997, p. 81; Maguire, 1991, p. 177; 
Simey, 1988, p. 94), the debate is very relevant in a number of other countries 
(Stenning, 2003, p. 80; Lewis, 1999, p. 12). In broad terms the issue concerns the 
exact boundary of the principle that law enforcement requires independence of 
arbitrary interference by the executive (Miller & Palmer, 2002, p. 110). Delimiting 
police independence has turned on a distinction between (police) ‘operational’ and 
(executive) ‘policy’ matters (Sossin, 2003, p. 73) -  classifications that have been 
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judged as hackneyed, overlapping, and arbitrary by Reiner (2000, p. 188). Much of 
the debate reveals a “bipolar situation of pro-police and anti-police camps”, viewing 
the police as either guardians of law enforcement or as violators of the rule of law 
(Sossin, 2003, p. 3). On one side, scholars see independence as the heart of the 
problem and accountability as a matter of ‘how to control police actions’ (Sanders, 
1993, p. 106; Reiner, 2000, p. 169; Maguire, 1991, p. 178; Lewis, 1999, p. 13); 
whereas others urge that it is “extremely unwise” to undermine senior police 
executives (Walker, 2001, p. 103) and “induced compliance is almost always 
preferable to exacted deterrence” (Goldsmith, 1991, p. 56). This preference accords 
with one former chief officer’s view that police management style must strike a 
balance between the need for an appropriate degree of (accountability) control and the 
demand for police freedom of action and discretion to plan and control their work 
(Butler, 1992, p. 67).  
 
Although it is questionable whether the policy/operation dichotomy actually 
corresponds to a readily identifiable boundary (Sossin, 2003, p. 4), the need to 
distinguish legitimate government interests from illegitimate or partisan ones is 
particularly relevant to the policy role of holistic oversight, and the suggestion that it 
might reduce misconduct. Patten (1999, p. 32-3) points out that the concept of 
operational independence lacks a basis in legislation and suggests that the term 
‘operational responsibility’ more accurately captures the required distinction between 
the need to allow senior officers to make operational decisions free from political 
interference and, at the same time, ensure that they are held to account for those 
decisions. Patten’s insight, once accepted, would not only dissolve a tortuous debate, 
but establish greater clarity concerning the reciprocity of responsibility and 
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accountability in policing. Notably, it would create a basis for holistic oversight based 
on comprehensive policy review rather than a more restrictive approach, linked to 
police complaint data alone. 
 
3.6 The locus of police accountability 
The framework of police governance and accountability is part of a range of processes 
and institutions that shape ‘democratically accountable’ policing: the extent to which 
this framework is effective depends crucially upon its relationship with the variety of 
other mechanisms, at both individual and organisational level, and within wider 
society (Jones, 2008, p. 694). Where then, according to holistic oversight proponents, 
should this means of ensuring accountability fit within the existing political 
architecture? In other words, what is the most appropriate locus of police 
accountability, or to whom or what should an oversight agency report in the existing 
political structures? 
 
These questions linger unresolved from the police oversight precursors of 
Prenzler & Faulkner’s ‘model commission’, a new type of oversight agency that will 
be discussed in more detail later. As noted, whilst there is broad agreement that the 
police should be held to account, there is less agreement about to whom the police 
should be accountable (Adams, 2010, p. 234). It is arguable that Prenzler and 
Faulkner fail to resolve the vexed question as to where their ‘model commission’ fits 
within the existing governmental architecture. It is, as they explain, a matter of 
achieving a balance between “independence from political interference and 
accountability to citizens” (2010, p. 258). Whilst they and others state a preference for 
cross-party parliamentary oversight committees (2010, p. 258; EPAC, 2011, p. 6; 
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Lewis & Coghill, 2005, p. 64), others suggest alternative structures. In the US, for 
example, oversight agencies are the creation of local government and exercise 
authority on its behalf (Petterson, 1991, p. 270; Walker, 2001, p. 180), thereby 
positioning them as an extension of the local dynamic and not an alternative. It is 
argued that the police should be accountable to locally elected authorities (Godfrey, 
2007, p. 498).  
 
Reiner (1993, p. 16) sees no risk in local politics and seems to exclude the role 
for oversight agencies, since the “ends to which [police] policy is directed is a 
political not a technical question, which should be determined by the electorate, not 
‘experts’ ”. In other words, police accountability – in relation to policy decisions – 
cannot and should not be delegated to an external oversight agency, whatever its 
composition or technical methodology. This view seems to find support from a 
leading American police expert. According to Bayley (1982 cited in Waddington, 
1999b, p. 203) political culture is far more important in determining whether policing 
is “congruent with the values of the community” than is either the mode of 
accountability procedures and forums, or the structure of the police organization. 
However, it is difficult to imagine how the objective of a more harmonious 
correspondence between policing practice and communal values (Reiner, 2000, p. 
183) might be achieved in a non-partisan or supra-partisan manner without some 
technical support to local authorities. 
 
It has been extensively argued that accountability must involve getting 
accurate information (Coliandris, Rogers & Gravelle, 2011, p. 204; Great Britain. 
Home Office, 2010, p.19; Neild, 2000, p. 235; Oliver, 1997, p. 187; Simey, 1988, p. 
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74; Cail, 2006, p. 73) and, according to one practitioner, English and Welsh local 
authorities in the 1980s lacked information, not least because they could not access 
HMIC reports at that time (Simey, 1988, pp. 80-81). Indeed, they had to rely upon 
Chief Constables to give them the information required to exercise local governance  
(Millen & Stephens, 2011, p. 267). Research suggests that the failure of the envisaged 
‘partnership’ between police and police authority was due to the lack of ‘analytical 
capacity’ in the police authorities (Weatheritt, 1993, pp. 28–29). Moreover, one study 
indicated that, in the absence of accurate data and analytical capacity, the police 
authority members lacked the understanding required to ask searching questions, and 
were overly deferential toward senior police officers (Millen & Stephens, 2011, p. 
280). Reiner’s vision of local authority control over policing policy risks failure: it 
will either continue as the ‘junior partner’ of the tripartite system (Rowe, 2004, p. 
124; Oliver, 1997, p. 184) or, as in the US and other countries, become the focus of a 
pro-police lobby that sees the war on crime as more important than claims of police 
abuse (Savage, 2007, p. 22; Walker, 2001, p. 9; Freckelton, 1991, p. 68). 
 
Other policing scholars insist that ECO agencies must be independent of the 
executive (EPAC, 2011, p. 6; Lewis, 2000, p. 35; Bayley, 2006, p. 52), and – like 
Prenzler and Faulkner - advocate a system whereby an agency is appointed, funded 
and reports to all-party parliamentary committees (Lewis & Coghill, 2005, p. 64; 
Lewis, 2000, p. 36; Sossin, 2003, p. 49). Interestingly, EPAC’s published principles 
support the idea that an oversight body should not be part of the executive but “should 
report directly to Parliament” (2011, p. 6). According to Waddington, the case for 
bringing policing firmly under the control of elected representatives is more 
compelling than most of the other responsibilities of politicians (1999a, p. 185). In 
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order to be independent, an ECO agency should be answerable to Parliament or a 
body of elected representatives that does not have express responsibility for policing 
(Smith, 2010, p. 67). 
 
Placing an oversight agency under parliamentary rather than executive control, 
it is argued, would help avoid undesirable partisan influences (Stenning, 2003, p. 8) 
and remove it from a well-noted risk of failure for all forms of civilian oversight, 
namely a lack of political support from elected officials (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 99; 
Lewis, 2000, p. 29; Freckelton, 1991 pp. 63-114; Manby, 2000, p. 221). However, this 
strategy is not infallible, since elected officials must represent popular interests in 
order to gain re-election. Torn between two potentially exclusive and competing 
political demands - the need to meet public expectations of greater crime control and 
the obligation to respect the rights of citizens in compliance with the law (Walker, 
2001, p. 7; Sossin, 2003, p. 39) - elected officials have often seen more political merit 
in fighting crime at the expense of an oversight agency that champions human rights 
(Manby, 2000, p. 221).  
 
According to Waddington the term “political” in liberal democracies is 
equated with the electoral representation of partisan interests that might be less 
concerned with pursuing justice than with achieving advantage for those they 
represent (Waddington, 1999a, pp. 192). What seems not to have occurred to 
proponents of democratic control is that elected police authorities might insist upon 
more “law and order” to the disadvantage of marginal groups. In the United States 
there has been a pronounced shift since the 1970s towards aggressive law 
enforcement championed by elected representatives under such slogans as the “war on 
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drugs” (Waddington, 1999a, p. 198). Indeed Waddington (1999a, p. 199) argues that 
there is a directly democratic reason why political control of the police does not 
produce enlightened policing - there is little public appetite for it.  
 
3.7 Authority to influence the causes of misconduct 
Related to the question of a holistic oversight agency’s position in the existing 
political landscape is its level of authority in the eyes of the police. Policy review 
seems to imply what Marshall (2005, p. 633), calls an ‘explanatory and co-operative’ 
approach, as opposed to the ‘subordinate and obedient’ approach that characterises 
Reiner’s (1993, p. 18) call for police control by locally elected officials. The former is 
popular in the US, where oversight agencies do not have the power to dictate policy 
(Walker, 2006b, p.19), perhaps the result of local government deference to police 
concerns that giving oversight agencies policy-making authority would undermine 
their management authority (Walker, 2001, p. 102; Miller 2003, p. 41; Walker, 2006a, 
p. 2). Yet such deference might explain the apparent lack of efficacy of the 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach. For example, Walker’s (2001, p. 94) brief 
survey of oversight agencies in the US found that of those authorised to conduct 
policy review only some make use of it, and of those, only a few appeared to be 
effective in terms of recommendations acted upon, such as improved crowd control 
measures (Walker, 2001, p. 98) and reductions in police shootings of citizens through 
changes in supervision (Walker, 2001, pp. 94-100). Other research found that many 
US agencies ‘lacked teeth’ and acted more as advisory boards (Luna & Walker, 2000, 
p. 95).  
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Although more research is required (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 90; Brereton, 
2000, p. 119; Walker, 2006b, p. 17), the limited data suggests that the use of the 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach seems to have had less impact on police 
standards of conduct than advocates of reform would have predicted (Brereton, 2000, 
p. 123). Moreover, the central themes of political support of the executive and police 
co-operation (Miller, 2003, p. 39) require closer examination as determining factors in 
cases of success and failure. Research into failed US agencies reveals that they 
generally suffered from limited powers, insufficient ‘political will’, lack of 
commitment on the part of elected officials and, significantly, an inability to deal with 
opposition from the police and their political allies (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 99). At 
the opposite extreme there is a growing concern in the literature with what is termed 
as ‘regulatory capture’ by police (Savage, 2012, p. 3; Prenzler, 2004, p. 87-88; 
Prenzler, 2000, p. 662; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992, p. 62). Prenzler defines this as 
‘the techniques by which the group being regulated subverts the impartiality and 
zealousness of the regulator’ (2000: p. 662). This can occur where the agency is 
populated by serving or former police officers (Prenzler, 2000, p. 664). According to 
EPAC (2011, p. 7) the oversight body should be “sufficiently separated from the 
hierarchy of the police”. 
 
Other evidence suggests that success stories such as Australia’s Criminal 
Justice Commission (CJC) - an exemplar of an agency that “can make a significant 
contribution to the process of police reform” (Brereton, 2000, p. 120) – requires 
detailed examination of the role of the executive in its success. Reported CJC police 
reform successes (Criminal Justice Commission [CJC], 1997; Lewis, 1999, p. 83; 
CJC, 2001) may have resulted from political factors other than the CJC, including 
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replacement of senior police management, substantial reforms to recruitment and 
training practices, government reviews of management practices, and the retirement 
of many ‘old school’ officers (Brereton, 2000, p. 121).  
 
The factors that influence police co-operation with oversight agencies require 
more detailed examination. Whilst Walker (2001, p. 103) argues that there are 
secondary benefits of public awareness and debate about police practices when the 
police reject or substantially modify an agency’s recommendations, the promise of the 
primary goal of police reform demands an examination of police perceptions of the 
agency and the quality of its work. A vital ingredient is appropriate training and 
professional expertise (Jerome, 2006a, p. 36; Jones, 2006, pp. 61, 67). For example, 
the Audit Commission in England and Wales, an ECO agency that employs the 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ approach, has successfully demonstrated an ability to 
command police attention, if it has the right mix of legal status and powers, specialist 
expertise, independent professional authority and a secure knowledge base 
(Weatheritt, 1993, pp. 33-34).  
 
3.8 Alternative triggers of policy change 
Some data suggests a need to think again, and move away from thoughts of more 
powerful, all-encompassing jumbo commissions. Research suggests that the majority 
of complaint cases do not involve serious misconduct. For example, a study of 
complaints in Queensland, Australia (between 1991 and 2001), found that just 14% of 
complaints against police alleged criminal conduct or corruption (Ede & Barnes, 
2002, p. 116); and a study of IPCC workload found that approximately 21% of 
complaint cases alleged serious misconduct  (Harrison & Cunneen, 2000, p. 9). There 
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is also a growing awareness that “mediation” can effectively resolve many of these 
complaints, to the satisfaction of the complainant and the officer involved (Walker, 
Archbold & Herbst, 2002, pp. 6 – 11; Ede & Barnes, 2002, p. 118). In addition, 
complaints can be significantly reduced by detecting patterns of complaints and, 
where appropriate, intervening in individual cases of errant officers (Macintyre, 
Prenzler & Chapman, 2008, p. 244). These initiatives place more emphasis on 
encouraging police organizations to reform from within, rather than rely upon the 
intervention of external agents of change.  
 
In response to the issue of the adequacy of existing measures some proponents 
of holistic oversight claim that unless there is an agency with authority to conduct 
proactive and own motion investigations into allegations of corruption and 
misconduct, such behaviour will “remain hidden” (Prenzler & Faulkner, 2010, p. 
255). This seems a rather tendentious claim, given the likelihood of a number of 
relevant causal factors in the exposure of corruption and the prosecution of its 
perpetrators. For example, in the case of British Members of Parliament submitting 
false and fraudulent claims for expenses, it is arguable that it was the availability of 
information, media interest, aggressive journalism and subsequent public concern that 
were the catalysts for a thorough investigation and necessary action (Brook, 2009; 
Newell, 2010). This same point seems to be implied by the authors’ reference to the 
numerous revelations about corruption in New South Wales and Queensland that 
resulted in decisions to introduce police integrity and anti-corruption commissions 
(Prenzler & Faulkner, 2010, p. 255). An important feature of accountability concerns 
access to accurate information (Neild, 2000, p. 235; Oliver, 1997, p. 187; Simey, 
1988, p. 74; Cail, 2006, p. 73) and in liberal democracies the media is often more 
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effective than official agencies as guardians of public interest in public sector probity 
(Newell, 2010; den Boer & Fernhout, 2008, p. 5). It is arguable that in some societies 
there is a broader, pre-existing web of police accountability. This web includes the 
watchdog function of the media, and the general openness and visibility of political 
processes and institutions (Jones, 2008, p. 695). 
 
3.9 Holding accountability theory to account 
The broad lines of consensus about the core features of holistic oversight are now 
much clearer. What must now be addressed is whether the literature reveals evidence 
to support the admittedly attractive theory that underpins the concept. Professor Tim 
Prenzler of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and 
Security (CEPS), Griffith University, has been at the vanguard of research into police 
corruption, its prevention and detection, for over a decade (Prenzler, 2000; Prenzler, 
2002a; 2002b; Bassett & Prenzler, 2002; Prenzler & Ransley, 2002; Ede, Homel, & 
Prenzler, 2002; Prenzler, 2004; 2005; 2009a; 2009b; Ransley, Anderson, & Prenzler, 
2007). In the article entitled, ‘Towards a model of Public Sector Integrity 
Commission’, Prenzler and Faulkner (2010, p. 251) explore and extend the debate 
about structured approaches to defeating police corruption. 
 
The holistic oversight theory is probably best represented by Prenzler and 
Faulkner’s definition of the ‘model commission’ as an oversight entity characterised 
by eleven criteria
5
 (2010, p. 259). Neither the criteria – a familiar mix of reactive and 
                                                 
5
 1. Conduct own motion investigations; 2. Require attendance and answers to questions; 3. Hold 
public hearings; 4. Apply for warrants to search properties and seize evidence; 5. Engage in covert 
tactics – including listening devices, optical surveillance, undercover agents and targeted integrity tests; 
6. Directly investigate the most serious and intermediate matters; 7. Make disciplinary decisions and 
manage a mediation program; 8. Conduct research and risk reviews aimed at improving procedures and 
preventing misconduct; 9. Engage in public sector ethics training; 10. Prosecute complainants who are 
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proactive functions - nor the underlying proposition are original. The proposition 
strongly echoes the claim of Brereton (2000, p. 123) that only such an oversight body 
(combining reactive and proactive roles) is likely to be effective in promoting [public 
sector] organisational and behavioural change. It is clear that the principle that lies 
behind Prenzler and Faulkner’s proposition finds some support among other external 
oversight advocates (Walker, 2001, p. 79; Maguire, 1991, p. 178; Newton Cain 2002, 
146). The question is whether the present debate, unlike previous contributions, can 
bring forward comparative data to demonstrate the point: in other words, to 
demonstrate that the model commission is more effective than alternative remedies, 
and indicate those features and methodologies that give the new model an advantage 
over alternative approaches (Walker, 2001, p. 184). 
 
In a radical step beyond the holistic oversight of police model, Prenzler and 
Faulkner propose a ‘model commission’ – an oversight agency that ensures 
accountability in respect of all public service organizations. What is proposed by 
Prenzler and Faulkner, therefore, is a ‘model commission’ that employs all of the 
ideal features of holistic ECO of police, yet goes far beyond the police in terms of 
scope. The ‘model commission’ will target corruption and misconduct in all public 
sector organisations, police included. The authors’ proposal includes all of the 
preferred features of reactive oversight of police: ‘own motion’6 investigations; power 
to require attendance and interview; public hearings; warrants to search and seize; and 
covert surveillance (Prenzler & Faulkner, 2010, p. 259). In addition, the authors refer 
to what have been described as ‘proactive’ features: conducting research and reviews 
                                                                                                                                            
patently vexatious; and 11. Account for its work using a variety of performance measures, including 
stakeholder satisfaction, prosecution outcomes and case study reports. 
 
6
 The term “own motion investigations” refers to the (lawful) capacity to take the initiative in targeting 
a suspected offender (or group of offenders), rather than simply wait for a complaint to be made. 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 87 
to improve procedures and prevent misconduct, and engage in ethics training (idem). 
In building the case for the ‘model commission’ the authors draw on survey data that 
provides important insights into the more restricted case of citizen oversight of police. 
 
The ‘model commission’ must inevitably be dogged by the same problems that 
its police oversight precursors continue to face: the unrequited search for 
unambiguous measures of efficacy (Brereton, 2000, p. 123). It is noteworthy that 
Prenzler and Faulkner admit at the outset that there are “no accurate measures of 
public sector misconduct and integrity which can be used to assess the impact of 
different systems” (2010, p. 252). Whilst the ‘model commission’ might gain further 
momentum in Australia on the basis of strong public approval alone, the question is 
whether the authors can deliver a sufficiently reasoned argument to show how it might 
succeed in “ensuring probity in the public sector” in other parts of world. On that 
matter the jury is yet to return. 
 
3.10 Some conclusions 
Much of the foregoing research provides strong evidence in support of the conclusion 
that the efficacy of an oversight agency is very much contingent upon its political 
context (Neild, 2000, p. 233; Flemming & Lewis, 2002, p. 94; Buren, 2007, p. 37; 
Loveday, 1999, p. 149). Whilst the holistic approach is not a panacea even in an 
appropriate political context (Buren, 2007, p. 39), evidence suggests it may be 
ineffective or superfluous as a means of police reform within an inappropriate 
political context. In some contexts alternative ‘change agents’ might be more cost 
effective and efficient methods of achieving desired police reforms, such as the media 
(Jones, 2008, p. 695; den Boer & Fernhout, 2008, p. 4; Arnold, 2004, p. 3), NGOs 
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(Chukwuma, 2006, p. 9; Neild, 2000, p. 235) the local executive (Oliver, 1997, p. 68), 
and public enquiries triggered by ‘system failures’ (Savage, 2007, pp. 33, 36). Just as 
it is cogently argued that the “crucial issue” in regard to reactive oversight is not who 
does the investigating but the terms on which it is done (Reiner, 1991, p. 228; Terrill, 
1991, p. 294; Smith, 2004, p. 15), the same principle might be applied to proactive 
functions, such as policy review as a means of reducing misconduct. In other words, if 
policy review is inadequate then the solution might be to change the process rather 
than the political actors.  
 
The case in favour of holistic oversight - as a more effective mechanism of 
behavioural change in police organisations – has not yet been clearly demonstrated 
through research. Setting aside the question of where a holistic oversight agency 
should (or could) fit within an existing framework of police accountability 
mechanisms, there are several closely related assumptions in the holistic oversight 
literature that are insufficiently explored. Research suggests that behavioural change 
through organisational reform is a highly complex goal that is difficult to achieve and 
verify. This suggests a need for considerable technical expertise in a successful 
holistic oversight agency and a corresponding capacity in the police organisation to 
interpret and implement policy recommendations. Jones (2008, p. 694) argues that an 
over-reliance upon external controls may actually be counterproductive if they foster 
indifference or resistance within policing organisations and weaken internal 
monitoring systems. This suggests that there must be a degree of balance in the 
responsibilities of the oversight agency and its host, as well as a degree of 
correspondence in the technical capacity to bring about the desired changes.  
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There seems to be a limited appreciation among holistic advocates of the 
difficulties encountered in achieving behavioural and organisational change. The 
point is best made by asking whether, all other things being equal, the holistic remedy 
would have precluded the utter shambles of the Dutroux Affair (Punch, 2003, pp.174-
180) or the “professional incompetence” of the Stephen Lawrence case (Newburn, 
2008a, p. 97). Research suggests that the laudable aims of holistic oversight are not 
easily achieved, even with the weight of the legislature and executive behind them. 
What advocates seek is broadly similar to the ambitions of ‘New Public 
Management’, a public sector reform strategy embraced by a number of governments 
and which research has found difficult to assess, in terms of efficacy in bringing about 
positive improvements in public service provision (Dawson and Dargie, 2002, p 44; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p.139; Burnes, 2004, p. 414; Handy, 1999, cited by 
Mullins, 2004, p. 959). Research into the efficacy of efforts to reform police 
behaviour in the UK reveals similar problems: for example, post-Lawrence Inquiry 
reforms (Great Britain, Home Office, 2005, p. 58), efforts to eradicate racist attitudes 
(Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary [HMIC], 1999, pp. 53-4; Rowe, 2004, p. 
29; Reiner, 2000, p. 134 ), the introduction of ethical interviewing techniques (Clarke 
& Milne, 2001, cited by Milne, 2007, pp.56 & 96), and equal opportunity reforms 
(Equal Opportunities Commission, 2007, p. 5; Morris Enquiry 2004, 1.21). Such 
research has made some question whether revised policies or legislation or training 
can automatically bring about a desired transformation of police behaviour (Newton 
Cain, 2002, pp. 147, 149). 
 
These problems in effecting public sector reform strongly suggest that if 
holistic oversight is to succeed it must demonstrate an appropriate level of technical 
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expertise, regardless of whether it adopts a restricted (i.e. purely linked to complaints 
data) or unrestricted ‘policy review’ approach. Although there is limited data 
regarding their efficacy, HMIC and the Audit Commission – agencies that pursue a 
broad policy review agenda - demonstrate a high degree of technical proficiency in 
terms of methodology and human skills (Savage, 2007, p. 97). Such a degree of 
technical capability has important cost and economy of scale implications, such as to 
preclude the idea of introducing holistic oversight in respect of relatively small police 
organizations. This implication finds support in the apparently weak performance of 
agencies in the US (Walker, 2001, p. 94). At the same time, there must be a 
corresponding capacity to effect changes among police managers.  
 
The policy review and recommendation approach respects the principle of 
police autonomy and responsibility, and implies a technical capacity to interpret and 
implement recommendations, and evaluate the results. Whilst UK police organisations 
have witnessed an evolution of internal and managerial accountability in response to 
policy review and recommendations from HMIC, the Audit Commission and Home 
Office (Oliver, 1997, p. 182; Reiner & Spencer, 1993, p. 172; Pagon, 2002, p. 166; 
Elliott, 2002, p. 198), such capacity development cannot be simply assumed in all 
cases. Likewise, the internally-driven reform in England and Wales that Savage 
(2007, pp. 126-7) documents, points to the necessity of an internal capacity to effect 
change. Police reform is a complex process that implies change or modification of a 
structure system “without altering the fundamental social or political order 
underpinning it” (Coliandris, Rogers & Gravelle, 2011, p. 200). If police reform is to 
work, the policy advice of the oversight agency must be reciprocated by a sufficient 
internal police capacity, in terms of leadership and change management (Hutchinson, 
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2010, p. 239). Some research highlights the capacity for bottom-up reform: i.e. 
encouraging patrol officer initiative to generate improved performance and conduct 
(Toch, 2008, pp. 67-70). Although Bayley (2008, p. 14) might be correct in stating 
that police reform is rarely initiated from within, externally-prompted change cannot 
succeed without a capacity and will to change within the organization. 
 
Although Walker (2001, pp. 86-7), Bayley (1983, p. 158) and Goldstein (1990, 
p. 48) recognise the ideal announced by the European Code of Police Ethics (Council 
of Europe – Committee of Ministers, 2001, Para. 64), that of the police themselves 
being responsible for police reform through research, policy innovations and 
education, there seems little recognition of the need for a sufficient degree of internal 
capacity to allow the holistic model to operate. There is support from at least one UK 
example that “timely, robust and quality research” can drive improvements in policing 
(Dawson, & Williams, 2009, p. 373), although the argument seems more concerned 
with efficiency than conduct. The proposition that policing can and does improve 
through academic research finds broad support among senior serving police officers 
and academics (Gravelle & Rogers, 2010; Stanko, 2009, p. 310 – 3011).   
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4.1 Introduction  
As indicated in Chapter 1, the overall aim of this research study is to attempt to 
answer the question of whether external citizen oversight (ECO) agencies or their 
procedures are associated with lower levels of police misconduct. Chapters 2 and 3 
have assisted in establishing the more precise parameters of the question, by 
identifying the conceptual framework that underlies the various expert proposals 
about oversight agencies in the literature. Theories about ECO have been placed 
within the broader context of the police governance debate, and the more important 
problems associated with the competing dynamics of governance have been 
recognized. This work has sought to set the stage for the main part of the research 
which will focus on a case study in Kosovo. 
 
The present Chapter will consider the methodological issues related to the  
objective of exploring the broader hypothesis that ECO is associated with improved 
conduct, by critically examining the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) as a case 
study. It will include a critical evaluation of the potential use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, as well as the possible benefits of adopting a mixed methods 
approach. Finally, it will present arguments in favour of those methods that were used 
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to obtain data about the beliefs, attitudes and perceptions
7
 of KP officers about 
external oversight, and their implications for improved policing standards and reduced 
misconduct.  
 
4.2 Use of a case study 
The use of the PIK as a case study is the central and most important feature of this 
research. It represents an opportunity to answer Walker’s question, provide a more in-
depth understanding of the particular case (Willig, 2008, p. 74; Buren, 2007, pp. 4-5; 
Hayden & Shawyer, 2007, p. 51; Ruona, 2005, p. 238; Yin, 2003, p.1), and add to the 
corpus of knowledge regarding ECO and the factors that influence its efficacy. 
Robson (2002, cited by Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, 2003, p. 93) defines a 
case study as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context”. The PIK – 
founded in 2006 - represents one the first ECO agencies in eastern Europe and the 
study will try to explore its impact on misconduct among Kosovo Police officers, and 
its efficacy relative to the police-centric system that preceded it.  
 
From a theoretical perspective the overall research strategy is akin to what 
scholars call ‘explanation building’ - a process of testing a theoretical proposition 
(e.g. Walker’s hypothesis) by constructing an explanation of certain factors that 
influence the efficacy of ECO oversight while collecting and analysing evidence 
(Saunders et al, 2003, p. 391). This approach involves testing and amending the 
hypothesis through a series of iterations of data collection and analysis, thereby 
                                                 
7 These terms are used in that sense described by Oskamp, & Schultz (2004, p. 9) as a “cognitive component” – i.e. 
ideas and beliefs one has about an object. 
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arriving at an increasingly accurate description of the relevant causal factors and the 
way they impact upon the efficacy of a holistic oversight agency.  
 
The case study research will fall into two general components: the source of 
data for the first component is secondary and the second is primary (Saunders et al, 
2003, p.188/9; Hayden & Shawyer, 2007, p. 57). Secondary data is the data that have 
been already collected by and are readily available from other sources (Saunders et al, 
2003, p.188/9; Hayden & Shawyer, 2007, p. 57): e.g. information that is available in 
the quantitative or qualitative data in published articles, in the form of text, graphs, 
and appendices. Such data are cheaper and more quickly obtainable than the primary 
data and also may be available when primary data cannot be obtained at all. Most 
importantly, secondary (documentary) data sources in a case study can be used to help 
ensure reliability and validity of primary data sources (i.e. interview and questionnaire 
data) by cross-checking data results (Yin, 2003, pp. 85-88). Such use of several 
primary and secondary sources in a case study is referred to as ‘triangulation’ 
(Hayden & Shawyer, 2004, pp. 51-52; Yin, 2003, p. 97). 
 
In the first (secondary data) component the PIK case study will be explored 
through certain documentary evidence, including: legislation that defines the PIK 
structure, powers and responsibilities; and PIK inspection reports and annual reports. 
In addition to confirming the extent to which the PIK matches the criteria proposed by 
ECO advocates in the literature, this data will yield important findings about the way 
in which the PIK might claim to influence levels of police misconduct and improve 
standards. The second component will be concerned with gathering primary data 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 95 
about the beliefs and perceptions of KP officers about the performance of the PIK and 
the way it influences police behaviour. 
 
The results of the data gathered under the first component of the case study 
(secondary data) are explored in Chapter 5. It looks at the evidence for and against the 
PIK as a valid instance of ECO, as per the requirements of scholars in the literature. 
The chapter then explores the available evidence in PIK reports that it has had an 
impact on the KP that could be interpreted as reducing misconduct and/or raising 
standards of policing. Chapter 6 explores primary data evidence under the second 
component: namely, perceptions of KP officers about the role and impact of the PIK 
on their conduct and standards.  
 
4.3 Research dilemmas associated with the central research question 
The question of whether external citizen oversight agencies (or their procedures) are 
associated with lower levels of officer misconduct, suggests – at a cursory level of 
analysis - a numeric comparison of two or more states of affairs – one in which 
external oversight is present, and one in which it is absent. In other words, it is a 
purely quantitative exercise of identifying the number of cases of recorded 
misconduct in one state of affairs, then identifying the number of cases (in identical or 
similar categories) of misconduct in the other state of affairs, and finally comparing 
the two and identifying a causal link. What is typically required is to compare key 
measures taken before the introduction of the PIK with the same measures taken after 
introduction (Johnson, 2002, p. 41). What is needed, therefore, is an approach that 
falls into that empirical research category that is concerned with quantitative data in 
the form of numbers, as opposed to that category concerned with qualitative data that 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 96 
is not in the form of numbers (Punch, 2005, p. 3). 
 
However, there are inherent problems in a purely quantitative approach per se, 
not least the search for a causal link. These difficulties are exacerbated still further 
when comparing performance before and after the introduction of an external 
oversight agency. Measuring oversight effectiveness is difficult because of the 
number of variables involved, conflicting ways of interpreting data and the problems 
of hidden misconduct (Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, p. 77). As Walker and Bumphus 
(1992, cited by Prenzler, 2000, p. 661) point out, the purely quantitative approach of 
analyzing the complaint disposal process (from initial receipt through to 
substantiation rates and final penalties) is fraught with “confounding variables”.   
 
A number of factors intervene and obviate a simplistic analysis in recorded 
cases of transition from what will be called ‘police-centric systems’ of complaint 
investigation (i.e. where only the police investigate the police) to systems in which 
investigations are conducted exclusively or – more frequently – jointly with police 
investigators. As often as not, the transition is accompanied by a change in the 
legislation that defines categories or types of misconduct, thereby making a direct 
comparison difficult or impossible (Prenzler, 2000, p. 662). In cases where the 
responsibility for investigation of complaints is shared by the police and the external 
agency, it becomes impossible to accurately separate the effects of the agency as 
distinct from that of the police investigators. Since it becomes impossible to talk of 
exact causes in the “complex network of causality”, one can only describe known 
correlates or associations (Oppenheim 1992, p. 17).   
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4.4 Potential benefits of a qualitative approach 
It seems that unless the realm of potential evidence extends beyond a simple numeric 
dynamic, the question of PIK efficacy will necessarily evade a reliable response. 
Qualitative research has been defined as encompassing those techniques of data 
collection and analysis that rely on non-numerical data (Cassell, Buehrins, & Symon, 
2006, p. 162); moreover, it is to mean “any kind of research that produces findings not 
arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, p. 17). According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) qualitative research 
methods are capable of finding data relating to phenomena about which little is yet 
known. It is argued that qualitative methods are appropriate in situations where one 
needs to first identify the variables that might later be tested quantitatively, or where 
the researcher has determined that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe 
or interpret a situation (Flick, 2009, p. 13-14). What is advocated, therefore, is a move 
away from the traditional dualism that dismisses qualitative data as subjective and 
highly fallible, whilst lauding quantitative data as objective and minimally fallible 
(Howe, 2003, p. 17).  
 
Since it is largely concerned with the meanings and personal experience of 
individuals, groups and sub-cultures (Flick, 2009, p. 62; Keegan, 2009, p. 22; Heaton, 
2004, p. 56), a qualitative approach to the external oversight question would mean 
amongst other things exploring the views of police officers and members of the public 
about their perceptions (or beliefs) of whether the advent of external oversight 
coincides with lower incidents of misconduct. Prenzler and Lewis, leading advocates 
of external oversight, point to the potential of such surveys of police perceptions as a 
way of measuring the “rigour and deterrent impact of agency processes” (2005, p. 78). 
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Indeed, there have been a number of valuable empirical studies on police officer 
perceptions of accountability (Sviridoff and McElroy, 1989; Perez, 1994; Weisburd, 
Greenspan, Hamilton, Williams, & Bryant, 2000; de Guzman, 2004; Wells and 
Schafer, 2007; De Angelis and Kupchik, 2007), although these studies are 
predominately based on North American or Western European research (Eijkman, 
2006, p. 411). 
 
What is sought through such surveys is that which Barnett (2000, p. 21) calls 
the epistemological voice of the KP organization: those matters - born of collective 
understanding - about which it speaks with authority. In spite of its “soft” social 
science reputation, qualitative research can be “hard-nosed, data-driven, outcome-
oriented, and truly scientific” (Yin, 2003, p. 33). Qualitative research views ‘reality’ 
as a concern for the negotiation of 'truths' through a series of subjective accounts 
(Jupp, 1989, p. 29).  
 
In terms of exploring the potential yield of the proposed PIK case study 
research, it will help to consider where it falls in Yin’s (2003, p. 3) triad of case study 
types: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. If successful, the search for 
qualitative data in response to Walker’s question is likely to yield useful insights 
under each type. An exploratory study is aimed at defining the questions or 
hypotheses of a subsequent study or at determining the feasibility of the desired 
research procedures (Ellinger, Watkins & Marsick, 2005, p. 330; Yin, 2003, p. 5): in 
other words, it is about finding out what is happening, and asking questions and 
assessing phenomena in a new light. The PIK case study will attempt to explore the 
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largely unknown patterns of beliefs, attitudes and perceptions
8
 about external 
oversight among KP officers.  
 
In the process of exploring and examining patterns in the data, the study will 
take on an ‘explanatory’ character: i.e. it will present data bearing on a cause and 
effect relationship and, therefore, explain how things happened (Ellinger et al, 2005, 
p. 330; Yin, 2003, p. 5). Specifically, the study ought to yield data from personally 
held beliefs that explain why the activity of the PIK has had (or failed to have had) an 
impact on officer conduct. However, what is proposed cannot alone claim to provide a 
descriptive study: i.e. a presentation of a complete description of a phenomenon 
within its context (Yin, 2003, p. 5). In order to portray such an accurate profile of the 
various persons, factors, events or situations that might reveal the nature of the impact 
of external oversight on the KP, more data would be required from other potential 
sources. 
 
An exploratory research design tries to more precisely define the research 
question that drives the study, and results in the formulation of hypotheses. In this 
sense an exploratory case study is one in which the collection of data occurs before 
theories or specific research questions are formulated. Walker does not state a 
hypothesis about the positive impact of external oversight that might be proved or 
disproved; rather he asks a question that both acknowledges the absence of sufficient 
research and also recognizes the complex nature of the causal relationship between an 
external oversight agency and the police organization it influences. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to characterize the intended case study research as exploratory 
                                                 
8
 These terms are used in that sense described by Oskamp, & Schultz (2004, p. 9) as a “cognitive 
component” – i.e. ideas and beliefs one has about an object. 
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rather than descriptive. If successful, the study might yield sufficiently intelligible 
patterns in the data to justify a limited theory (or theories) about the complex 
relationship at the heart of Walker’s question.  
 
4.5 Selecting an appropriate qualitative strategy  
Among the stated benefits of qualitative research methods is the potential they offer to 
gain insights into people and work-related situations (Glenn, 2010. p 104; Easterby-
Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Lowe, 2004, p. 85), and the array of interpretative techniques 
that can describe, decode, and translate the meaning of phenomena of the social world 
(Denscombe, 2003. p. 267; Van Maanen, 1983, p. 9). Johnson (2002, p.27) 
emphasises that the selection of an appropriate methodology represents a critical step 
in the research planning process: an error at this point will result in failures further 
into the planning and implementation stages. A methodology is appropriate if it serves 
the research question. In order to acquire data from a large number of middle- to 
senior-ranked police officers, the rich qualitative research tradition suggests a number 
of options, including: focus groups, interviews, observation, and questionnaires 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007. p 352; Ruona, 2005, p. 234; Noaks & Wincup, 
2006, p. 77). A decision was made to adopt the use of semi-structured interviews as 
the most appropriate qualitative method of obtaining perception data from senior KP 
officers. The rationale behind this decision and the process of designing the interview 
guide are described in Appendix B. 
 
4.6 Mixing methods 
According to Johnson (2002, p. 40) a research design in pursuit of a relationship 
question must tackle a special challenge: namely, if the research seeks to say that one 
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particular factor (i.e. external oversight or its procedures) caused something to happen 
(i.e. reduced incidents of police misconduct), then the design must rule out any and all 
other possible determining factors. In relation to Walker’s question this task is far 
more problematic than that of a controlled laboratory study. In the complex world of 
police organizations it is much more difficult to isolate the exact impact of policies or 
programmes where the environment (of possible causal factors) cannot be controlled 
(Johnson, 2002, p. 40). The complexity of the environment in which performance is 
being measured means that no single measure, or even group of measures, provides an 
objective demonstration of the effectiveness of an agency in preventing corruption or 
effectively adjudicating allegations of misconduct (Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, p. 78). It 
is important, therefore, that the research strategy is fully cognizant of the fallibility – 
in an absolute sense - of any research finding: it would be virtually impossible to 
eliminate the effects of all the potential or actual determining factors in officer 
behaviour. What can be ascertained with a degree of certainty are dominant patterns 
in the attitudes and beliefs of officers about the impact of external oversight on their 
behaviour and that of their peers or those they supervise. 
 
As discussed earlier, it can be fairly argued that the answer to Walker’s 
question cannot take the form of the simple product of a numeric analysis: i.e. a 
simple demonstration that there are more (or, as the case might be, less) cases of 
misconduct after the introduction of external oversight. Apart from the discussed 
problem of comparing performance (before and after introduction) where the recorded 
categories of misconduct are quite different, there is the seemingly impossible task of 
isolating extraneous causal factors – i.e. all those potential factors that (regardless of 
external oversight) might have influenced the overall number of misconduct cases. A 
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topical example: coinciding with the period of introduction of external oversight there 
may have been an economic crisis, resulting in a series of violent protests that brought 
the police into more frequent confrontations with members of the public. The 
dramatic increase in the number of complaints against police would have occurred 
regardless of the presence or absence of the external oversight agency. In such 
circumstances it would be wrong to conclude – on the basis of the number of 
complaints alone - that the agency had no impact on police misconduct.  
 
If Walker’s question defies a purely quantitative response, an answer must 
include patterns in the beliefs and perceptions of those whose behaviour is 
(potentially) influenced by external oversight – i.e. qualitative data. It would, 
however, be wrong to conclude that this argument excludes the use of quantitative 
research strategies and their contribution to the Walker debate. 
 
Much has been written on the researcher’s dilemma in reconciling the 
quantitative and qualitative (Howe, 2003, pp. 16 – 23); however, it is arguable that the 
quest for an answer to Walker’s question transcends the alleged incompatibility of 
positivist versus interpretive dynamics. By examining the case study of the PIK, a 
satisfactory answer might be achieved by isolating patterns of freely articulated 
beliefs about the impact of the PIK. It is noteworthy that, in the complex context of a 
case study, Yin (2003, p. 4) firmly recommends that multiple sources of data are often 
required: this implies the need to consider more than one approach, qualitative or 
quantitative, or a combination. It is, therefore, perhaps more appropriate to view the 
qualitative/quantitative divide as less contradictory and more complimentary in the 
examination of issues as complex as Walker’s question (Blaxter, 2010. p 217; 
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Denscombe, 2003. p. 231; Scott, 1996. p 59). As Howe puts it, “quantification does 
not eliminate qualitative judgments and therefore is not an alternative to them” (2003, 
p. 21). The two approaches might best be viewed as opposite sides of a single coin. If 
this is the case, then the obverse of the previous paragraph is also true.  
 
The nature of concepts used in oversight research (e.g. achievement, and 
attitude) is such that dependence on qualitative judgments and data is required to 
minimize the fallibility of quantitative instruments. So long as external oversight 
research remains couched in terms of such concepts (and it must to have a bearing on 
practice), quantitative data gathering will have to remain faithful to and parasitic upon 
qualitative judgements (Howe, 2003, p.20).  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the quest for an answer to Walker’s question takes 
the study into the eye of the stormy ‘mixed methods’ debate, which reaches back to 
1973 and earlier (Denzin and Giardina, 2006, xvi; Sieber, 1973, p. 1335). Much of the 
early argument tended to accentuate certain characteristics and attributes of the two 
approaches - quantitative and qualitative – thereby emphasizing the purported and 
exclusive benefits of one, over the deficits of the other (Sieber, 1973, p. 1336). In this 
polarized debate, quantitative methods are described as techniques associated with the 
gathering, analysis, interpretation and presentation of numerical information (Teddlie 
& Tashakkori, 2009, p. 5; Keegan, 2009, p. 23; Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2006. p 64; 
Ten Have, 2004, p. 4): whereas, qualitative methods are defined as techniques 
concerned with the gathering, analysis, interpretation and presentation of narrative 
information (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 6). This polarization led to talk of the 
traditional superiority of deep, rich observational data and virtues of hard, 
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generalizable, survey data (Sieber, 1973, p. 1335). There cannot be any 
accommodation – we are told - between such disparate and irreconcilable dynamics 
(Guba, 1978, p. 81).  
 
Whilst much of the early argument appeared to take place in isolation from the 
business-end of actual research, the same conundrum created by Walker’s question 
was troubling those in social science research. It was felt that social research must, if 
it is to be deemed legitimate and credible, aspire after the meticulous standards of 
physicists – the rigorous testing of hypotheses by means of the data that take the form 
of numerical information (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p. 251; Thietart, 2001, p. 
27). Yet, as shown in the Walker example, this ideal is not always achievable and 
suggests the counter-intuitive conclusion that many areas of social reality must remain 
incomprehensible, since they cannot yield sufficiently quantitative data.  
 
Mixed methodologists present an alternative to the quantitative and qualitative 
traditions by advocating the use of whatever methodological tools are required to 
answer the research questions under study (Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007a, p. 7; 
Creswell & Creswell, 2005, p. 317). Accordingly, investigators go back and forth 
seamlessly between statistical and thematic analysis (Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007a, 
p. 8; Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007b, p.303). This ‘combined’ or ‘mixed’ method 
approach means that the strengths of both approaches are combined, leading to a 
better understanding of research problems than either approach alone (Blaxter, 2010. 
p 206; Creswell & Garrett, 2008, p. 322; Heaton, 2004, p. 56; Gabrielian, 1998, p 
193).  
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The mixed method approach, therefore, seems appropriate as a key to the 
Walker question. It acknowledges that there are inevitably important research 
questions that relate to human behaviour, that defy a purely quantitative approach and, 
at the same time, indicate that certain types of purely qualitative data require further 
triangulation (Creswell & Creswell, 2005, p. 320). It is also a recognition that, in 
cases such as the complex causes of police misconduct and incompetence, every 
technique suffers from inherent weaknesses and these weaknesses can only be 
corrected by cross-checking with other techniques – no research operates without bias 
(Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966, quoted by Sieber, 1973, p. 1337). 
The result is a ‘composite’ insight into a complex reality (Creswell & Creswell, 2005, 
p. 322). 
 
In view of these observations, it was decided to adopt a ‘mixed methods’ 
strategy and complement the semi-structured interviews with a more expansive 
quantitative method. A decision was made to use the self-report questionnaire as the 
best quantitative strategy on the basis of a number of factors. The rationale behind this 
decision and the process of designing the questionnaire are set out under Appendix C. 
 
4.7 Data gathered through use of the questionnaire 
As in qualitative research, the realm of quantitative research offers a range of 
methods. Easterby-Smith (2004, p.130) indicates that interviews, questionnaires, 
tests/measures and observation are the main ways of gathering quantitative data, 
alongside some less commonly used methods such as sourcing from archives and data 
banks. Questionnaires are measuring instruments that ask individuals to answer a set 
of questions, often about attitudes and opinions; if the questions ask for information 
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about the individual respondents, they are called “self-report questionnaires” 
(Schwab, 2004, p. 39). This approach involves use of a series of precisely worded and 
standardized questions that are designed to cater for either factual answers or less 
precise answers where the respondent is uncertain (Denscombe, 2003. p. 166; 
Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.75).  
 
A decision was made to adopt the self-report questionnaire as the best strategy 
on the basis of a number of factors, particularly the size of the target population and 
the time constraints on all involved. Since the relevant population consists of over 
7,000 police officers, a limited sample would have to be conducted rather than full 
census. A sufficient sample would nonetheless involve several hundred KP staff, and 
the appropriate strategy would have to make the task practically feasible among busy 
operational police staff. Having considered the options described earlier, it was 
decided that the best strategy would be to conduct a survey using a structured self-
report questionnaire, as a means of “obtaining information from, or about, a defined 
set of people, or population” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p.135). Quantitative 
questionnaires seemed to offer obvious advantages for the main aim of a survey: 
namely, to construct a subset of the KP population, which is fully representative in the 
main areas of interest (i.e. perceptions of the effectiveness of the PIK). Moreover, this 
strategy held out the possibility of making subsequent statistical inferences on the 
likelihood that patterns of beliefs and attitudes observed in the sample would also be 
replicated in the entire KP population. Finally, it is noteworthy that the mix of 
structured interviews and self-administered questionnaires has been used in similar 
studies of police perceptions (see for example de Guzman, 2007, p. 34). 
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As described in Appendix B a survey methodology was employed to measure 
the perceptions of PIK clients, both supervising officers and supervised officers (i.e. 
patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants). Although there are reservations about the 
use of surveys and respondent perceptions, other data collection procedures were not 
possible because of time and financial constraints, and would not allow for the 
collection of data in a substantial number of cases. For example, data would need to 
have been collected concerning the history and reasons why KP policies were enacted 
to see if they were implemented in response to PIK actions. Officers would need to be 
debriefed using protocol analysis on a regular basis to determine whether the 
existence of the PIK influenced their daily street-level decisions. It was clear that the 
costs involved in these types of data collection processes would have been beyond the 
scope of this limited research. 
 
It is acknowledged that the use of beliefs and perceptions to measure external 
oversight impact is not uncontroversial. There are concerns that, inter alia, 
respondents may forget, filter, or misinterpret events or that they might give socially 
desirable (rather than accurate) responses to questions. In short, there is concern that 
respondents might reconstruct their own reality concerning an issue about which they 
are being questioned (Brace, 2008, p 13, 21). Against all this, there is good evidence 
in the relevant literature that indicates that perceptions are important determinants of 
actions (Smith, 2009. p. 58; Oskamp, & Schultz, 2004, p. 6); police officers, like other 
employment groups, tend to act upon the information that is at their disposal. 
 
The questionnaire consists of two parts (see Appendix B). The first part of the 
survey instrument provides an explanatory note that is designed to provide some 
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explanation concerning the purpose of the interview and the research as a whole, as 
well as the issues of confidentiality (Gillham, 2005, p. 78; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 
350). With the prior agreement of the KP General Director and the Head of EULEX 
Police Strengthening Department (PSD), the questionnaires were distributed by KP 
Station Commanders of the main regional police stations of Kosovo, located in the 
five main urban centres: Prishtinë/Priština, Prizren, Pejë/Peć, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, 
and Gjilan/Gnjilane. Station commanders distributed the questionnaires among 
operational officers of the early and late shifts during the course of a single day. 
Officers were told that the process of completing the questionnaires would only take a 
few minutes and that it was entirely voluntary. It was explained to the officers that the 
research data would be treated confidentially and that the researcher was not in any 
way connected with a government agency. It was also explained that the survey 
instrument contained no identifiers that might link the respondent to the recorded data. 
Completed forms were collected and handed back to the Station Commanders.  
 
Although the respondents were drawn from across Kosovo and the sample size 
was quite large, it was nonetheless a convenience sample, not a representative sample. 
A decision was made not to attempt to distribute the questionnaires in a random 
manner, as required in probability sampling (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003, pp. 
153-5; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002, pp. 135-6; Doherty, 1994, p. 21). A 
non-probability sampling approach was adopted, due to the previous difficulty in 
achieving a reasonable response rate with random sampling of KP officers. The 
adopted approach, therefore, might be classified as non-probability sampling 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003, p. 170). The analysed data only refers to the 555 
respondents, and no claim is made that the results are representative of the entire 
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target population of KP officers in the first four ranks. It is acknowledged that the 
sample might just be “a quirk of the random nature of the selection procedure” rather 
than representing a real underlying trend in the population as a whole (Connolly, 
2007, p. 142). All that will be claimed is that the findings are true for the actual 
sample group of KP officers. 
 














Responses as % 
of total 
officers/rank 
Patrol officer 5918 81.2 441 79.5 7.4 
Sergeant 795 10.9 73 13.2 9.1 
Lieutenant 285 3.9 37 6.7 12.9 
Captain 83 1.1 4 0.7 4.8 
Total 7081 97.1 555  7.6 
 
 
A total of 700 questionnaires (or 10% of the total target population) were 
distributed across all five KP main police stations (140 forms per station) and 
distributed by Station Commanders among operational shift officers who were on 
duty on the day of distribution. A total of 555 forms were returned as completed 
(79.2% response rate), albeit some participants neglected to respond to one or more 
items; as a result of these missing data, sample sizes differed somewhat across 
questions and are reported accordingly. Once the questionnaires had been returned, 
the challenge of studying the results and identifying patterns in response to Walker’s 
question was tackled. Analysis is about drawing out distinct and potentially 
                                                 
9
 Data obtained from Directorate of Personnel, Kosovo Police HQ, on June 5
th
 2012. 
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generalizable features of the data (Gillham, 2005, p. 131). It was found that the task of 
quantitative analysis was made much easier by use of a version of SPSS
10
 software; as 
recommended in the literature, this made the process of identifying dominant patterns 
from the limited responses much easier (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2006, p. 203, 211; 
Gillham, 2005, p. 144; Denscombe, 2003. p. 242). 
 
Table 4.1 provides an analysis of the respondents, according to rank. The 
majority of respondents (79.5%) belonged to the first rank, patrol officer, and 
represented 7.4% of the total number of officers of that rank in the KP. However, as a 
proportion of their numbers in the KP organization, the first three supervisory ranks 
were even better represented in the study results. Sergeants, the first supervisory rank, 
formed 13.2% of the respondent group, and represented about 9.1% of the total 
number of Sergeants in the KP. A group of 37 Lieutenants formed 6.7% of the 
respondents, and represented almost 13% of the total officers in that rank. As noted 
above, however, the distribution was not random and the respondents cannot be said 
to be representative of the entire population of KP officers in the first four ranks. The 
survey results only reflect the beliefs of those KP officers who took part in the survey.  
 
Following the pattern of de Guzman’s study, the questionnaire (see Appendix 
A) was designed to differentiate between officers who had had direct experience of 
the PIK or PSD and those without such experience. The final section of the 
questionnaire contains a series of four factual questions – i.e. questions for which 
there is, in principle, a true answer, rather than whether the answer is factual 
(Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.78). The first two factual questions (see Row 1) are 
                                                 
10
 Originally known as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
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simple closed measures (yes/no), asking respondents whether (a) they have been 
investigated by the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK); and (b) whether investigated 
by the Professional Standards Directorate. These are of course important indicators of 
both a heightened level of awareness or increased knowledge of the disciplinary 
regime, and will create an important subset of the survey that might contrast with the 
perceptions of those respondents who had not had direct contact with PIK or PSD.  
 
Questions three and four (Row 2) are also factual and closed (yes/no), and 
seek to identify those officers with experience of (a) making a complaint against 
another officer, and (b), those who have provided evidence against other officers. 
These categories have particular importance in the KP because of the unusually high 
incidence of complaints made against officers by other KP officers (Police 
Inspectorate of Kosovo, 2008, p. 5). Expanding on the work of Perez (1994), the 
second portion of the survey instrument contains six items aimed at eliciting 
responses concerning the perceived impact of the PIK on the KP, at the individual and 
organizational levels. A six-point Likert-scale response option was provided with each 
statement. The response options were “strongly agree,” “agree,” “slightly agree”, 
“slightly disagree”, “disagree,” and “strongly disagree”. The six statements are: 
 
a) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because 
of the presence of the Police Inspectorate. 
b) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity 
and honesty. 
c) Police misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years. 
d) PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations. 
e) Complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent 
agency. 
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f) Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators of 
complaints against Kosovo Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers. 
 
Data from responses to the six statements were entered on an SPSS database and 
the results analysed in the following manner: total responses across all ranks 
(Appendix E, Chart 6.2); responses of officers who stated that they had (Chart 6.3) or 
had not (Chart 6.4) been investigated by the PIK; responses of officers who stated that 
they had (Chart 6.5) or had not (Chart 6.6) been investigated by the PSD; responses of 
officers who stated that they had (Chart 6.7) or had not (Chart 6.8) made a complaint 
against another officer; and, finally, responses of officers who stated that they had 
(Chart 6.9) or had not (Chart 6.10) given evidence against another officer. All these 
charts can be found in Appendix E. The findings are critically discussed under 
Chapter 6. 
 
4.8 Semi-structured interviews 
The second part of the primary research involved 10 interviews with senior officers, 
above the rank of Captain. The choice of semi-structured interviews was based on a 
number of factors that were found in the literature. The interview is identified as the 
most fundamental qualitative research method (Keegan, 2009, p. 73; Easterby-Smith 
et al, 2004, p. 85; Ten Have, 2004, p. 5), offering the opportunity to probe deeply, 
uncover clues, open new dimensions of the problem, and secure inclusive accounts 
based on personal experience or biographies (Smith, 2009. p 115; Burgess, 1982, p. 
107). Moreover, interviews can provide a vehicle for data about individual 
perceptions (Smith, 2009. p 116; Weinberg, 2002, p. 117), and qualitative interviews 
are often used in conjunction with other techniques (Fontana & Prokos, 2007. p 112), 
thereby offering a potentially useful component of the present study.  
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Semi-structured interviews offer a via media that has a number of potential 
advantages in the present study: use of open-ended questions balanced by a degree of 
pre-determined purpose (Smith, 2009. p 116; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 233); 
flexibility balanced by structure (Jupp, 1989, p. 68); greater opportunity to probe with 
follow-up questions (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 79). As a result, it can yield rich and 
often surprising data about perceptions, contradicting the assumptions of policy 
makers (Jupp, 1989, p. 68). Although costly in question/topic development, 
demanding interviewing skill/practice (Gillham, 2005, p. 79), and requiring more 
investment in analysis and interpretation (Gillham, 2005, p. 70), this approach holds 
out the promise of sufficiently rich data in relation to the research question about PIK 
efficacy. 
 
The decision to adopt a particular research strategy, according to Noaks & 
Wincup, (2006, p. 78), should be influenced by a number of factors, including the 
characteristics of the target population, the sensitivity of the topic, location of the 
interview and the timescales. An exploration of senior KP perceptions about the 
impact of the PIK on their organization must go beyond highly structured interviews 
that are based on questionnaires and offer a limited and positivistic approach 
(Easterby-Smith-Smith et al, 2004, p. 86). Likewise, it helps to move beyond the 
inevitable assumptions that drive structured questions. Semi-structured interviews 
offer the benefits of both structure and opportunities to probe responses and explore 
ideas about the impact of external oversight. Finally, a semi-structured approach has 
the benefit of non-verbal clues, such as voice inflection and facial expression 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 86) - an important consideration when communicating 
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with ethnic Albanian officers who sometimes feel reluctant to voice negative views 
about government organizations. 
 
A semi-structured guide (see Appendix A) was used and included 13 questions 
that are open in style and invite the respondent to express an opinion rather than 
merely state a fact (Robbins, 1998, p. 91). The first four questions explore the 
respondent’s knowledge and understanding of the PIK, as well as his/her perceptions 
of its apparent strengths and weaknesses. The next five questions try to explore the 
respondent’s perceptions of the nature, extent and trends in KP misconduct. This is 
followed by two further questions exploring perceptions about the impact of the PIK, 
and two final questions on misconduct trends. Some questions deliberately overlap in 
an effort to check understanding and consistency in the responses. Responses were 
recorded using a system of jotting down notes that would serve as a memory aid, and 
more detailed notes were later constructed, thereby avoiding the detrimental effects of 
writing too much (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 86; Denscombe, 2003, p 175). A 
Kosovan friend and colleague read the questions to the interviewees (in Albanian or 
Serbian) and simultaneously translated the responses. In some cases, the senior KP 
staff preferred to speak English.  
 
Once the interview records were completed the process of analysis began: i.e. 
drawing out distinct and potentially generalizable features of the data (Gillham, 2005, 
p. 131). According to Bogdan and Biklen (1982, p. 145) qualitative data analysis 
means “working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, 
synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be 
learned, and deciding what you will tell others.” Following the advice in the literature, 
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the chosen strategy involved the use of inductive analysis of data: that is, allowing 
critical themes to emerge from the data itself (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 461; Denscombe, 
2003. p 187). This included use of “open coding” – the identification of the themes 
emerging from the raw interview data (Blaxter, 2010. p 221; Blaxter, Hughes, & 
Tight, 2006, p. 203; Ellinger, Watkins & Marsick, 2005, p. 341). This meant 
identifying and tentatively naming some conceptual categories into which the 
responses could be grouped (Ellinger, Watkins & Marsick, 2005, p. 337; Denscombe, 
2003. p. 271). In view of the relatively small number of interviews, a simple analysis 
method was employed. Key words and phrases were highlighted on each set of 
interview notes, and a list of those key words and phrases was compiled according to 
their frequency across the group of respondents. Words or phrases that appeared to be 
similar were grouped under the same category. As and when necessary, categories 
were modified or replaced during the subsequent stages of analysis (Denscombe, 
2003. p. 272).  
 
4.9 Ethical considerations and conclusions regarding the methodology 
 
Due consideration was given to the question of access and the requirements of ethical 
research. Although there were no significant ethical issues raised by the study, 
certainly nothing of the dilemmas of personal dignity that occur in some studies 
(Flick, 2009, p. 4), a number of steps were necessary to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of ethical research. Using the University of Portsmouth guidance and, 
specifically, the ethical research form, it was ensured that the interview Guide 
(Appendix A) and questionnaire (Appendix C) incorporated clear and unambiguous 
principles: namely, that participation was on a strictly voluntary basis, based on 
informed consent and that the anonymity of participants would be respected. As 
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advised by scholars, prior to obtaining the consent of individual participants I 
discussed the exact terms and purpose of the research with the KP Director General, 
Reshat Maliqi, and received his formal permission (Oliver, 2003. p 41, 43).  
  
These points of action were important in order to ensure that participation was 
conditional upon the person’s voluntary consent, an essential requirement of ethical 
research (Denscombe, 2003. p. 138; Coontz, 1998, p.7); it sought to ensure, moreover, 
that the consent was properly informed, rather than just a bureaucratic process 
(Oliver, 2003. p 28). It was also vital, from an ethical perspective, to reassure the KP 
participants that their responses would remain anonymous, not simply to encourage 
honest responses but to protect them from any possible negative consequences 
(Oliver, 2003. p 77; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 239). Due consideration was given to 
any risks, physical or psychological or economic (e.g. career opportunities), that 
might affect respondents (Oliver, 2003. p 31) and these were deemed to be negligible. 
 
4.10 Reflections on methodological practice 
The combined use of the two approaches as part of an effort to answer Walker’s 
question about the efficacy of ECO agencies moved successfully through the planning 
stage and on to the implementation of a pilot study. No significant practical problems 
were encountered with the implementation stage, once the access and ethical issues 
were tackled. All the interviews under the qualitative stage (Appendix A) yielded 
useful data, with senior KP officers providing free-flowing and rich accounts in 
response to the questions. The only adverse factor in most interviews was the feeling 
among respondents that it took too long to get through all the questions (60 – 70 
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minutes on average) and the suggestion that some of the questions were superfluous, 
insofar as they repeated the substance of earlier questions.  
  
Table 4.2 - Research Method Matrix 






1 Third objective: 
explore whether a 
particular ECO case 













evidence that PIK 
recommendations 
had been acted upon 
by KP. 
5 & 7 
2 Fourth objective: 
explore whether a 
particular ECO case 





primary evidence of 
police perceptions. 




Obtain data about 
officers’ beliefs and 
perceptions about 
PIK, using a question 
Guide, and analyse 
findings. 
6 & 7 
3 Fourth objective: 
explore whether a 
particular ECO case 





primary evidence of 
police perceptions. 
KP officers in the 




Obtain data about 
officers’ beliefs and 
perceptions about 




6 & 7 
 
The feedback regarding the questionnaires was generally good. Most 
respondents found the form easy to use, in terms of question comprehension and 
readily understandable choice of response, as well as quick to complete – a major 
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factor in KP acceptance and cooperation. The only unresolved issue concerned the 
failure of one or two KP staff to complete all the final factual questions.  
 
Table 4.2 (Research Method Matrix) provides a summary of the research 
methods that were used in the course of this study. The idea of presenting the 
summary in the form of a matrix was inspired by a similar approach in Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison (2007, p. 59). It provides a useful overview of the mixed 
methods approach that was adopted and a point of reference for what follows in the 
thesis. 
 
It is important to clarify how my professional role relates to the participants in 
the study. Whilst the ultimate object of the research is the PIK (an entity that is quite 
independent of KP), the research sought to identify patterns of beliefs and attitudes 
among KP officers about the PIK, its procedures and how effective it is in dealing 
with police misconduct. I have in the past worked closely with both organizations, 
PIK and KP; however, at the time of the research I worked with EULEX and my 
position involved no direct or indirect relationship with the PIK, and only a very 
indirect working relationship with KP.  
 
It is important to stress that my work with EULEX involved a direct interface 
with the managers of EULEX Police Strengthening Department (PSD), an 
organization with about 350 EU police officers. However, my interface with KP was 
mainly indirect (apart from monthly update meetings at KP Headquarters) and only 
related to the most senior KP officers. At the time of the study, I had no direct or 
indirect professional relationship with the PIK, having completed the PIK project in 
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2008. Thus, the research work was conducted within a work context in which I had no 
direct engagement with KP officers (of any rank), still less a power relationship, in 
which I had any authority over KP officers. It should be noted that, even in terms of 
their relationship with senior EULEX staff, KP staff form part of an autonomous and 
independent police organization that did not act under the authority of EULEX at any 
stage of the Mission’s mandate. 
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Chapter Five 




Chapter Five will explore the broader hypothesis that external citizen oversight (ECO) 
is associated with reduced misconduct and higher standards, by critically examining 
the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) as a case study, comparing its legal and 
political framework with the theoretical principles that are discussed in the literature. 
It will also examine the available secondary evidence to support a link between the 
PIK and reduced levels of misconduct among Kosovo Police employees.  
 
The study will look at the evidence of police governance and accountability in 
the Republic of Kosovo, a former part of Yugoslavia that has emerged from a 
devastating inter-ethnic war, to achieve relative stability and an independence that 
continues to be disputed. It represents an important source of contemporary data for a 
number of reasons, not least because of the pivotal role of the Kosovo Police (KP) in 
maintaining long-term stability, and its relationship with the Police Inspectorate of 
Kosovo (PIK) – the first example of holistic police oversight in the western Balkans. 
Police governance and accountability are - in a very real sense – critical ingredients in 
the political stability of Kosovo. In order to understand the governance dynamic that 
now operates in Kosovo and the role of the PIK in that dynamic, it is essential that the 
study begins with an examination of the history of the KP and the unusual if not 
unique evolution of its governance dynamic.  
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5.2 A short history of police governance in Kosovo  
The present day Republic of Kosovo came into existence as a result of foreign 
intervention in the last of the series of wars that brought about the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. Following an intensive NATO bombing campaign, the Yugoslav forces 
of Slobodan Milošović retreated from Kosovo in June 1999 and the United Nations 
assumed authority for the province of Kosovo, then part of the Republic of Serbia 
within Yugoslavia (Peake, 2004, p. 16). That event brought an end to the last 
Yugoslav war and the beginning of a process of resolving the status of this small 
territory – an area ravaged by war and conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs 
for centuries (Simpson, 2007, p. 80; Scheye, 2008, pp. 171-2). On June 10, 1999, the 
UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 which 
placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorised KFOR, 
a NATO-led peacekeeping force. Through UNSCR 1244 the United Nations 
appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) who had 
responsibility for an interim government administration (United Nations [UN], 1999, 
Para. 10), known as United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the creation of 
a new democratic government for Kosovo (Pettifer & Vickers, 2007, p. 229; UN, 
1999, Para. 11 [c]).  UNSCR 1244 also provided the UN with full executive authority 
for policing in Kosovo and a mandate to create an indigenous police service (Bayley 
& Perito, 2010, p. 45; United Nations, 1999, Para. 11(i); Scheye, 2008, p. 174). An 
UNMIK Police Commissioner was appointed to lead several thousand United Nations 
International Civilian Police (UNIP) officers and the emergent Kosovo Police (KP). 
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In the broader context of police reform on the world stage, it must be 
recognised at the outset that Kosovo represents a case that stands at the extreme end 
of the spectrum of post-conflict intervention. As with East Timor, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, police reform occurred after a period of military conflict and the collapse of the 
former government administration (Bayley, 2001; Bayley, 2006). As with the other 
examples, the intervention forces in Kosovo had to quickly fill the post-conflict power 
vacuum, ensure security and public order, establish an interim administration and - 
simultaneously – construct permanent government institutions. The creation of the 
Kosovo Police (KP)
11
 formed only one part of the hugely complex task of building an 
entire government from scratch (Bayley & Perito, 2010, pp. 44-5). As will be seen, 
the creation of the KP spanned almost a decade and it only achieved full executive 
authority at the end of 2008. It is possibly the longest police reform programme in 
history, ending with the exit of the last UNMIK Police Commissioner in December 
2008. 
 
The history of the KP since its inception in 1999 has been one of evolution 
toward the status of a fully autonomous and independent organization (Harris, 2007, 
p. 7). The period of development up to 2009, however, was never characterised by a 
discernibly uniform pattern of smooth progression; rather, the KP evolved in an 
uneven pattern that was dictated by the changes in UNMIK staff and their policy 
decisions made in response to changing events in Kosovo (Narten, 2009, p. 138). 
Judah (2008, p.108) identifies two distinct periods of UNMIK history, that equally 
apply to KP development: September 1999 to March 2004, and March 2004 to full 
autonomy in January 2009. The pivotal event that separates the two periods was the 
                                                 
11
 Note that between 1999 and January 2009 the KP was known as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). 
The name change occurred after full transition of authority from UNMIK to the Government of the 
Republic of Kosovo. Throughout this research paper the organisation will be referred to as the Kosovo 
Police or KP. 
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outbreak of widespread and serious ethnic violence in Spring 2004 (Judah, 2008, p. 
108). This event resulted in a seismic shift in the UNMIK policy with regard to the 
pace and scope of transition of authority for policing in Kosovo.  
 
In the immediate period that followed the violence in March 2004, the UN 
woke up to the underlying causes of unrest among the majority population and 
dramatic changes followed. Work to construct the KP was accelerated and the transfer 
of substantial areas of policing authority began. The SRSG, Harri Holkeri, resigned in 
June 2004, followed by the UNMIK Police Commissioner, Stefan Feller, in August 
2004 (Top Kosovo official is quitting, 2004); and UNMIK adopted a sharp change of 
policy on the transfer of authority for policing in Kosovo. This involved a programme 
of rapidly promoting KP officers into higher ranks, handing over police stations to KP 
command and developing a legal framework and organizational structure (Gowan, 
2006). In August 2004 there were more than 6,000 KP officers, including 410 
Sergeants, 100 Lieutenants, 22 Captains, nine Majors, nine Lieutenant Colonels, and 
one Colonel; in December 2004 UNMIK announced that 20 of 33 police stations had 
been transferred to the KP (Harris, 2007, p. 23). By March 2005 UNMIK was able to 
announce that 31 out of a total of 33 police stations across Kosovo and two Regional 
Commands (Prizren and Gjilan/ Gnjilane) had been transferred to the KP. A total of 
20 police stations had been transferred in a period of just eight months.  
 
UNMIK could also indicate in March 2005 that the task of drafting a legal 
framework for the KP was advancing well. Regulation 2005/53, providing authority to 
establish the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice, and Regulation 
2005/54 (On the Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service) 
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were ratified by the SRSG in December 2005. In March 2006 the Senior Police 
Appointments and Discipline Committee (SPADC) - a body that represents local 
Municipalities and was introduced by Regulation 2005/54 – convened for the first 
time and assisted in the selection of a KP Deputy Commissioner and four Assistant 
Deputy Commissioners
12
 (UNMIK, 2005b). Following the departure of the last 
UNMIK Police Commissioner at the end of 2008, the first Director General
13
 of the 
KP was appointed by the Prime Minister and assumed full authority for the police 
organisation in February 2009 (EULEX – EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 2009). 
Whilst the shift in UNMIK policy after March 2004 was a welcome change from the 
initial period of slow transition of responsibility to the KP, the speed of transfer of 
stations and – more significantly – the meteoric rate of promotions among KP officers 
that followed, created a number of new problems for this young organization. As late 
as 2007, PIK reports reveal the incomplete state of the KP organization, fragile and 
largely untested leadership and marginal role in a weak criminal justice system (PIK, 
2007f).  
 
In spite of the apparent weaknesses in KP leadership capability, the 
organization has commanded an unparalleled level of public confidence throughout its 
short history. This is an important factor in the role of the PIK and its perceived 
efficacy. Evidence suggests that the KP, unlike the documented ‘hard cases’ for police 
oversight (Lewis, 1999, p. 30), might be characterised as a ‘soft case’ in terms of 
ethical conduct and public/police relations. Public opinion surveys indicate high 
                                                 
12
 Note that the Police Law of Kosovo, ratified after the declaration of independence in 2008, abolished 
the most senior rank titles of ‘Commissioner’, ‘Deputy Commissioner’ and ‘Assistant Commissioner’, 
introduced by UNMIK. The new law, perhaps inspired by the practice in the Republic of Albania, 
introduced the titles ‘Director General’, Deputy Director General’ and ‘Assistant Director General’.  
13
 With the departure of UNMIK the KP changed its name (Kosovo Police, rather than Kosovo Police 
Service) and adopted the title ‘Director General’ (as used in the Republic of Albania) for the most 
senior police officer, rather than the UNMIK title, ‘Police Commissioner’. 
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approval ratings for the KP, at least among the majority, ethnic Albanian, population. 
Between March 2005 and November 2011 surveys conducted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that KP had an average public 
satisfaction rating of 78.1%, with a peak of 86.9% in 2005 and a low point of 70.9% 
in September 2009 (UNDP, 2012, p. 7). This compares with 17% satisfaction with the 
police among citizens in neighbouring Serbia in 2004 (Downes, 2004, p. 52). KP 
popularity is no doubt the result of the apparent absence of what Punch (2000, pp. 
304-51, cited by Savage, 2007, p. 16) calls ‘straightforward corruption’. In 2006 a 
survey found that only 6% of Kosovo citizens believed that corruption was present in 
the KP, compared with 18% for the courts and 23% for the Kosovo Customs Service 
(UNDP, 2006, p. 50).  
 
Although the public perception of the KP as a corrupt organization has been 
rising, it remains one of the most trusted organizations in Kosovo: a survey in June 
2011 found that only 15.2% of the public believed that the KP was corrupt, compared 
with 42.3% for the Customs Service and 41.6% for the Courts (UNDP, 2012, p. 18). 
The KP approval rating contrasts strongly with other government entities: in 
November 2011 Kosovans expressed just 30.2% satisfaction with Government, 40.5% 
satisfaction with their politicians in the Assembly of Kosovo, and 19.7% satisfaction 
with the Public Prosecutors’ Office (UNDP, 2012, p. 10). The public opinion survey 
data is consistent with the general trend in complaints against the KP. PIK data for 
2008 indicated just 95.4 citizen complaints per 1,000 officers (or 0.09 complaint per 
officer). Unfortunately, it proved impossible to locate accurate data concerning the 
number of complaints against police in neighbouring states, such as Serbia, Albania 
and F.Y.R. Macedonia. However, the KP data compares very favourably with 
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England and Wales in 2008, at 291 complaints per 1,000 officers (Steele, 2008) and 
Queensland Police throughout the 1990s – the reforming era of the CJC - at an 
average of 250 complaints per 1,000 officers (Criminal Justice Commission [CJC], 
2001, p. 4). No data could be obtained regarding public satisfaction with the various 
systems (UNMIK, KP and PIK/KP) of dealing with complaints against KP officers 
between 1999 and 2012. 
 
However, in 2010 the number of complaints against KP officers had risen to 
166 per 1,000 officers, KP (Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, 2011, p. 7), indicating a 
significant increase in complaints over the two-year period after KP obtained full 
autonomy from the UN. Interpreting this sudden increase is difficult, given the 
continuation of public satisfaction above 70% and the relatively low public concern 
about corruption. Later in this Chapter the study will consider one possible clue to this 
apparent anomaly: the unusually high proportion of complaints that derive not from 
members of the public, but other KP officers. 
 
5.3 Independence dynamic versus central dynamic 
For much of its history the KP was controlled by UNMIK, rather than a parent 
Ministry. Even after the appointment of the first Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
spring of 2006, it was the UNMIK Police Commissioner rather than the Minister who 
exercised authority over the KP (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 2005b). The 
broader political context of the KP and its parent Ministry, has been fluid, uncertain 
and sui generis since their inception. That profound uncertainty derives from the 
disputed status of Kosovo, a matter that continued to divide the international 
community years after its declaration of independence in February 2008 (Ker-
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Lindsay, 2008). Indeed by December 2012 only 98 of the 193 UN countries had 
formally recognised Kosovo, and two permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (China and Russia) had reiterated their refusal to recognise its independence, 
blocking the way to UN membership (Who recognised Kosovo, 2012). Although 
Kosovo has edged toward political and socio-economic stability after many years of 
ethnic conflict, poverty and political uncertainty, the process of stabilisation remains 
incomplete and directly influences the power relationship between the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and KP (Narten, 2009, p. 141). 
 
The applicable law that regulated the relationship between the KP and 
Ministry of Internal Affairs before 2008 consisted of UNMIK Regulation 2005/53, 
UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, and UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. This legislation was 
replaced by the Constitution of the Republic (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 
2008a) and Police Law of Kosovo (Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008b) in 
2008. It is clear that the model of police governance described in this legislation is 
quite different from that of Serbia (and the F.R. Yugoslavia), and more closely 
mirrors Council of Europe principles – i.e. the separation of the police organization 
and its parent Ministry (Council of Europe – Committee of Ministers, 2001, Para. 13, 
15 & 59). In contrast, the traditional Yugoslav model of government is based on a 
principle of centralised control of the police (Downes, 2004, p. 22). Serbia in 2004, 
for example, structured the Ministry of Interior as the final tier of police management 
in a system of government that, according to Downes, confused “the difference 
between police accountability and operational control” (2004, p. 20). Ministry posts 
were largely populated by police officers and Ministry functions eclipsed those of a 
police headquarters. This created a decision-making nexus that allowed political 
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motive to influence the full range of police operational and administrative activities. 
This system and its consequences created a public perception of the police as a 
political tool, eroding and undermining the sense in which the police act with 
impartiality and without fear or favour. Echoing the arguments of Walker (2001, p. 
102) and Miller (2003, 41), Downes (2004, p. 21) contends that the restoration of 
public confidence in an impartial police service demands that the Ministry is clearly 
separated from the police organization. As will be noted, however, the original 
governance model in Kosovo was altered and shifted toward the old Yugoslav model 
after 2008. 
 
The UNMIK Regulation (2005/53) was replaced in 2007 by a Police Law 
which was promulgated by the Assembly of Kosovo and has undergone several 
subsequent and largely minor amendments, resulting in Law No. 04/L-076 in March 
2012. As depicted in Figure 5.1, the police governance dynamic in Kosovo is 
characterized by a dominant central dynamic, weak local dynamic and weakening 
independence dynamic. According to the 2012 Law the police act “under authority of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and under the control and supervision of the General 
Director of the Police” (Article 5(1), Government of Kosovo, 2012a). This provision 
captures the legislator’s intention of creating a bi-polar political tension between the 
parent Ministry and the authority of the General Director, the most senior police 
officer. This point is made clear in what follows. 
  
The Minister’s authority does not include the operational management of 
the Police. The General Director shall report and shall be directly 
accountable to the Minister for administration and management of the 
Police. The General Director cooperates with the Minister and provides 
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him/her with information and reports according to the manner 
determined by the law (Government of Kosovo, 2012a, Article 5(1)).  
 
Echoing the lines of demarcation in the long-standing debate in England and 
Wales, the Kosovo police law attributes exclusive authority for “operational 
management” to the police, and a requirement for direct accountability to the Minister 
in respect of administration and management, and the provision of information. 
Article 5(2) goes on to elaborate upon the additional aspects of the Ministry’s 
authority vis-à-vis the police. These include the development of police-related policies 
and legislation, overseeing the coordination of activities of the police with other 
internal and external agencies, and kindred matters. 
 
 









‘ S U B O R D I N A T I O N  &  C O N T R O L ’  A P P R O A C H  
‘ E X P L A N A T O R Y  A N D  C O - O P E R A T I V E ’  A P P R O A C H  
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In a clear sign of the diminishing authority of the local dynamic in Kosovo, the 
2012 Police Law removed the last remnants of the UNMIK provisions that required 
station commanders to actively consult Municipal Community Safety Councils 
(MCSCs) when formulating local policing objectives and the provisions whereby 
MCSCs had authority to short-list candidates for appointment as Station 
Commanders. All this is replaced by a bland and generalized duty to “provide 
assistance” to local government institutions (Article 8(2), Kosovo. Government of 
Kosovo, 2012a).  
 
The most senior staff of the Kosovo Police (General Director and the Deputy 
General Directors) are selected and nominated by a Commission, established by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (Article 37(1), Government of Kosovo, 2012a). What 
happens then is unclear, due to the imprecise wording of Article 37(4) (Government 
of Kosovo, 2012a): it would seem that the Minister proposes a candidate to the 
Government (Cabinet of Ministers), which in turn recommends a candidate to the 
Prime Minister. The latter has exclusive authority to appoint the General Director, 
seemingly without following the recommendation of the Government. The Minister 
has exclusive authority to appoint the Deputy General Directors upon the 
recommendation of the General Director (Article 37(5), Government of Kosovo, 
2012a). This marks a remarkable shift toward the central dynamic, and away from the 
earlier UNMIK provisions which gave a greater role to local representatives in the 
process of selecting senior police staff. The earlier legislation provided that the Senior 
Police Appointments and Discipline Committee (SPADC) had authority to interview 
and select candidates for the most senior posts and recommend a short-list of three 
(for each position) for final choice and appointment by the Minister. Each 
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Municipality would nominate representatives to participate in the SPADC on a 
rotational basis, thereby ensuring that all ethnic groups and political parties had a 
voice in senior police appointments. This crucial ingredient to lasting stability in a 
deeply divided society has been removed, and the authority to appointment senior 
police staff is concentrated in the hands of one political party of the majority ethnic 
group. This is a cause for concern among those who wish to see lasting stability and 
peace in Kosovo. 
 
The concern about the overtly dominant role of the central dynamic in Kosovo 
is not merely a matter of legal theory. In July 2011 the Prime Minister - whose 
administration introduced these amendments to the Police Law – acted in apparent 
breach of the same Law by peremptorily dismissing the General Director of the 
Kosovo Police because of a dispute about an operational policing matter (Balkan 
Insight, 2011). There is growing evidence, therefore, of a pronounced dynamic shift in 
Kosovo, as depicted in Figure 5.1. The local dynamic has effectively disappeared and 
the central dynamic has increasingly adumbrated the independence dynamic, in a 
strong movement toward the ‘subordination and control’ approach. This dramatic shift 
seems to form one part of the ruling political party’s ambition to exercise exclusive 
control of all parts of the Administration, not just the police. For the purposes of the 
present study this change must have important implications, in terms of the 
perceptions of KP officers of the Ministry and its means of ensuring police 
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5.4 PIK’s role in police governance in Kosovo 
The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) was established in July 2006 as an oversight 
agency for the Kosovo Police (KP) and derived its authority from that of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (UNMIK, 2005b, Section 9.3; UNMIK, 2005a, Annex XVI (vi)). 
The law relating to the PIK has been amended several times since 2006, and the 
organization is currently regulated by Law No.03/L-231, the Law on the Police 
Inspectorate of Kosovo (Government of Kosovo, 2010). It is the mission of the PIK to 
ensure an “accountable, democratic and transparent police service” (Government of 
Kosovo, 2010, Article 3). This overall aim is achieved via six specific objectives 
under the PIK Law (see Chart 5.1). 
 
In general terms the PIK seems to satisfy the basic requirements of external 
oversight advocates: i.e. it is civilian, independent of the police, and combines 
reactive and proactive functions. According to Article 2 the PIK is an ECO 
mechanism that combines two primary functions. Firstly, the PIK has authority to 
investigate allegations of crime committed by KP officers of all ranks (Article 2.1 & 
2.4) - the ‘reactive’ function. The 2010 PIK Law marked a significant change in the 
scope of the PIK reactive function, moving the PIK competency away from serious 
discipline allegations (as defined under the old legislation - UNMIK, 2005b, Section 
9.1(b); UNMIK, 2006, Section 11.4) to allegations that, if proved, would amount to a 
criminal matter.  
 
Secondly, it performs an inspection function, scrutinizing the structures and 
functions of Kosovo Police to ensure accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in 
the implementation of the law (Article 2.1). This broadly corresponds to the proactive 
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role advocated by Brereton (2000, p. 118) and others (Lewis, 1999, p. 82; Lewis & 
Prenzler, 1999, p. 6; Auerbach, 1999, p. 8; Walker, 2001, p. 179; Maguire, 1991, p. 
178; Newton Cain, 2002, p. 146). However, the inspection function appears not to be 
limited only to matters pertaining to conduct (or the causes of misconduct): the 
wording of Article 2.2 suggests a broader concern with police performance in 
achieving objectives and, therefore, perhaps indicating a link to those complaints 
against police that concern failures to perform correctly. 
 
Table 5.1 - Legal objectives of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (Article 2) 
(1)   prevention, detection, documentation and investigation of the criminal offences 
committed by Kosovo Police employees, regardless of rank and position while on 
duty or off duty; 
(2) inspection of the structures and functions of Kosovo Police to ensure 
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of applicable 
laws, sub-legal acts and standard operational procedures that are in force; 
(3) investigation and/or inspection of high profile disciplinary incidents, involving KP 
employees, as defined in Article 4, paragraph 1, and sub-paragraph 1.11 of this 
law; 
(4) investigation of all alleged disciplinary offences of police officers having the 
highest rank of the senior police management level and senior appointed police 
positions; 
(5) when there is a based suspicion that the General Director of Police has committed 
disciplinary violation, the Prime Minister may authorize the PIK to conduct the 
disciplinary investigations. Upon completion of disciplinary investigation the PIK 
shall report on findings to the Prime Minister; 
(6) to receive all citizens complaints, as well as to review and determine where the 
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The two functions were implemented separately in a phased capacity building 
programme conducted by the OSCE. The proactive function was implemented first, 
commencing in July 2006 with a six month training programme (PIK, 2006f, p. 7); in 
October 2007 the reactive function became operational after a six month programme 
(PIK, 2007f, p. 9). A closer examination of the PIK Law is required, however, to 
ascertain the extent to which it corresponds or diverges from the views of holistic 
advocates. The Chapter will now explore the PIK’s independence, and reactive and 
proactive functions, in greater detail. 
 
 
5.5 PIK independence 
According to the relevant law (Article 6, Government of Kosovo, 2010), the PIK is 
established as an executive agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, independent 
from the Kosovo Police, and stated to be ‘apolitical’, even though it “functions under 
the authority of the Minister” (Article 10, Government of Kosovo, 2010). It operates 
under the “control and supervision” of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who 
manages the budget (Article 9, Government of Kosovo, 2010). Although not fully 
defined in law, the term ‘executive agency’ was introduced by the UNMIK interim 
constitutional framework for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001, Chapter 9.3.3) and provides for 
certain specialist entities within the government administration that, although linked 
to a parent Ministry, exercise a degree of operational autonomy. The CEO only 
answers to the Minister, has independent authority for the agency’s budget and does 
not rely upon the administrative support of the Ministry. If independence is construed 
as ‘impartiality’ or ‘neutrality’ – the majority finding of research into the beliefs of 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 135 
ECO agencies in the British Isles (Savage, 2012, p.8 of 19) – the PIK might stake a 
strong claim on the basis of its non-police staff and distinctly separate organization. 
 
The PIK broadly meets the EPAC definition of a ‘police oversight body’, since 
it has a defined statutory responsibility for oversight and matches many of the EPAC 
principles (EPAC, 2011, p. 5). However, the PIK forms part of the government 
administration, deviating from the EPAC principle that an oversight agency “should 
ideally not form part of the executive branch of government” (EPAC, 2011, p. 6). 
Much like HMIC, PIK operates as an extension of the Ministry that has a policy 
control function for the police (Oliver, 1997, p. 75; Government of Kosovo, 2010, 
Article 6 & 10). However, the all-civilian PIK would claim to be more independent of 
the police than the HMIC, and has a budget that is quite separate from that of the 
police and Ministry (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Article 9). In spite of its name and 
unlike other ‘police inspectorates’ in the former-Yugoslavia (Downes, 2004, pp. 52-
53), the PIK is comprised exclusively of civilian staff and is not – directly or 
indirectly – linked to the KP or otherwise dependent upon the police organization for 
finance or equipment or logistical support. It is, however, solidly linked to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and provides the means whereby the Ministry can 
exercise active oversight of the police, whilst respecting the principle of police 
operational responsibility (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Articles 6 & 10).  
 
In spite of its status as fully independent of the police organisation, the PIK 
link to the parent Ministry is at odds with the views of Lewis (2000, p. 35), Bayley 
(2006, p. 52), Sossin (2003, p. 4) and other holistic oversight advocates (EPAC, 2011, 
p. 6). These policing scholars argue that a close link to the executive risks exposing 
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the oversight agency to unsympathetic political forces that might easily view the war 
on crime and the need to support the police as more likely to win votes than tackling 
police abuse of civil rights. These scholars would - with some justification - challenge 
the PIK Law’s indication that this oversight agency is guided by the principle of 
“political impartiality” (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Articles 5(3), 6(2), & 12(1)). It 
can be readily argued that the statutory role of the Minister (an elected politician) has 
the obvious potential of circumscribing the autonomy of PIK decision-making. The 
PIK forms part of the Ministry (Article 6); it functions under the authority of the 
Minister (Article 10(1); the Minister sets its strategic objectives, ensures its 
coordination with KP, and provides its secondary legislation (Article 10(2)); the 
Minister establishes a Commission to select CEO candidates, then appoints one its 
candidates (Article 13(2) & (3)).  
 
5.6 PIK reactive function 
Since its inception in 2006 the PIK, in spite of setbacks, has performed an important 
and effective role in investigating complaints against police officers. The history of 
PIK investigations falls into two distinct parts, corresponding to the change in its 
governing legislation: 2007 – 2010, and 2011 – 2012. In each period the evidence 
suggests that the PIK staff were able to successfully investigate complaints and allow 
the relevant adjudicating authority to make a decision. Each of the two periods will be 
discussed and PIK performance data explored. 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 (UNMIK, 2005b) and UNMIK Administrative 
Direction 2006/9 (UNMIK, 2006) – the first PIK legal framework - replaced a system 
whereby all complaints against KP officers were investigated exclusively by police 
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officers of the Professional Standards Directorate (PSD). Until its full transfer to the 
KP in October 2005, the PSD comprised both KP officers and UN Civilian Police 
(PIK, 2007a, p. 4). Mirroring the principle explained by Lewis (1999, p. 77), the new 
UNMIK legislation did not exclude KP officers from the process of resolving 
complaints. Under the 2006-2010 legislation, all complaints were initially directed to 
the PIK, evaluated and recorded. The evaluation involved deciding whether the 
allegation of misconduct would – if proved – amount to a criminal offence or serious 
discipline offence or minor discipline offence (UNMIK, 2006, Section 11.4). Criminal 
allegations were forwarded to a public prosecutor for appropriate action. Complaints 
in respect of minor offences were sent by the PIK to the UNMIK Police 
Commissioner for investigation by the PSD. In the case of allegations that amounted 
to serious misconduct against police officers of any rank – including forms of 
corruption – the PIK officers led the investigation. Sections 12 and 13 of UNMIK 
Administrative Direction 2006/9 defined a number of offences as either serious or 
minor. In this way the UNMIK legislation created a graded response mechanism 
similar to that of the IPCC which, as Seneviratne (2004, p. 335, cited by Savage, 
2007, p. 39) points out, falls short of a fully independent system of investigating 
complaints. 
 
 Under the PIK Law 2010 the PIK continues its function of receiving, 
recording and grading complaints (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Article 2(1)6), but 
the categories are simplified and the PIK competence is radically changed. The PIK 
must decide whether a complaint, if proved, would amount to a criminal offence; if 
not a criminal offence, the PIK must consider whether the alleged behaviour, if 
substantiated, would amount to a disciplinary offence (Government of Kosovo, 2010, 
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Article 2 & 18). All cases of alleged criminal behaviour are investigated by the PIK 
(and not the KP) in close cooperation with the Public Prosecutor; discipline cases, 
unless deemed to be “high profile”14 or involving senior police officers, are referred 
to the KP Director General for investigation by the PSD (Article 2(1)3 & 4). Thus the 
former distinction between minor and serious discipline offences is dissolved, and, 
more importantly, the PIK has responsibility for the investigation of criminal cases. 
These changes brought the PIK in line with the relevant EPAC principles, in terms of 
competence for criminal and high profile matters (EPAC, 2011, p. 6).  
 



























0 482 599 408 
Completed cases 
that were referred 
to SPADC 
0 157 139 100 
Total Cases 250 2024 1688 1185 
 
                                                 
14
 According to Article 4 the term “high profile” discipline offences include: (1) direct conflict or 
incidents between the police and communities that relate to racial, ethnic or discriminatory acts; (2) an 
acute problem of a direct conflict between the police and the community. The conflict may take the 
form of police harassment, brutality or excessive force; (3) all use of lethal force incidents; (4) death in 
police custody; (5) fatal traffic accidents involving police employees. 
 
15
 PIK, 2011a, page 5. 
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How effective was the PIK reactive function? Table 5.2 provides a brief 
analysis of PIK performance in the first period. The OSCE training programme for 
PIK investigators ended in September 2007 and the team of twenty investigators 
began to record and categorize complaints between October and December of that 
year. A few cases were investigated toward the end of the year but, since the 
investigations ended after the end of December, these initial cases were recorded 
under the 2008 figures. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.2 the PIK began to fully implement the new 
legislation in 2008. In that year, the PIK recorded 1,235 complaints and investigated 
482 of these as ‘serious discipline allegations’ and passed most of the remaining cases 
to PSD for investigation (PIK, 2008, p. 159); in 2009 a total of 1,688 complaints were 
recorded, and PIK investigated 599 as ‘serious discipline allegations’ (PIK, 2009, p. 
224); and in 2010 a total of 1,185 cases were recorded and 408 investigated as 
‘serious discipline allegations’ (PIK, 2010, p. 173). On average the PIK investigators 
referred about 25% of the cases they investigated to the SPADC for adjudication: 157 
(32%) in 2008, 139 (23%) in 2009 and 100 (24%) in 2010. 
 
Although PIK staff began investigations at the end of 2007, SPADC hearings 
finally began in June 2009
16
, after many months of delay in the approval of the list of 
Municipal representatives by the Minister. This meant that a backlog of over 200 
cases had built up by the time of the first hearing. This problem was further 
exacerbated by the slow rate of progress with SPADC hearings in 2009 and 2010. 
However, between the start of SPADC hearings and the end of 2010 the Committee 
                                                 
16
 Note for the File – Hearing Session of SPADC, 3rd July 2009, Department of Security and Public 
Safety (DSPS), OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 
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made a total of 359 discipline recommendations (PIK, 2011, p. 13), suggesting that 
the backlog was being tackled. As evidenced in Chapter 6, some KP officers view the 
PIK as responsible for the backlog and consequent delay in finalizing cases during 
this period.  
 
Since the introduction of the new legislation the PIK has expressed greater 
optimism that it can make an effective contribution (PIK, 2011b, pp. 13-18). 
However, the new legislation means that the PIK has responsibility for investigating a 
significantly reduced proportion of the complaints it receives. In 2011 PIK recorded 
649 complaints against KP officers (PIK, 2011b, p. 13) and, following a period of 
formal training, the agency’s staff investigated 164 complaints of alleged criminal 
behaviour (PIK, 2011b, p. 15 - 17). In 2012 PIK received and recorded 1,078 
complaints and forwarded 776 cases to the Professional Standards Directorate. Of the 
remaining cases 292 were investigated as possible criminal offences and a decision to 
charge was made in 122 cases. At the request of the PIK, a total of 66 KP employees 
were suspended and 6 employees were transferred pending a final decision of a court. 
Although the evidence is admittedly limited to the 2011/12 complaint data, it suggests 
that although the PIK will now have authority to investigate all of the most serious 
complaints against police under the PIK Law2010, the overall proportion of 
complaints the agency will deal will greatly reduce.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the PIK in 2006, all complaints were handled by an 
internal police agency known as the Professional Standards Directorate (PSD), and it 
continued after 2006 albeit with a diminished if complementary role. As much as 
50% of all complaints continued to be dealt with exclusively by the PSD under the 
new law in 2012, and this might be a cause for concern. The only independent 
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assessment of the PSD that has been published is the PIK report of April 2007 (PIK, 
2007a), which relates to PSD performance in 2006. During that year PSD received 
854 complaints. A total of 278 (32.5%) cases resulted in disciplinary action and 185 
(21.6%) cases were under investigation or awaiting decision at the close of the year. 
In the remaining 130 cases the officers were not found guilty or the matter was 
referred back to the officer’s supervisor for resolution.  
 
No data is available regarding the perception of complainants about the 
efficacy of the system before the PIK was introduced, or subsequently up to the end 
of 2012. However, the PIK did find two areas of concern. Firstly, KP procedures 
allowed for a system of informal resolution but failed to record the number of such 
cases and the nature of the complaints (PIK, 2007a, Para. 2.8). Secondly, the PIK 
found that the appeal process (after an officer is found guilty) was seriously flawed. 
The appeal panel was composed exclusively of senior KP officers (PIK, 2007a, Para. 
2.3) and, in the first three months of 2007, over 74% of KP officers were successful 
on appeal against a discipline decision (PIK, 2007a, Para. 2.12). This extraordinarily 
successful appeal system meant that, in real terms, the probability of an officer being 
properly disciplined was reduced to just 8% rather than 32%. This performance, 
combined with the delays in finalising cases, suggests that – following the change in 
Law – PSD and the police appeal system must be monitored closely by the PIK to 
ensure that the police-controlled complaint system operates with integrity. 
 
Among its legal powers, the PIK is competent to deal with complaints by 
police officers against other KP employees – the most important reactive function 
according to Lewis and an important “strength” of the CJC (1999, pp. 75-76). What is 
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striking in the case of the KP is that the majority of complaints (over 50%!
17
) are 
made by KP employees, whereas, even at its peak in 1994-5, the CJC could only 
claim 16.7% (Lewis, 1999, p. 74). Lewis (1999, p. 73) points out that many oversight 
agencies either do not have this power or are restricted to serious allegations, and 
argues that its absence tends to encourage the closing of ranks and obstruction of 
complaint investigation. Clearly the KP demonstrates a very different culture in 
which there is a readiness to enter complaints against other staff members. This 
important feature of the KP culture is explored more closely in the next stage of the 
research, through an examination of the perceptions of officers who admit to making 
complaints against others (see Chapter 6). 
 
5.7 PIK proactive function 
As defined in Article 25(4) of the PIK Law (Government of Kosovo, 2010, p. 10) the 
PIK inspection function consists of a series of twelve ‘ordinary inspections’ in every 
fiscal year. As indicated in Table 5.3, each inspection focuses on one management 
theme. The inspection process involves visiting the relevant police stations and KP 
Departments or Units and, using structured interviews and data gathering techniques, 
collecting and collating data in respect of certain police management performance 
areas or themes (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Article 25).  Each ordinary inspection 
focuses on one thematic area but seeks out information from a variety of sources in 
order to build an accurate picture of current performance in areas such as arrests and 
detention, road traffic policing, budget and finance, crime investigation, human 
resources, and other areas listed in Table 5.3. The accent is on effectiveness 
(achievement of core police objectives), efficiency (achieving objectives in a cost 
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 As indicated in Table 5.2, 61% of complaints were made by other KP officers in 2008, 53% in 2009, 
and 50% in 2010. 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 143 
effective manner), and compliance with the applicable law (including European Code 
of Police Ethics [ECPE] standards) (PIK, 2006f, p. 8). 
 
 
Table 5.3 - Article 25 (4) - Law on Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (2010) 
 
25(4). Inspections include but are not limited to the following areas: 
4.1. police buildings, infrastructure and all related assets; 
4.2. budget, finance, logistics and procurement management; 
4.3. vehicle fleet and police equipment management; 
4.4. human resources management; 
4.5. management of firearms, ammunition and other equipments; 
4.6. escort, detention and arrest procedures; 
4.7. traffic patrol and road safety management; 
4.8. crime detection, investigation, and case management; 
4.9. management of complaints and disciplinary investigations; 
4.10. border control, protection and migration management; 
4.11. management of local policing planning, community safety and initiatives of 
community policing; and 




Data derived from each inspection undergoes a process of analysis: important 
trends and patterns of performance are mapped, best practice is identified and areas of 
weakness are isolated (PIK, 2006f, p. 10). Key conclusions are drawn and assembled 
into progress reports on police performance that include key recommendations for 
future action by the Police Commissioner and his/her senior staff (PIK, 2006f, p. 8). 
An effort is made to ensure that these reports are properly balanced and that the 
recommendations are realistic and achievable, given the limitations on budget and 
other police resources (Government of Kosovo, 2010, Article 27; PIK, 2006f, p. 10). 
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In subsequent years, the PIK looks for specific responses to its recommendations, 
thereby exerting cumulative pressure on senior police staff to cooperate in an 
continuous process of reform (PIK, 2006f, p. 9). 
 
There are obvious and strong parallels, therefore, with the general strategy and 
methodology of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). The PIK 
emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness echoes the HMIC role (Oliver, 1997, p. 73), 
as well as its concern with output-oriented management regimes rather than 
“behavioural change” (Oliver, 1997, p. 77). In this way the PIK, in general terms, 
exercises a policy review function in respect of the management performance of the 
KP but appears to diverge sharply from the preferred direction of oversight advocates 
– i.e. the emphasis on behavioural change and the link to complaint data (Lewis, 
1999, p. 98; Walker, 2001, p. 93; Walker, 2006b, p. 14). However, it is arguable that 
the scope of PIK policy review is much more ambitious than that suggested by 
advocates of holistic oversight. Although the legislation does not overtly link PIK 
policy recommendations to police complaints and police misconduct (other than the 
more indirect link to management of complaints and disciplinary investigations under 
Article 25(4)9), the focus on verifying compliance with the applicable law and ECPE 
standards, creates a policy review avenue broad enough to embrace behavioural 
change.  
 
How effective are the PIK recommendations is achieving the sort of 
organizational change envisaged by Walker’s question, in terms of being associated 
with lower levels of misconduct (2007, p.21)? In terms of scope, the PIK policy 
review has always been more ambitious and comprehensive than the narrow link to 
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misconduct that oversight advocates call for. Indeed, in terms of the PIK’s legal 
framework (both UNMIK Regulation and Assembly Law), the scope reflects the  
emphasis in England and Wales on cost-effectiveness and business-like management 
(Oliver, 1997, p. 27), often referred to as the New Public Management phenomenon 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, 90; Dawson & Dargie, 2002, p. 35; Osborne & 
McLaughlin, 2002, p. 9). It is arguable that the emphasis on inspecting KP 
compliance with the law represents a more holistic approach to tackling potential and 
actual misconduct and performance failure than the exclusive link to complaint data 
that is advocated by some policing scholars (Lewis, 1999, p. 98; Walker, 2001, p. 93; 
Walker, 2006b, p. 14).  
 
Prior to the 2010 PIK Law the evidence suggested that the PIK model 
combined an ambitious reform agenda with a weak authority for policy 
implementation (Harris, 2008, p. 47). The role of the Ministry, particularly in regard 
to the policy recommendations of the PIK, was concordant with Oliver’s (1997, p. 14) 
call for “persuasion and consultation” rather than statutory direction. It is noteworthy 
that an independent audit found a similar weakness in respect of IPCC 
recommendations to police organizations in England and Wales that related to matters 
arising from complaints (National Audit Office, 2008, par. 31). The relevant UNMIK 
legislation provided no clear instruction regarding what, if any, response was required 
by the KP to specific PIK policy recommendations. In terms of authority to require a 
response to the PIK recommendations the UNMIK law was silent and this was almost 
certainly a factor in the negligible impact on KP behaviour (Harris, 2008, p.53). This 
lacuna legis was effectively closed by the PIK Law in 2010 (Government of Kosovo, 
2010, Article 27). However, due to insufficient data from the period 2011-12 (i.e. 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 146 
after the change in law), it proved impossible to explore the possible relationship 
between PIK recommendations and corresponding changes in the KP organization as 
a result of the change in legislation. 
 
5.8 Concluding note 
The examination of the available secondary evidence relating to the PIK (and its host, 
the KP), has revealed a number of important insights into its legal structure and 
authority, its role in the changing dynamic of police governance in Kosovo, and its 
potential – if not actual – impact on levels of misconduct among Kosovo Police 
employees. It will be important to fully analyse the meaning of the secondary data 
results of the present Chapter, and link them back to the overall aims and objectives of 
the study. In Chapter 7 the study will explore and interpret the results obtained in  
Chapter 5, linking back to the broader ECO literature, explaining the broader 
implications of the results and identifying their limitations.  
 
In the next Chapter the study will move to the second phase of the PIK case study, 
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Chapter Six 




Chapter Six will critically examine the findings of primary research regarding patterns 
of beliefs, attitudes and perceptions
18
 about external oversight (i.e. the PIK) among a 
group of Kosovo Police (KP) officers, and evaluate the implications for improved 
policing standards and reduced misconduct. As described in Chapter Four, the 
research falls into two main parts, corresponding to the qualitative and quantitative 
methods employed. Firstly, the Chapter will present an analysis of the data obtained 
through use of a structured questionnaire, exploring the perceptions of several 
hundred KP operational officers in the first four ranks. Secondly, it will present and 
contrast the main patterns of beliefs that emerged from the semi-structured interviews 
with senior KP officers. 
 
It is important to clarify again the decision to focus on the perceptions of KP 
officers about PIK, rather than the other stakeholders (the PIK, complainants) in 
Kosovo’s complaint system. As noted by Walker and Bumphus (1992, cited by 
Prenzler, 2000, p. 661), Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, p. 77), de Guzman (2004, p. 167) 
and discussed under Chapter 4 of the present study, measuring oversight effectiveness 
is difficult because of the number of variables involved, conflicting ways of 
interpreting data and the problems of hidden misconduct. A number of factors 
                                                 
18 These terms are used in that sense described by Oskamp, & Schultz (2004, p. 9) as a “cognitive 
component” – i.e. ideas and beliefs one has about an object. 
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intervene and prevent a simplistic analysis in recorded cases of transition from what 
will be called ‘police-centric systems’ of complaint investigation (i.e. where only the 
police investigate the police) to systems in which investigations are conducted 
exclusively or – more frequently – jointly with police investigators. Since it becomes 
impossible to talk of exact causes in the “complex network of causality”, one can only 
describe known correlates or associations (Oppenheim 1992, p. 17; de Guzman, 204, 
p.168). In his research studies de Guzman (2004, 2007) has pointed to evidence that 
the perceptions of police officers about the impact of ECO can be a valid and useful 
measure. He points to the “learning” construct as the basis for measuring police 
perceptions: i.e. that the police acknowledge that ECO represent “mechanisms for 
controlling and changing police behaviour” (de Guzman, 2004, p. 167). Thus, the 
present research seeks to test the claims of de Guzman and other researchers, and to 
add to the corpus of evidence regarding police perceptions. 
 
6.2 Police Inspectorate themes 
Four statements listed in the questionnaire are intended to elicit information about the 
respondents’ beliefs and attitudes toward the PIK: (1), (2), (4) and (5). The results will 
now be examined. In general, the responses reveal a certain degree of KP support for 
the role of the PIK. Table 6.3 presents the data from all the respondents, without 
differentiating their degree of exposure to the PIK or complaints system. In response 
to the first statement - which suggests a link between KP respect for citizens’ rights 




University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 149 
Table 6.2 - Overall results of the questionnaire study (all ranks/categories) 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 553 Frequency 34 115 176 56 111 61 
 % 6.1 20.7 31.7 10.1 20 11 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 553 Frequency 27 140 182 64 95 43 
 % 4.9 25.2 32.7 11.5 17.1 7.7 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 527 Frequency 37 178 202 50 42 18 
 % 6.7 32 38.3 9.4 7.9 3.4 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 526 Frequency 28 154 208 47 61 28 
 % 5.3 29.2 39.5 8.9 11.5 5.3 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 529 Frequency 42 105 86 57 161 78 
 % 7.9 19.8 16.2 10.7 30.4 14.7 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 526 Frequency 31 114 182 70 107 22 
 % 3.8 21.6 34.6 13.3 20.3 4.1 
 
However, a study of the categories of officers who have had experience of the 
complaints system reveals an interesting pattern of beliefs among the KP respondents. 
Among those officers who stated that they had been investigated by the PIK, 49.5% 
expressed agreement; and similarly, 50.7% of those who stated that they had been 
investigated by PSD expressed agreement. Whereas 61.2% of officers who had not 
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been investigated by PIK expressed agreement; and 62.6% of officers who had not 
been investigated by PSD agreed with the statement.  
 
This evidence suggests that there is a good degree of underlying support for 
the role of the PIK among KP officers, as graphically depicted in Chart 6.1. Over half 
the respondents expressed a belief that the presence of the PIK has an ameliorating 
impact on police standards. Although the level of support is lower among officers 
who have had direct experience of being investigated (by either PIK or PSD), it is 
nevertheless approaching half of all respondents. Interestingly, support for the first 
statement is higher among officers who indicated that they had made a complaint 
against another officer (54.8% agreed) and officers who had given evidence against 
another officer (54.3% agreed). This evidence is perhaps more important than the two 
categories of investigated officers, since those who make complaints or give evidence 
inevitably include persons who are victims or somehow equivalent to non-police 
‘complainants’ or aggrieved parties.  
 
Chart 6.1 – Analysis of responses to Statements 1- 4 
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Although the overall support is less than in his study, the above results seem to 
be broadly concordant with those of de Guzman, who found that 55.1% of 
respondents who had been investigated (by the oversight agency) agreed with a 
similar statement (“The potential of receiving complaints before the PLEB [oversight 
agency] stops police from violating an individual’s rights”); and no less than 72% of 
respondents who had not been investigated agreed with the statement (2004, p.177).  
 
The evidence in response to the second statement is probably the more 
important indication of positive sentiment toward the PIK by the KP respondents. 
Table 6.3 reveals that 62.8% of respondents agreed with the statement that the ‘Police 
Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.’ 
Importantly, a majority of respondents who have been investigated by the PIK 
(57.1%) and by the PSD (57%) also agreed with the statement that links the PIK to 
higher KP standards (see Tables 6.3 and 6.5 in Appendix E). Moreover, the agreement 
with this statement is even greater among respondents who had made a complaint 
against another KP officer (60.8%) and those who stated that they had given evidence 
against another officer (60%) (see Tables 6.7 and 6.9 in Appendix E). This finding is 
of course the most relevant to the overall objective of the research: namely, the search 
for evidence in support of Walker’s proposition that the PIK (or its procedures) is 
associated with improved standards among KP officers. 
 
Statement 4 (“PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations”) 
also attributes a positive quality to the PIK and acts as an important test of consistency 
in the responses to statements 1 and 2: any significant variation in the pattern of 
responses across the three statements would suggest that the results might be 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 152 
unreliable. As displayed graphically in Chart 6.1 the results more than echo the 
responses to the earlier statements. Overall 74% of respondents agreed with the 
statement that the “PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations” 
(see Table 6.3). This generous endorsement gains credibility by being confirmed by 
71.9% of respondents who had been investigated by the PIK and 71% of those 
investigated by PSD (see also Tables 6.3 and 6.5 in Appendix E). Although this 
pattern is followed by those who had given evidence against another KP officer 
(73.9%), it finds 64.4% support among those who had made a complaint against 
another KP officer (see Tables 6.7 and 6.9 in Appendix E).  
 
The response to statement 4 and the earlier two suggest an emergent pattern of 
beliefs among the respondents, one that appears to confirm the findings of de Guzman 
and supports the truth of Walker’s proposition. It is arguable that the pattern of beliefs 
is further reinforced by the strong responses in favour of statement 3: that “police 
misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years”. This statement gained the 
highest level of agreement overall, with 77% of respondents indicating some degree 
of approval (see Table 6.3). Yet higher levels of approval were found among KP 
officers with experience of the PIK and the complaint system. Among both 
respondents who had been investigated by PIK and those who had been investigated 
by PSD this statement found over 80% agreement (see Tables 6.3 and 6.5 in 
Appendix E); and among those who had made a complaint it found 78.1% approval 
and among those who had given evidence 79.3% agreement (see Tables 6.7 and 6.9 in 
Appendix E).  
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As will be discussed later, caution is required when interpreting these results. 
Although the PIK had been active during the period 2007 – 2012 in investigating 
complaints, it shared that responsibility with the PSD – the KP internal investigation 
function. It cannot, therefore, be deduced that the respondents were expressing a 
belief that the decrease in misconduct was solely attributable to PIK activity during 
that period (i.e. “recent years”). Indeed, as will be discussed, the responses to 
statements 5 and 6
19
 would suggest that this is not the case. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings in respect of statements 1 - 4
20
, taken together, seem 
to suggest a strong pattern of beliefs among the KP respondents that the presence of 
PIK has had a positive impact on KP standards and conduct. A majority of the KP 
respondents expressed beliefs that the PIK conduct thorough and professional 
investigations, that they help KP officers perform to high standards of integrity and 
honesty, and that KP officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because 
of the presence of the PIK. Importantly, these beliefs are echoed – often strongly – by 
officers who have had experience of being investigated, as well as those who have 
made complaints or provided evidence against a fellow officer. If taken alone, this 
evidence might have resulted in an endorsement of Walker’s proposition and further 
confirmation of de Guzman’s study. However, responses to the other statements 
would suggest the need for caution and a more measured appraisal of the respondents’ 
beliefs about the PIK.   
                                                 
19
 i.e. (5) Complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent agency; and (6) 
Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo 
Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers. 
 
20
 i.e (1) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence 
of the Police Inspectorate; (2) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of 
integrity and honesty; (3) Police misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years; (4) PIK officers 
conduct thorough and professional investigations. 
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6.3 Professional Standards Directorate themes 
The strong support for the PIK among respondents did not preclude an equal measure 
of support for the Professional Standards Directorate (PSD). Statement 6 asked 
respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement: “Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators 
of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers.” As seen 
in Chart 6.2, 60% of respondents overall agreed with this statement, thereby 
diminishing the apparent support recorded under statements 1, 2 and 4, which make 
positive assertions about the PIK. This high level of agreement is mirrored by officers 
who had been investigated by PIK (62.7% agreed), and, perhaps surprisingly, those 
who had been investigated by PSD (59.8% agreed) (see Table 6.3 in Appendix E). 
Interestingly, however, a slightly less supportive pattern is found among the other 
categories of respondent with experience of the complaint system. Among those who 
had made a complaint against another officer 53.7% agreed with the statement, and 
56% of those who had given evidence against a fellow KP officer agreed with that 
statement (see Tables 6.7 and 6.9 in Appendix E).  
 
As vividly depicted in Chart 6.2, there is evidence that many KP officers hold 
a belief that police officers are more competent to investigate fellow police officers 
than the PIK. This conclusion is reinforced by the responses obtained to statement 5: 
“complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent 
agency.” In overall terms 55.8% of respondents disagreed with this statement, almost 
matching the pattern found with statement 6 (see Table 6.3). A similar level of 
disagreement is found among both those who had been investigated by the PIK 
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(55.4%) and those who had been investigated by the PSD (54.7%) (see Tables 6.3 and 
6.5 in Appendix E). Yet about half (49.9%) of those who had who had made a 
complaint against another officer and slightly less (48.9%) of those who had given 




Chart 6.2 – Analysis of responses to Statements 5 and 6 
 
At one level there appears to be an apparent contradiction within the evidence 
obtained in the study. Respondents seem to express strong beliefs that the PIK has had 
a positive impact upon the KP and, at the same time, they reveal almost equally strong 
beliefs that a police-centric system of resolving complaints is preferred over a non-
police system. However, there is another interpretation that might explain this 
apparent anomaly: the KP responses might reflect the reactions to the two, distinctly 
different roles of the PIK: i.e. the ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ functions. It might be the 
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case that statements 1, 2 and 4
21
 have been interpreted as being related to the 
‘proactive’ role; whereas statements 5 and 622 are explicitly related to the ‘reactive’ 
(complaint investigation) role. This problem of interpretation will be discussed more 
fully later. 
 
6.4 Level of misconduct themes 
As noted by research scholars, the task of evaluating the impact of external oversight 
agencies is extremely complex, not least because of the difficulty of accurately 
measuring the level of misconduct.  Proving an agency’s efficacy by reference to the 
number of complaints and conviction rates is problematic due to a variety of 
confounding factors (de Guzman, 2004, p. 166). Official statistics of complaints 
against police cannot provide an accurate picture of the actual level of misconduct or 
track changes in the level of misconduct as a result of the introduction of external 
oversight. This lack of certainty results from the unquantifiable variables in the 
correspondence between the actual number of incidents of misconduct and the 
recording of complaints. These variables notably include vexatious complaints, 
decisions not to make a complaint even though justified, and cases where the police 
decide not to record a complaint. It is simply impossible to draw unequivocal 
conclusions from the increase or decrease in the number of complaints (de Guzman, 
2004, p. 168). Although not free of problems of interpretation, police perceptions 
about the nature and degree of misconduct offer a potentially useful way of 
                                                 
21
 (1) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of 
the Police Inspectorate; (2) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity 
and honesty; and (4) PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations. 
22
 i.e. (5) Complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent agency; and (6) 
Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo 
Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers. 
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triangulating evidence drawn from official statistics and, if available, public opinion 
surveys. 
 
Table 6.11 - KP officers’ perceptions of common types of misconduct 
Which of the following types of misconduct among KP officers 
causes you most concern
23





Graft or taking bribes 249  44.8 
Insubordination or poor performance 96  17.2 
Abuse of human rights 74  13.3 
Excessive use of force 32  5.7 
Other types of misconduct 88  15.8 
Not completed 16  2.8 
 
Question 7 of the questionnaire takes the form of a multiple-choice question 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007. p 323) and asks respondents to select one of five 
different types of misconduct among KP officers that causes them most concern. The 
results are indicated in Table 6.11. 
 
That almost 45% of respondents express the concern that graft or taking bribes 
is the form of misconduct that causes most concern is both surprising and intriguing, 
given the other available evidence about KP misconduct. Indeed the pattern of beliefs 
among the respondents seems to be the reverse of statistics published by the PIK at 
about the same time. In the period June – December 2011 the PIK recorded a total of 
                                                 
23
 It is recognized that the wording of this question (whether in English or Albanian or Serbian) is 
ambiguous, a matter that was sadly not identified at the planning stage. Respondents are asked which 
type of behaviour causes them most “concern” and this might be interpreted as meaning either ‘more 
serious or grave’  in itself, or more prevalent in the KP. It was the latter sense that was intended by the 
author and it is acknowledged that an interpretation of the results must be qualified as a result of  this 
ambiguity. 
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164 complaints that were judged to be allegations of criminal conduct, as per the PIK 
Law 2010. Of that number a total of 16 (9.7%) cases related to graft or taking bribes, 
and 52 (31.7%) cases related to excessive use of force. This contrasts strongly with 
the perceptions of the KP respondents, only 5.8% of whom were concerned about 
excessive use of force and, as noted, almost half were most concerned about graft.  
 
This divergence between the perceptions of the respondents and official 
statistics seems even more perplexing when placed alongside the data from public 
opinion surveys about the KP. Surveys conducted by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) between March 2005 and November 2011 indicate that KP has 
an average public satisfaction rating of 78.1%, with a peak of 86.9% in 2005 and a 
low point of 70.9% in September 2009 (UNDP, 2012, p. 7). It had been argued that 
KP popularity is probably the result of the absence of what Punch (2000, pp. 304-51, 
cited by Savage, 2007, p. 16) calls ‘straightforward corruption’. In 2006 a survey 
found that only 6% of Kosovo citizens believed that corruption was present in the KP, 
compared with 18% for the courts and 23% for the Kosovo Customs Service (UNDP, 
2006, p. 50). This evidence seems to contradict the stated beliefs of almost half of the 
respondents in the present study, who see bribery as a cause of considerable concern.  
 
At the same time, there might be some distortion as a result of the ambiguity 
of the question. The respondents are indicating the types of misconduct that cause 
them ‘concern’ which, unfortunately can be interpreted in one of two ways. It might 
mean (as intended) the type of misconduct that the respondent perceives to be most 
prevalent among KP officers; or (as not intended) it might mean the type of 
misconduct that the respondent believes to be the most serious or deleterious within 
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the KP. This ambiguity was not identified at the planning stage, and it is 
acknowledged that the value of the responses is much reduced due to the uncertainty 
about interpretation of the question. 
 
Equally intriguing are the beliefs of the respondents about the pattern of 
misconduct during recent years. Statement 3 of the questionnaire asks respondents to 
express their degree of agreement or otherwise with the following statement: ‘Police 
misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years’. In overall terms 77% of 
respondents agreed with statement, the highest level of approval for any statement 
across the entire respondent group. Agreement with the statement rises to over 80% 
among respondents who have been investigated by the PIK and PSD. Likewise, 
78.1% of respondents who had made a complaint against a KP officer and 79.3% of 
those who had given evidence against a KP officer believed that police misconduct 
had been decreasing.  
 
It is not immediately obvious how these results should be interpreted, in light 
of the other patterns of belief revealed in the study. A generous interpretation would 
link these beliefs with those expressed in response to statements 1, 2 and 4: namely, 
that respondents believed that misconduct had decreased since the advent of the PIK, 
and as a result of the agency’s thorough and professional investigations and help in 
allowing KP officers to perform to high standards of integrity and honesty. However, 
the responses to statements 5 and 6 (in support of the PSD) would rule out such a 
benign conclusion and perhaps even support the alternative view: namely, that the 
decline might be the result of the PSD’s activities.  
 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 160 
6.5 Semi-structured interview themes 
As described in Chapter 4, a simple analytical process was employed to identify 
patterns in the responses provided by the interview participants. Key words and 
phrases were highlighted in the interview notes, and a list of those key words and 
phrases was compiled according to their frequency across the group of respondents. 
Words or phrases that appeared to be similar were grouped under the same category, 
and - as and when necessary - categories were modified or replaced during the 
subsequent stages of analysis (Denscombe, 2003. p. 272). This process resulted in the 
following seven statements which summarise the list of key words and phrases: 
 
(a) 6 out of 10 of interviewees expressed a generally negative sentiment toward 
the idea that non-police officers should investigate police officers; 
(b) 6 out of 10 of interviewees stated a belief that the delays in dealing with 
discipline cases is a major problem; 
(c) 6 out of 10 of interviewees indicated a belief that the delays and other 
problems with the post-2006 discipline regime are caused by the PIK, rather 
than the Ministry or the Senior Police Appointments and Discipline 
Commission; 
(d) 5 out of 10 interviewees stated a belief that the PIK investigators are poorly 
trained and lack investigation skills; 
(e) there are mixed views among the respondents on whether KP misconduct has 
got better or worse since 2006: 6 were unsure, 2 thought it had got worse, and 
2 thought it had improved.; 
(f) there is a positive attitude toward the PIK inspection work and the value of its 
reports on KP performance among the respondents, but a negative attitude 
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toward the PIK investigation work: 8 out of 10 make positive reference to PIK 
reports, and 7 out of 10 make negative comments about PIK investigation 
work; and 
(g) there is a weak understanding of the legal purpose of the PIK among the 
respondents, particularly in respect of its dual functions: only one interviewee 
made reference to the PIK Law, and the majority (9 out of 10) could only refer 
to the two main functions of the PIK. 
 
It is immediately obvious that there is divergence as well as convergence of 
beliefs with the larger group of questionnaire respondents. Point (a) seems to accord 
with the majority view of the questionnaire respondents (see statement 6 of Table 
6.2):  the belief that only police officers should investigate other police officers is 
strong in both the senior officer respondents and the larger group of junior rank 
respondents. However, the open question approach has allowed the smaller, senior 
officer, group to indicate reasons for this belief. Most of the respondents pointed to 
undue delays in the process of resolving complaints as a cause of concern, and – most 
importantly – most of the respondents believed that the PIK (rather than other actors) 
was responsible for the delays. One officer stated: “PIK has not proved competent in 
investigations. There are too many unresolved cases; too many officers suspended and 
waiting for many months. The delays are unacceptable” (R.4)24. Another said: “Too 
many cases are delayed and there is a growing backlog” (R.7). 
 
Many of the senior officer group indicated a belief that the PIK investigators were 
poorly trained and lacked sufficient investigation skills. In a response that typified 
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 In order to ensure that the anonymity of the 10 respondents is protected the thesis will identify the 
source of a comment with the designation R.1 to R.10.  
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half of the group, one officer said: “PIK people are not strong enough and lack 
training and skills to deal with police officers” (R.4). Another said: “They need more 
training if they are to succeed”. This pervasive belief links back to the majority 
agreement with statement 6 (see Table 6.2), that PSD staff are more effective 
investigators.  
 
This data adds a new and interesting dimension to the earlier evidence and 
suggests a need for further investigation of the performance of the complaint system 
and, specifically, the average time taken to resolve cases. It would also suggest a need 
to review the skill profile of PIK investigators, who receive substantially more 




There is a marked divergence in terms of the senior officer group’s beliefs about 
the trend in misconduct. Whilst this smaller group had mixed views and a general 
sense of uncertainty as to whether the trend was toward an increase or decrease, 77% 
of the larger group of respondents in the junior ranks believed that levels of 
misconduct were decreasing. In response to the sixth question (What, in your view, 
are the most worrying discipline problems among KP officers today?) a pattern of 
response emerged: 6 out of 10 senior respondents referred to basic standards of 
behaviour and the lack of professionalism. One officer’s comment captured the 
dominant opinion of this group: “Lack of respect for the rules and for orders that are 
given. I think you call it insubordination. Unprofessional conduct or bringing discredit 
on the KP. We have too many people who lack professionalism” (R.7). 
  
                                                 
25
 Note that PIK investigators underwent a comprehensive training programme in 2006/7 that lasted six 
months; whereas most KP investigators only undergo about 6 weeks of cumulative training on average 
(PIK, 2006f, p.7). 
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One might assume that a senior officer would express a belief based on knowledge 
of statistical data, but none of the respondents referred to complaint statistics during 
the interviews. Indeed the lack of factual knowledge in the smaller group was 
particularly obvious in regard to the legal functions of the PIK. Very few respondents 
could accurately describe the powers and responsibilities of the Inspectorate, as 
defined in law.  
 
On a final, more positive note, a majority of the respondents expressed positive 
beliefs about the PIK’s inspection role (i.e. proactive function) and revealed some 
knowledge of PIK inspection reports and their recommendations. One officer stated: 
“PIK Inspection reports have some important messages - this is probably their 
strongest contribution” (R.3). Another mirrored the sentiment of the majority when he 
said: “They have made a good contribution with their inspections and reports. I think 
that most would agree that this is their strength” (R.4). Most of the respondents 
clearly differentiated their negative views about the PIK’s investigation role, and their 
positive views about the inspection function. For example, one officer stated: “There 
is a need for stronger control mechanisms and this probably means giving more power 
to the Professional Standards Directorate. PIK Inspection have some important 
messages - this is probably their strongest contribution” (R.3). Another said: “The 
problems with the investigations and the delay in finalizing cases have not helped. On 
the positive side, I think that their reports have had some impact on senior officers. 
The recommendations are important” (R.4). 
 
This finding is important and may provide a useful insight into the dichotomy 
in the beliefs in the larger (junior rank) group of KP respondents: namely, the majority 
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agreement with statements 1, 2 and 4 (in favour of the PIK); and the disagreement 
with statement 5, linked to the agreement with statement 6 (in favour of the PSD). 
Once again, this evidence confirms the advice of Wells and Schafer (2007, pp. 2-3) 
that more detailed study is required of the views of police officers about specific 
oversight functions and roles, and not simply whether officers hold positive or 
negative beliefs about oversight agencies.  
 
6.6 Concluding note 
In this Chapter the study has described the findings of the primary research data and 
conducted an initial stage of the process of interpreting the information. In order to 
assess the results in the light of the original aims and objectives of the research further 
interpretation and analysis is required. In the next Chapter the study will further 
explore the meaning of these results, in the light of other research findings, and the 
relevant literature. It will seek to explore the wider implications of the results and 
their limitations.  
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Chapter Seven 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this Chapter the study will seek to explain and interpret the results obtained in the 
earlier chapters, looking back at the relevant literature and explaining the broader 
implications of the results and their limitations. It will also seek to provide answers to 
the research questions and hypothesis concerning the relationship between external 
citizen oversight (ECO) and improved police conduct. Finally, the Chapter will try to 
provide justification for the approach undertaken to conduct the study, critically 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the research. 
 
7.2 Assessing PIK impact on KP performance – Secondary Data Sources 
In the first stage of the case study examination, Chapter 5 established that the PIK 
meets the main criteria of holistic oversight, as discovered in Chapter 3. There are 
important parallels between the legal structure and modus operandi of the PIK and the 
key features of ECO preferred by advocates in the literature. In other words, there are 
good grounds to argue that the PIK qualifies as a case study in the search for an 
answer to Walker’s question (2007, p.21) – i.e. whether it is possible to establish a 
link between an instance of ECO (or its procedures) and improved police conduct 
and/or performance. The PIK is fully independent of the police organization in respect 
of which it investigates complaints; it is exclusively comprised of civilian (i.e. non-
police) staff; it has a comprehensive legal framework with clearly defined powers; it 
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has a budget sufficient to achieve its objectives; and it has both ‘reactive’ and 
‘proactive’ functions, that correspond to the requirements of a number of advocates. 
Perhaps more importantly, the PIK has demonstrated an ability to implement its legal 
powers and exercise authority since its foundation in 2006, having successfully 
investigated hundreds of complaints and produced numerous inspection reports with 
important policy recommendations.  
 
At the same time, it has been noted that the PIK and its police counterpart 
form part of an unusual (and, in Europe, unique) socio-political process: the creation 
of a new state ex nihilo by international organizations acting under the authority of the 
United Nations. Features of that process must inevitably separate the PIK from its 
sister organizations that have developed in the context of long-established 
democracies with many decades of experience of modern public policing. In 2012 the 
PIK and KP could look back on much less than a single decade of experience as fully 
autonomous entities, with none of the seismic incidents of failure and corruption that 
triggered police reform efforts and the introduction of ECO oversight in other 
countries. Although the exact implications for the present research study will be 
difficult to quantify, there can be little doubt that certain sui generis aspects of the 
PIK are relevant to the question of its potential (if not actual) impact on the KP. 
 
The KP stands quite apart from many of the ‘hard cases’ discussed by 
oversight scholars as the precipitators of public enquiries, and the bases for much of 
the argument in favour of ECO (Prenzler, 2002a, pp. 3-13; Walker, 2001, pp. 19-39; 
Lewis, 1999, pp. 19-30). Kosovo’s fledgling police organization has enjoyed 
unparalleled public support and satisfaction levels since its creation in 1999, as well 
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as being perceived by Kosovo citizens as one of the least corrupt public entities in the 
country. The evidence also suggests relatively low levels of recorded complaints by 
ordinary citizens against police officers. Although the data suggests that the number 
of serious or criminal allegations received by PIK rose after 2008 (when KP became 
autonomous of UNMIK), about half of those complaints were entered by other police 
officers, rather than ordinary citizens. In this way, therefore, the KP represents a more 
challenging case study in the pursuit of an answer to Walker’s question than a 
recognised ‘hard case’: the combination of high public satisfaction with police 
performance, low levels of perception of corruption, and low levels of recorded 
complaints, generate an overall picture of an organization that performs at a 
satisfactory level. Measuring the positive impact of the PIK – relative to the police-
centred system it replaced – presents a greater challenge than such well-documented 
corrupt organizations as the New York Police in the 1970s and New South Wales 
Police in the 1990s (Prenzler, 2009a, 3-7). The task of isolating and measuring 
indicators of PIK success are made yet more problematic because of its position in the 
changing landscape of Kosovo police governance. 
 
In terms of police governance, the PIK emerged as part of a model that is very 
different from that of England and Wales, or jurisdictions within the United States, or 
areas of Australia. Two main points are noteworthy in terms of its potential impact on 
the police: the PIK’s relationship with the parent Ministry, and the growing pre-
eminence of the central dynamic in Kosovo. The PIK forms part of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs - the government administration - and therefore diverges sharply from 
the model preferred by some oversight advocates. The issue is important, since there 
appears to be evidence in Kosovo to support the argument of the scholars against 
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placing an oversight agency under the authority of the government administration: 
namely, that such an arrangement might facilitate a particular political agenda vis-à-
vis the police and thereby diminish the impact of the oversight body. There is 
evidence that the KP is becoming subject to increasing political interference, in 
operational decisions and staff appointments (European Commission, 2011, pp. 16, 
57). 
 
Figure 7.1 – Interaction of Police Governance Dynamics in Kosovo 
 
As noted above, Kosovo saw the elimination of the local dynamic in 2008, 
with the advent of the first Police Law ratified by the Assembly, after UNMIK’s 
transfer of authority. The resultant bi-polar arrangement, depicted in Figure 7.1, 
suggests an increasingly dominant central dynamic and diminishing independence 
dynamic. This change marked a shift away from the tripartite model introduced by 
UNMIK in 2005, and a clear move back toward the model that was familiar in the 
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Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, Republic and Montenegro, and – prior to 2010 - the 
Republic of Albania). Most troubling in this shift are the increasing signs of control 
over the KP by the ruling political party since 2008 - Partia Demokratike e Kosovës 
[PDK] (Democratic Party of Kosovo). After becoming autonomous from UNMIK in 
December 2008, the KP had three Director Generals in three years, one of whom was 
apparently ‘sacked’ in a manner contrary to the Law on Police (Balkan Insight, 2011).  
 
This overt exercise of political power over the police has clear and unwanted 
ramifications for democratic policing in Kosovo. With the removal of the local 
dynamic and cowing of the senior police staff (independence dynamic), the fear is that 
the KP – like some neighbouring police organizations - will become the tool of a 
ruling political party. This would certainly impact upon the performance of the police 
in Kosovo, as senior officers act out of deference to their political masters rather than 
in response to local community concerns. This susceptibility to overt political 
interference is perhaps increased further, given the weaknesses in the performance of 
KP senior managers that have been noted by Scheye, (2008, p. 182), EULEX (2009, 




These observations regarding police governance are important as the study 
moves to an interpretation of the next stage of the case study – the primary data of 
police perceptions. Given the evidence that the KP – in general terms – represents a 
‘soft case’ (low public perceptions of corruption, high public satisfaction, relatively 
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 For example, communication skills (PIK, 2006a, Para. 2.4, 2.8; PIK, 2006d, Para. 2.10; PIK, 2006e, 
Para. 2.5; PIK, 2007g, Para. 4.6; PIK, 2007h, Para. 2.6, 3.6; PIK, 2007a, Para. 2.15; PIK, 2007c, Para. 
2.23;  PIK, 2007d, Para 2.4, 4.6), planning (PIK, 2006b, Para. 4.1; PIK, 2006c, Para. 2.12; PIK, 2007h, 
Para. 3.4-6; PIK, 2007b, Para. 2.5, 2.10; PIK, 2007e, Para. 2.19), and strategic planning (PIK, 2006c, 
Para. 2.2; PIK, 2006d, Para. 2.16; PIK, 2007b, Para. 2.9; PIK, 2007c, Para. 2.25; PIK, 2007e, Para. 
2.20) are often noted as factors in poor management performance. 
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low levels of complaint) and the corresponding difficulty in measuring PIK impact, 
the overall aim of the study can only be challenged further by the possible KP 
perceptions of the PIK’s role in Kosovo’s changing governance model. Whilst the 
PIK is unquestionably independent of the police, it is part of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and, therefore, part of the government administration. KP perceptions of the 
PIK must inevitably be coloured by the reality of the growing power of the central 
dynamic, and the very real possibility that the PIK forms a part of the ruling political 
party’s means of control. 
 
7.3 Assessing PIK impact on KP performance – Primary Data Sources 
In Chapter 6 the study presented the findings of the primary data research in the PIK 
case study. The results of the survey of police perceptions would seem to have 
important significance in the quest for a satisfactory response to Walker’s question – 
i.e. discovering whether external citizen oversight agencies or their procedures are 
associated with lower levels of officer misconduct (2007, p.21). As noted by de 
Guzman (2004, p. 167), only a limited number of systematic evaluations have been 
conducted. It is important, therefore, that the results described in Chapter 6 are 
properly interpreted as either providing support to the proposition that such an agency 
(or its procedures) is in some manner associated with reduced misconduct, or not. 
What might be a correct interpretation is not immediately obvious in the PIK case 
study. 
 
On the face of it, the research seems to reveal a strange dichotomy in the 
beliefs of a majority of the respondents. On the one hand, the respondents hold a 
cluster of positive beliefs about the PIK and its influence on the KP: namely, that the 
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PIK helps KP officers to respect the rights of citizens; that the PIK helps the KP to 
perform to high standards of integrity and honesty; and that PIK officers conduct 
thorough and professional investigations. On the other hand, a majority of the same 
respondents hold beliefs that appear to contradict what would seem a logical 
consequence of the first group of beliefs. If a majority believe that the PIK has those 
positive attributes listed in statements 1, 2 and 3
27
, surely they must also accept that 
complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent agency? 
Surely they must refute the suggestion that Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) 
staff are more effective investigators of complaints than the PIK? Whilst it might 
seem at first a neat and convincing syllogism, the assumption that a positive belief 
about the PIK must necessarily exclude a positive belief about the PSD is clearly 
flawed.  
 
It is possible to hold positive beliefs about both the PIK and the PSD at the 
same time, and without contradiction. In the period between the launch of the PIK in 
2006 and 2012 the KP became familiar with a system whereby the investigation of 
complaints was shared by both PSD and PIK. Although their exact roles changed in 
2010, KP officers – particularly those in the four categories with experience of the 
complaint system – would have formed beliefs about both agencies. Under the 
original 2005/06 UNMIK legislation the PIK had authority to investigate all 
allegations of serious discipline offences, whilst the PSD investigated minor discipline 
offences and KP crime investigators assisted the public prosecutor with allegations of 
criminal conduct. With the advent of Law No. 03/L-231 in 2010 the PIK was given 
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  i.e (1) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence 
of the Police Inspectorate; (2) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of 
integrity and honesty; (3) Police misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years. 
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authority to investigate all allegations of crime and PSD dealt with all other 
complaints, in a manner similar to the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC). It is possible that a majority of KP respondents might agree with statement 4 
(PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations) and also believe that 
statements 6 is true (PSD staff are more effective) and that statement 5 (complaints 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency) is not true. In effect, the 
majority of respondents are saying that the PIK staff are good, but not as good as the 
PSD staff. 
 
Such an interpretation would not necessarily negate Walker’s proposition. 
Firstly, in spite of the respondents’ overall preference for the PSD, there is evidence 
that a majority recognise the capability and good performance of the PIK. This 
recognition has resulted after less than six years of PIK investigations, interrupted in 
2010 as the agency underwent changes under the new legislation. As with many other 
police organizations, KP respondents operate within a culture that prefers a police-
centric system of investigating complaints. The responses of a majority of KP 
respondents in the present study reveal unequivocal evidence of an acceptance that an 
external/independent agency can investigate complaints in a professional and 
thorough manner. Given the short period of PIK activity, the evidence suggests that 
the PIK has gone some way toward winning the support of a significant proportion of 
the group of respondents and has created a strong foothold in a formerly police-
controlled domain. Moreover, it might be reasonably surmised that this view is held 
by a much wider group of KP officers. 
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As revealed in the smaller semi-structured interview group (see paragraph 
6.5(f)), there is a distinct possibility that the agreement of the majority of respondents 
with statements 1 and 2
28
 in the questionnaire group is based not only on an 
experience of PIK investigators (reactive function) but also the inspectors (proactive 
function). This highlights a weakness in the formulation of the statements in the self-
complete questionnaire, which fail to explore the possibility of distinct and separate 
beliefs about the two PIK functions. As pointed out by Wells and Schafer (2007, pp. 
2-3), research into police perceptions of ECO agencies should seek to identify beliefs 
about the different roles and functions of the agency. Such data would move the 
debate beyond general perceptions of success or failure in the oversight agency, to 
more discriminating information about which functions and activities are effective or 
ineffective.   
 
 
How do the research results compare with other findings in the literature? 
Although ECO agencies have been operating for a number of decades there has been 
scant research into the impact that external citizen oversight has had on attitudes and 
beliefs of police officers (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, p. 652). This deficit has 
particular relevance, given the poor understanding of its costs and benefits, and the 
opposition it attracts (Walker, 2001, p. 14-15; Finn, 2001, pp. 111-115; Terrill, 1991, 
p. 314-315). The available research data about police perceptions of external citizen 
oversight provides mixed and mainly negative messages. Some of the earliest research 
in the literature is published by D.W. Perez and provides gloomy reading for external 
oversight. Referring to research conducted as part of a doctoral dissertation in 1978, 
he concluded that “hundreds of hours of observation and hundreds of interviews seem 
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 (1) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of 
the Police Inspectorate; (2) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity 
and honesty. 
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to confirm that civilian review has a less immediate impact on police officers than 
does internal review” (Perez, 1994, p. 159). Likewise a US study of 900 police 
officers in 2000 found that over 62% of respondents did not believe that these 
agencies were effective in preventing police misconduct (Weisburd, Greenspan, 
Hamilton, Williams, & Bryant, 2000, p. 7). This opposition is confirmed by the 
Sviridoff and McElroy study of attitudes among New York Police Department 
officers, most of whom viewed the external oversight agency as unfair and biased 
against the police (1989, p. 16). 
 
However, de Guzman’s study in the Philippines in 2004 found that an 
overwhelming majority of the 700+ respondents expressed beliefs about the positive 
impact of external oversight, and, most surprisingly, most of those who had been 
investigated held such beliefs (2004, pp. 175-177). For example, over 86% of the 
respondents who had been investigated (those “with cases”) agreed that the potential 
of being prosecuted [by the oversight agency] makes officers more careful when 
dealing with citizens (de Guzman, 2004, p. 177). A more limited study by Wells and 
Schafer in 2007 found that 78% of police respondents were opposed to their local 
oversight agency (2007, p. 11). Indeed the same study found that the overwhelming 
majority of respondents were totally opposed to all oversight functions that related to 
complaint resolution (reactive functions) and only 16% were in favour of those 
functions related to the review of police policy and related recommendations 
(proactive functions) (Wells & Schafer, 2007, p. 13).  
 
However, another American study of the same year introduced a new 
dimension into the debate. The research looked at levels of police satisfaction with 
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various aspects of the procedures related to complaint resolution, and the findings 
indicated that respondents were concerned about fairness regardless of whether the 
system was driven by other police officers or non-police (De Angelis & Kupchik, 
2007, p. 667). This result implied that, if its procedures are seen to be fair the police 
respondents would accept external oversight as a legitimate means of resolving 
complaints. Herein lies a potential key to the interpretation of the apparent discord in 
the beliefs of the majority of KP respondents, and a way forward in exploring police 
beliefs about the complaints process and its impact on conduct. Rather than ask 
officers to agree or disagree with statements that attribute positive (or negative) 
qualities to internal and external oversight mechanisms, De Angelis & Kupchik asked 
respondents to rate their satisfaction with various processes of the complaints system.  
 
This led to a shift in emphasis: away from theoretical preconceptions and 
toward what officers had actually experienced; and away from the polarized debate 
about two alternative systems, and toward an appraisal of the fairness and objectivity 
of how officers are dealt with. Is it possible that the KP responses reflect an 
underlying satisfaction with the way both PSD and PIK staff dealt with complaints, 
but greater satisfaction with PSD? Only further research – inspired by the De Angelis 
& Kupchik method – could find an answer, and provide important insights into the 
actual and potential impact of Kosovo’s oversight system on KP conduct and 
standards. It would require more than a change of method. It would require a 
reappraisal of the structure of Walker’s proposition, widening the scope to include any 
processes (regardless of the agent responsible) that are associated with reduced 
misconduct.  
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7.4 ECO’s role in police governance  
The present research suggests that the governance context of ECO is largely a lacuna 
or gap in the literature; moreover, this gap seems to weaken the argument of the ECO 
advocates, pointing to the need for further comparative studies.  
 
There is an apparently unresolved conceptual dilemma at the very heart of 
police governance in the literature that ensnares the conceptual basis of ECO: how can 
a police organization be governed in a way that ensures that it remains an effective 
guarantor of democracy? As captured in Loader’s prosaic statement, the dilemma is 
one of finding a way in which police organizations ought to be “rendered responsive 
to democratic audiences” (Loader, 2000, p. 324). That dilemma lurks largely 
unexplored in the ECO literature. The present study has revealed various dynamic 
shifts in the on-going effort to define a successful formula in the interplay of three 
major dynamics: central, local and (police) independence. In a seemingly unresolved 
dialectical process, the constitutional position of the police is shaped by a long-term 
struggle between the competing principles of political independence versus electoral 
accountability, and central versus local dynamics (Waddington, 1999a, p. 187).  
 
 Whilst much of the explored literature refers to England and Wales, and other 
parts of the English-speaking world, the PIK case study reinforces the sense of 
dilemma and cautions against a pursuit of a universally applicable solution. Each part 
of the world is likely to reveal its own unique political stage for police governance. 
The literature suggests that in some jurisdictions the shifting of dynamics tends to be 
bipolar: greater (or lesser) police autonomy at the expense of either central or local 
control. In England and Wales the tripartite formula has tended to create a more 
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complex dialectic of the three competing dynamics (Savage, Charman, & Cope, 2000, 
p. 46) in which “all levels of policing were ‘controlled’ and accountable” (John, 
Lewis, Read, & Rogers, 2011, p. 88). In Kosovo the first ten years of the KP has seen 
a dramatic move from a similar tripartite arrangement, toward a bi-polar system in 
which the central dynamic has eliminated the local dynamic and is diminishing the 
independence dynamic. The PIK, wittingly or otherwise, forms part of that dynamic 
shift since it is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
 
Evidence suggests that too much of the police governance debate in the 
literature has centred on attempts to diminish the police independence dynamic per se, 
rather than construct a positive model of democratic governance. The argument in 
favour of greater political control has been built on too much emphasis on identifying 
how the police have failed, rather than on how the local dynamic has succeeded 
(Waddington, 1999a, p. 197). To argue that the subordination of police to elected 
representatives is the only democratic solution would be to exclude much of the 
liberal democratic world (Waddington, 1999a, p.191). The Kosovo case study 
suggests that the increased control by the central dynamic, at the expense of the 
independence and local dynamics is far from satisfactory in terms of democratic 
governance. A vital component of the independence dynamic is the capacity to effect 
changes within the police organization (Savage, 2007, p. 128-9), and there is evidence 
that this can be endangered by disenfranchising senior officers and excluding 
discretion in decision-making. Where that capacity is removed the basis for holistic 
ECO is effectively undermined: the ability of a police organization such as the KP to 
act upon policy recommendations would be reduced or handicapped. 
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However, talk of community empowerment implies a broad base of citizens 
who seek to be involved in decisions about policing and some research questions 
whether this is a realistic assumption on which to build a new approach to 
governance, given the failure of community consultative groups (Bowling, Parmar, & 
Phillips, 2008 p. 628). 
 
The research suggests a role for ECO (in some contexts) as an adjunct of the 
central government dynamic and/or the local government dynamic. Democratic 
accountability and governance require information (Jones, 2008, p. 696; Jones, 
Newburn & Smith, 1996, p. 195) and this must reflect the complexity of police 
organization and its objectives. Moreover, the type of information offered must go 
beyond the important role of the media in highlighting moments of failure, 
incompetence and misconduct, and provide detailed data about routine, daily and local 
performance. Without such detailed, objective and accurate data it is difficult to 
imagine how governance – as informed policy-making and strategic direction – can be 
carried out by local and/or central government. A possible factor in the apparent 
failure of the local dynamic is its traditional lack of technical capacity in monitoring 
police performance and providing more sophisticated feedback (Weatheritt, 1993, 
pp.28-9). Modern police organizations in the liberal democracies of the world are both 
sophisticated and complex, dealing with the equally complex and sophisticated crime 
and public disorder events of contemporary society. Governance of such organizations 
must de facto include a sufficient degree of technical capability and expertise. 
 
Whether located in the complex, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural urban 
societies of the liberal democracies or in the virtually mono-ethnic and traditional 
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societies of the Balkans, the efficacy of ECO is surely contingent upon its governance 
context. There can be no generic model. Unless it fits within or compliments the 
extant governance architecture, it cannot hope to exercise authority in a way that is 
likely to positively influence police conduct and performance. Although not 
guaranteed, ECO holds out the prospect of ameliorating the democratic deficit in 
police governance in some contexts and this is perhaps a question that warrants 
further research. 
 
7.5 Limitations of ‘holistic’ External Citizen Oversight’ 
The central claim of advocates of holistic ECO should not be underestimated: what is 
proposed is the ability to change the behaviour of all or large parts of a police 
organization. Research suggests that the bold and ambitious aims of holistic oversight 
are not easily achieved, even with the weight of the legislature and executive behind 
them. There is sobering evidence of a series of efforts to reform police behaviour in 
the UK in areas that are directly relevant to the ECO cause. The post-Lawrence 
Inquiry reforms; the effort to eradicate racist attitudes; the introduction of ethical 
interviewing techniques; and the equal opportunity reforms were all found to have 
disappointingly modest results, in terms of changing behaviours.  
 
There are grounds to question whether revised policies or legislation or 
training can automatically bring about a desired transformation of police behaviour 
(Newton Cain, 2002, pp. 147, 149). If holistic oversight is to succeed it must surely 
demonstrate an appropriate level of technical expertise - regardless of whether it 
adopts a restricted (i.e. purely linked to complaints data) or unrestricted ‘policy 
review’ approach – and it must accept that changing behaviour is a long-term 
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enterprise rather than a matter of ‘quick fix’ solutions. There must be a corresponding 
capacity to effect changes among police managers: a point that is rarely, if ever, 
acknowledged by advocates. The policy review and recommendation approach 
implies recognition of the importance of the police independence dynamic: 
recommendations must be acted upon and this demands autonomy and responsibility, 
and implies a technical capacity to interpret and implement recommendations, and 
evaluate the results. If police reform is to work, the policy advice of the oversight 
agency must be reciprocated by a sufficient internal police capacity, in terms of 
leadership and change management (Hutchinson, 2010, p. 239).  
 
At the same time there must be a review of the ECO advocates’ argument that 
individual cases of misconduct have a causal relationship with organizational culture 
and structures. Although this may be the case in some instances there is a danger that 
an unwarranted preoccupation with the ‘rotten organization’ approach results in a 
disregard of growing evidence of effective ways of dealing with the ‘rotten apples’. 
For example, research suggests that only a small proportion of complaints against 
police allege criminal conduct or corruption and the majority of complaints are such 
as could be resolved informally (Ede & Barnes, 2002, p. 116; Harrison & Cunneen, 
2000, p. 9). Other evidence points to the way that “mediation” can effectively resolve 
many of these complaints, to the satisfaction of the complainant and the officer 
involved (Walker, Archbold & Herbst, 2002, pp. 6 – 11; Ede & Barnes, 2002, p. 118).  
 
Research conducted in Norway suggests that most complaints relate to 
individual deviance (“rotten apples”) rather than systems failures (Gottschalk, Dean, 
& Glomseth, 2012, p. 20), reinforcing the need for a system that tracks persistent 
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misconduct by individual officers. One study indicates that complaints can be 
significantly reduced by detecting patterns of complaints and, where appropriate, 
intervening in individual cases of errant officers (Macintyre, Prenzler & Chapman, 
2008, p. 244). None of these initiatives necessitate the intervention of an independent 
agency that has more than a reactive function. Whilst not voiding the argument in 
favour of independence of investigations into police misconduct, these initiatives do 
place emphasis on encouraging police organizations to reform from within and 
develop the capacity to change.  
 
What of the more serious instances of misconduct and performance failure? In 
spite of Prenzler and Faulkner’s (2010, p. 255) claim that external oversight agencies 
have a key role in exposing and investigating such matters, the evidence suggests that 
it is the media in liberal democracies that more often ‘guards the guards’. It is 
arguable that media interest and aggressive journalism created a dynamic force as a 
watchdog in a number of important cases (Jones, 2008, p. 695): the MPs expenses 
investigation (Brook, 2009; Newell, 2010); the shambolic investigation of the 
Dutroux Affair (Punch, 2003, pp.174-180); and the “professional incompetence” of 
the Stephen Lawrence case (Newburn, 2008a, p. 97). Accountability necessitates 
access to accurate information (Neild, 2000, p. 235; Oliver, 1997, p. 187; Simey, 
1988, p. 74; Cail, 2006, p. 73) and in liberal democracies the media is often more 
effective than official agencies as guardians of public interest in public sector probity 
(Newell, 2010; den Boer & Fernhout, 2008, p. 5). It is arguable that in some societies 
there is a broader, pre-existing web of police accountability.  
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ECO that goes beyond a purely ‘reactive’ function has not been confirmed as a 
solution that can meet the expectations of the public and the police in all jurisdictions. 
Only the police can restore public confidence where it is lost; only the police can 
change their culture and organization; and only the police can perform to a standard 
that satisfies expectations. An external agency can only hope to play a facilitative role 
where it has the appropriate level of technical capability and where it is supported by 
sufficient political will, and the engagement of the police staff through consultation 
(Bayley, 2008, p. 13). Finding the right formula for facilitating police reform will – in 
each case – require careful planning and research, to ensure that specific needs are 
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8.1 Introduction  
In the final Chapter the study will seek to reach overall judgements about the aims and 
objectives of the research, summarizing the findings of each Chapter and identifying 
the significance and weight of the findings and main arguments about ECO efficacy. 
It will also look at the scope and limits of the central argument, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the chosen method, and suggestions as to the direction of future 
research on the efficacy of ECO. Finally, the Chapter will talk about the contribution 
to the ECO literature and how the research findings have extended the field of ECO 
knowledge. 
 
8.2 Main findings of the research 
The overall aim of the study has been to address the question of whether external 
citizen oversight (ECO) agencies or their procedures are associated with lower levels 
of police misconduct. To what extent has the research found an answer to this 
question? In other words, to what extent has the research established that there is a 
causal relationship between the activities of an ECO agency and instances of 
improved police performance and/or lower levels of police misconduct? The overall 
aim was divided into four separate yet interconnected objectives that deal with 
specific aspects of the research. In order to reach a judgement concerning the 
achievement of the overall aim, each objective will be reviewed. 
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The first objective sought to critically explore the broader landscape of police 
governance in the literature, and the competing dynamics of accountability within the 
debate. This would help establish the governance context of ECO as a mechanism of 
police reform. In Chapter 2 it was suggested that the governance debate is best 
characterized as a dialectical interaction of certain governance forces or dynamics: i.e. 
(a) local government dynamic; (b) central government dynamic; and (c) police 
independence dynamic. In some contexts all three interact, and in other contexts only 
(a) and (c) operate. In all contexts the interaction can be characterized by a linear 
movement, either toward a greater ‘subordinate and obedient’ approach (diminishing 
the independence dynamic) or alternatively toward a greater ‘explanatory and 
cooperative’ approach. It is argued that this conceptual framework helps to analyse 
not only the various arguments as to how and to what the police should be held to 
account, but also the guiding principles that drive those arguments.  
 
Two important conclusions are relevant to the research objective. The question 
of how to render police organizations more responsive to democratic audiences 
appears to be unresolved and, in certain English-speaking contexts, made more 
problematic by the complexities of multi-ethnic and diverse urban populations. 
Secondly, much of the debate in the literature appears to focus on an effort to 
diminish the independence dynamic per se, rather than construct a positive model of 
democratic governance. This preoccupation is built on an apparent emphasis on 
identifying how the police have failed, rather than on how the local dynamic has 
succeeded. Moreover, following the examples of the Audit Commission and HMIC, it 
is arguable that ECO might play an important part of a positive model of police 
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governance. It could empower the local dynamic by providing the data and related 
analysis on which local representatives could make informed decisions.  
 
Linking back to the overall aim, it might be concluded that an ECO model that 
purports to effect change within a police organization must either extend or 
complement one or more governance dynamics. Moreover, change can only be 
achieved via a ‘subordinate and obedient’ approach that reduces the independence 
dynamic, or, alternatively, via a greater an ‘explanatory and cooperative’ approach. 
Later evidence in the study suggested that the latter approach might be more 
productive in liberal democratic contexts, since an internal capacity and will to change 
are likely to be necessary preconditions. 
 
Having established its governance context, the second objective moved the 
focus to the nature of ECO itself by critically evaluating the theories in the literature 
that argue that it is a means of improving policing standards and reducing misconduct. 
It was concerned with discovering what ECO advocates suggest as the structure and 
method required to effect police reform. In Chapter 3 the study found an evolution of 
thought about ECO in the literature, from a model that acquires increasing powers to 
investigate complaints against police, to a more expansive and proactive approach to 
tackling the root causes of individual and group misconduct. Key ECO advocates are 
found to struggle with the concrete implications of combining the former (reactive) 
approach with the latter (proactive) approach in a holistic model of ECO. The 
conviction that misconduct is linked to organizational factors and that that causal 
relationship can be addressed by policy change is found to be driven by reflections on 
certain ‘hard case’ studies or ‘system failures’ (i.e. New York Police Department, 
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Queensland Police), rather than data drawn from research studies of the causes of 
misconduct per se. Uncertainty is found to increase in the literature as the debate 
evolves toward the exact mechanisms of policy recommendations and their translation 
into changes in police organization and culture. 
 
Linking back to the earlier governance analysis, the study found two 
competing views in the literature regarding the preferred locus of ECO. Some 
gravitated toward the local dynamic, seeing holistic oversight as an extension of local 
governance that empowered it with informed analysis and policy recommendations. 
Whereas others – possibly a majority – preferred ECO to be fully independent of the 
administration (local and central), and answerable only to parliament. What remains 
seemingly unclear in both propositions are the exact mechanics of ECO 
recommendations: i.e. whether they operate with a ‘subordinate and obedient’ 
approach or alternatively an ‘explanatory and cooperative’ approach. Other, closely 
related and practical issues, appear to be only thinly explored – not least the necessity 
of sufficient competence and political will within the host police organization to 
translate the suggested policy changes into action.  
 
Two major conclusions are relevant to the overall aim. Firstly, the holistic 
ECO edifice is built upon the inadequately researched assumption that many or most 
instances of individual misconduct are somehow causally linked to organizational 
factors (rotten organizations rather than rotten apples). This assumption must surely 
be subjected to more rigorous research. Secondly, there is a consequent hesitation and 
imprecision about the best method of influencing or changing those organizational 
factors that are thought to cause or facilitate or encourage individual misconduct. 
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The third and fourth objectives are concerned with a detailed exploration of 
the Police Inspectorate Kosovo (PIK) case study.  The former objective sought to 
compare the PIK legal and political framework with the theoretical principles that are 
advocated in the literature, and examine the available secondary evidence to support a 
link between the PIK and reduced levels of misconduct and/or improved performance 
among Kosovo Police employees. Chapter 4 identified the available secondary 
(documentary) data concerning the structure and method of the PIK. It examined the 
links between this particular instance of ECO and changes in KP conduct, providing a 
more in-depth understanding of a particular case, and adding to the corpus of 
knowledge regarding ECO and the factors that influence its efficacy. The study found 
a good degree of correspondence between those features of holistic ECO that are 
preferred by scholars in the literature and the legal framework, organization, staffing 
and modus operandi of the PIK. It is all-civilian, fully independent of the police, and 
has both the power to investigate complaints against police officers of all ranks 
(reactive function), and the authority to inspect police performance in specific areas 
and bring forward policy recommendations (proactive function). PIK qualifies, 
therefore, as a valid instance of holistic ECO.  
 
In terms of its overall aim, the research could not find fully conclusive links 
between PIK activities (reactive and/or proactive) and improved conduct among 
Kosovo Police (KP) officers. It was found that the PIK has investigated several 
hundred complaints since its inception in 2006, resulting in punitive decisions being 
brought in many cases. It has also conducted many inspections of KP performance 
and brought forward evidence-based policy recommendations. Establishing causal 
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links between ECO activities and police reform in this specific case was found to be 
particularly problematic. Firstly, the KP, unlike the ‘hard cases’ catalogued by ECO 
scholars, represents a ‘soft case’: it enjoys very high levels of public approval, low 
volumes of public perceptions of corruption, relatively low volumes of complaints of 
serious misconduct and corruption, and high volumes of complaints made by police 
against police. The majority of complaints are concerned with basic discipline and 
professional conduct. Quantifying change in such a ‘soft case’ is clearly more 
difficult.  
 
Secondly, PIK recommendations lack ‘teeth’ and form part of an ‘explanatory 
and cooperative’ approach: this has allowed senior police officers to largely ignore 
PIK policy recommendations in the first few years of operations. Yet the study found 
that the police governance dynamic of Kosovo appears to be shifting in the opposite 
direction, toward a ‘subordinate and obedient’ approach. Since 2008 the local 
dynamic has been effectively removed, allowing the central dynamic to exercise 
increasing control over the police independence dynamic but seemingly not through 
PIK recommendations. All this tends to frustrate efforts to detect any positive impact 
on police conduct as a result of PIK activity. 
 
Two conclusions inter alia are relevant to the overall aim. The case study 
points to the inadequacy of the proposed policy recommendation (linked to an 
‘explanatory and cooperative’ approach) strategy of changing those organizational 
matters that link to misconduct. In the absence of a legal requirement to act upon an 
ECO recommendation, senior police officers may – as in the case of the KP – simply 
ignore the suggested policy change. Secondly, a decision to implement ECO must 
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take cognizance of the available evidence regarding police misconduct and 
performance failures. If the police organization represents a ‘soft case’ the needs of 
democratic governance and accountability might be better (and more cost-effectively) 
met by alternatives to ECO. Lastly, if – as in the case of Kosovo – the local 
governance dynamic is missing, ECO is exposed to the danger of being captured by a 
central governance dynamic that seeks political control of policing. This reinforces 
the earlier conclusion that the efficacy of ECO as a mechanism of accountability is, in 
large measure, contingent upon its governance context. 
 
The fourth objective further extends the PIK case study, exploring a rich 
source of primary data. Following the lead of other researchers in this field, the 
objective seeks to examine the largely unknown patterns of beliefs, attitudes and 
perceptions about ECO among Kosovo Police officers, and evaluate the implications 
for improved police performance and reduced misconduct. In Chapter 6 the main part 
of the primary research – the questionnaire survey – yielded results that seem to 
support a link between PIK activities and changes in KP conduct. The results appear 
to confirm the findings of other researchers that evidence of ECO efficacy can be 
found in the beliefs and perceptions of those police officers who have had direct 
contact with such agencies and their procedures. There is a need for caution however. 
Whilst many of the survey group expressed positive views about the role and efficacy 
of the PIK, a large proportion also expressed positive views about the Professional 
Standards Directorate’s (PSD) role and many indicated a preference for investigations 
of complaints by other police. Although qualified in this way, the research 
nevertheless provides evidence of an acceptance of ECO by many officers and 
recognition of its positive impact.  
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Whilst based upon data from a much smaller target group, the interview 
findings revealed important qualitative information that provided further insight into 
the main (questionnaire) survey results. Most senior officer respondents expressed 
generally negative views about ECO and the idea of employing non-police 
investigators in a police complaints system. Interestingly, however, many of these 
interview respondents differentiated between the two PIK functions, expressing more 
positive views about its proactive (policy recommendation) role. It is possible that this 
distinction might explain the apparent contradiction in the findings of the main survey 
group: in other words, most officers hold positive views about the PIK proactive 
function, but less positive views about the reactive function. The questionnaire did not 
allow respondents to indicate such a distinction. 
  
Two main conclusions are noteworthy, with respect to the overall aim of the 
study. Firstly, police perceptions are confirmed to be a useful source of information 
about the actual impact of ECO on police conduct. This conclusion moves the debate 
about ECO efficacy beyond the apparent impasse of an argument based only on 
secondary, quantitative data. Secondly, and most importantly, the study has identified 
some evidence that suggests that ECO can have a positive impact on police conduct 
and performance. Although the data reveals mixed views and an abiding preference 
for police-centric systems of investigating complaints, there is nonetheless a 
significant core belief that ECO has a beneficial role. 
 
On reflection, it is suggested that the present thesis has made several important 
contributions to the corpus of knowledge about ECO and its relationship to police 
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reform matters. Firstly, the present research has made an important contribution to the 
growing body of data and related analysis in the international literature on ECO. It has 
added to the limited volume of case study material about specific instances of ECO, 
their legal structure, organization and modus operandi. Secondly and uniquely, the 
research has provided the literature with data and related analysis about the nature and 
scope of ECO in Kosovo. Although research has been conducted into various aspects 
of policing in Kosovo in the post-1999 era, there has not been any research conducted 
into police oversight in Kosovo prior to the present thesis.   
 
Thirdly, the research has extended the limited body of primary research data 
and analysis concerning police perceptions of ECO and its efficacy in changing police 
behaviour. As discussed earlier, this area of research holds out significant potential as 
a method of breaching the apparent empirical impasse of demonstrating via less 
ambiguous data a link between ECO and changes in police behaviour. The study has 
contributed new insights into the relationship between ECO and the broader police 
governance debate, which has tended to focus on the dialectic of two or three 
dynamics – central governance and/or local governance and police independence. If 
effective, ECO might trigger a new approach to resolving the perennial democratic 
deficit in many contexts. 
 
8.3 Signposts for future research 
There are certain signposts that emerge from the study and that point toward emergent 
and relevant issues. One of the important contributions of this study is the primary 
data about police perceptions: it has added a new source to the limited number of 
systematic evaluations of police perceptions of ECO, such as that of de Guzman 
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(2004). The study appears to have reinforced the case for research into police 
perceptions of ECO, and, at the same time, indicates the need to shift the emphasis in 
such research away from a polarized debate of either ECO or police-centric systems 
and toward an emphasis on process and fairness.  
 
An identified weakness in the questionnaire design was its failure to 
differentiate beliefs and perceptions about the two PIK functions – the reactive and 
the proactive functions. There is an obvious possibility that the agreement of the 
majority of respondents with statements 1 and 2
29
 in the questionnaire group is based 
not only on an experience of PIK investigators (reactive function) but also the 
inspectors (proactive function). As Wells and Schafer (2007, pp. 2-3) point out, 
research into police perceptions of ECO agencies should seek to identify beliefs about 
the different roles and functions of the agency. These scholars argue for a need to 
move beyond general beliefs about the success or failure of the oversight agency, to 
more discriminating information about which functions and activities are effective or 
ineffective.   
 
Comparative research could further explore other examples of ECO, with 
specific emphasis on their location within the overall governance structures. For 
example, although the PIK’s link to the parent Ministry is at odds with EPAC 
principles (EPAC, 2011, p. 6) and the preference of important advocates (Lewis, 
2000, p. 35; Bayley, 2006, p. 52; Sossin, 2003, p. 4), it nevertheless provides the 
means whereby the Ministry can exercise active oversight of the police. It might be 
                                                 
29
 Statement 1: ‘Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the 
presence of the Police Inspectorate’; statement 2: ‘Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to 
high standards of integrity and honesty’. 
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argued that without this vital mechanism to ensure police accountability the current 
ascendency of the central dynamic in Kosovo would be increased. In other words, a 
Ministry that lacked real authority to intervene in cases of corporate failure or group 
misconduct would be more inclined to return to the Yugoslav model, wherein the 
police and the parent Ministry form a single political reality. A comparative study of 
such diverse examples as the KP on one hand and large urban police organizations on 
the other, would inform a broader analysis of the range of possible solutions to the 
governance of police dilemma and the place of ECO.  
 
Such comparative research might throw much needed light on the question of 
the adequacy of an unqualified use of public confidence as an indicator of satisfactory 
governance. It is argued that, where public confidence is lost, it can only be restored if 
the police are answerable for their acts, and act responsively to the concerns of the 
public at large - two important elements of police accountability (Maguire, 1991, 
pp.178-9). Some research has established a link between public trust in the police and 
police effectiveness and the perceived legitimacy of police actions (Sunshine and 
Tyler, 2003, p. 522). If the public view the police as legitimate (or trustworthy) then 
public co-operation with the police is more likely, thereby enhancing police 
effectiveness. Whilst complex and not fully understood, formal accountability 
mechanisms are said to have an effect of building or preserving public confidence 
(Goldsmith, 1991, p. 24; Reiner, 1991, p.221). However, in both the literature and the 
PIK case study there is evidence to suggest that over reliance on public confidence as 
a measure is problematic. The dilemma is about how to interpret public confidence as 
the key criterion in a debate in which ‘the public’ is becoming an increasingly 
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uncertain concept in multi-pluralist, consumer societies (Fleming & McLaughlin, 
2010, p. 201).  
 
8.4 Final reflections  
This research work has allowed me to continue a process of transformative learning 
through critical reflection, reflective discourse, and action (Mezirow, 2000, p. 24). My 
work with EULEX – EU Mission to Kosovo (2008 – 2012) and role as ICITAP30 
advisor on accountability to the Albanian State Police (2013), has sustained and 
further stimulated my interest in academic study, as well as reinforced my conviction 
that I am operating as what some experts would describe as a ‘knowledge worker’ in 
the effort to move police reform abroad toward a new work order (Lee, Green, & 
Brennan, 2000, al, p. 117). Both EU missions and ICITAP programmes are placing 
greater emphasis on learning from experience rather than simply repeating failed 
strategies in security sector reform (Witney, 2008, p. 49 – 50). This places me on the 
edge of an exciting period of development through transformative learning in police 
development and reform in post-conflict and post-communist societies.  
 
Although mainstream policing in the English-speaking world has forged 
increasingly fruitful links to university research as a means of developing professional 
knowledge and competence, the same is not true for what Bayley calls “changing the 
police abroad to promote democracy” (2001, p. 75). For some experts, this tension 
between university and profession-oriented perspectives on knowledge represents the 
major theme of professional knowledge and competence (Eraut, 2003, p.8). Some 
writers claim that mainstream policing (in the UK) means that officers have become 
                                                 
30
 International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, US Government 
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“knowledge brokers” and “expert advisers” (Ericson, 1994, p.152). Developing 
policing abroad has so far fallen into that category of professions that have seen little 
investment in specialist courses (Eraut, 2003, p. 10). The world of policing in 
international development remains impoverished by the piecemeal and fragmentary 
approach adopted, preventing the formation of a cohesive and structured corpus of 
expertise and knowledge. The large international organizations that have been 
involved in this field, by their own admission, have been slow to set in place 
mechanisms whereby they learn from experience - whether at the corporate or group 
or individual level (Bayley, 2001, pp. 6, 44).  
 
As observed by experts in policing and police reform, there has been a 
remarkable dearth of literature that reflects upon the experience of reforming (and 
forming) police organizations in post-conflict societies (Deflem, 2002, p. 9; Bayley, 
2001, pp. 5-6). Moreover, the holistic approach to ECO of police and its link to 
reduced police misconduct and police reform – my specific area of interest - is an area 
that the experts readily acknowledge to be in great need of further research (Luna & 
Walker, 2000, p. 90; Brereton, 2000, p. 119, 123; Walker, 2007, p. 17). I believe that 
the present study has made a significant contribution to the effort of bridging that gap 
between professional education and the problems of practice. Moreover, it has done 
so in respect of a critical feature of policing in a democratic society. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Semi-Structured Interview Guide (Kosovo Police Survey) - 












Interviewer and Interviewee 




1. What do you understand to be the purpose of PIK’s work? 
 
 
2. What do you think PIK has done well over the last two years? 
 
 
3. What do you think PIK has failed to do well over the last two years? 
 
 
4. How has PIK influenced the way KP officers do their job? 
 
 
5. How would you describe the current level of misconduct among KP officers? (Follow-on: Why do you 
believe this to be the case?) 
 
 
Introduction. This interview forms part of a broad assessment of opinions about the role and 
efficacy of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), since start of operations in 2006. The 
purpose of the interview is to obtain your honest views and opinions about the way in PIK has 
assisted in reducing the level of police misconduct, and how you believe that such misconduct can 
be best tackled. Your personal details will NOT be recorded and the researcher will ensure that 
the responses you provide remain anonymous. Your responses will form part of a Professional 
Doctorate dissertation submitted to the University of Portsmouth, UK, and will be presented in a 
way that will not allow you or your views to be identified. Thank you for your time and 
contribution. 
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6. What, in your view, are the most worrying discipline problems among KP officers today? (Follow-on: 
State in order of priority the three most troubling discipline problems) 
 
 
7. What do you believe to be the main factors that influence misconduct among KP officers? (Follow-
on: Why do you believe this to be the case?) 
 
 
8. What do you believe to be the main forces that deter misconduct among KP officers? (Follow-on: 
Why do you believe this to be the case?) 
 
 
9. Do you believe that that there is less officer misconduct among KP staff since 2006? 
 
 
10. What are your views on the benefits of the PIK as independent investigators of police misconduct? 
 
 
11. What do you think about the PIK involvement in the investigation of police misconduct? 
 
 
12. How would you describe the changes that you have seen in the standard of professional conduct 
among KP officers since you joined? 
 
 
13. What do you think needs to change in the way misconduct is dealt with? 
 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to take part in this interview! 
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APPENDIX A  (ALBANIAN) 
 
Udhëzues interviste gjysëm i strukturuar (Anketë e Policisë së 













Intervistuesi dhe i intervistuari  
 



















Hyrje. Kjo intervistë është pjesë e një vlerësimi të gjërë mendimesh për rolin dhe efikasitetin e 
Inspektoratit Policor të Kosovës (IPK), që nga fillimi i veprimit në vitin 2006. Qëllimi i 
intervistës është të sigurohen pikëpamje dhe mendime të sinqerta për mënyrën se si IPK-ja ka 
ndihmuar në zvogëlimin e nivelit të sjelljeve të këqija të policisë dhe si këto sjellje mund të 
trajtohen më së miri. Të dhënat tuaja personale NUK DO TË  evidentohen dhe hulumtuesi do të 
sigurojë që përgjigjet e juaja mbesin anonime. Përgjigjet tuaja do të përbëjnë pjesën e një studimi 
më të gjërë të performancës së Inspetkoratit policor te dorëzuar ne Univerzitetin e Portsmouth-it, 
UK, dhe do të prezentohen në atë mënyrë që të mos shpalosin pikëpamjet tuaja apo identitetin 
tuaj. Ju faleminderit për kohën dhe kontributin tuaj. 
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5. Si e përshkruani nivelin e tanishëm të sjelljeve të këqija në mesin e pjesëtarëve të PK-së? (vazhdim: 





6. Sipas mendimit tuaj, cilat janë problemet më shqetësuese lidhur me disciplinën e pjesëtarëve të PK-




7. Sipas mendimit tuaj, cilët janë faktorët kryesor që nxisin sjelljete e këqija nga ana e zyratrëve të PK-




8. Sipas mendimit tuaj, cilat janë forcat kryesore që pengojnë sjelljet e këqija në mesin e zyrtarëve të 
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10. Sipas mendimit tuaj, cilat janë përparësitë e ekzistimit të IPK-së si organ i pavarur hetues  i 








12. Si do t’i përshkruani ndryshimet e vërejtura në standardet e sjelljes profesionale të pjesëtarëve të 




13. Sipas mendimit tuaj, çfarë duhet të ndryshohet në mënyrën e trajtimit të sjelljeve të këqija? 
 
Ju faleminderit shumë për pjesëmarrjen në këtë intervistë! 
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APPENDIX A  (SERBIAN) 
 
Polustruktuirani intervju (Anketa Kosovske Policije) - 












Interviewer and Interviewee 



















4. Na koji način PIK utiče na rad policajaca KP? 
Uvod. Ovaj intervju predstavalja deo široke ankete mišljenja o ulozi i efikasnosti Policijskog 
Inspektorata Kosova (PIK), od početka njegovog delovanja 2006. godine. Svrha intervjua je da se 
dobije vaše iskreno mišljenje o načinu na koji je PIK pomogao smanjenju nivoa lošeg vladanja 
policije i šta vi mislite da bi bio najbolji način da se okonča ovo loše vladanje. Vaši lični podaci 
neće biti evidentirani i ispitivač će obezbediti da odgovori koje nam budete dali ostanu anonimni. 
Vaši odgovori će obrazovati deo profesionalne doktorske disertacije dostavljene Univerzitetu 
Portsmut, VB, i predstaviće se na način da vi i vaše mišljenje nećete biti identifikovani. Hvala vam 
na uloženom vremenu i doprinosu. 
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6. Po vašem mišljenju, koji su to danas najzabrinjavajući problemi u vezi sa disciplinom među 





7. Po vašem mišljenju, koji su glavni faktori koji utiču na loše ponašanje među pripadnicima KP? (Zašto 





8. Po vašem mišljenju, koji su glavni načini za promenu lošeg ponašanja među pripadnicima KP? (Zašto 





9. Da li verujete da je od 2006.godine opao nivo lošeg ponašanja među pripadnicima KP? 
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12. Kako biste opsiali promene koje ste primetili u standardu profesionalnog ponašanja među 









Veoma smo vam zahvalni što ste pristali da učestvujete u ovom intervjuu!! 
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Structured Interview (Kosovo Police Survey) - 


















1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
“Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of 
the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
 
 
2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
“Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity and 
honesty.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
 
Please turn to page 2 
 
Introduction. This interview forms part of a broad survey of opinions about the role and efficacy 
of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK), since start of operations in 2006. The purpose of the 
interview is to obtain your honest views and opinions about the way in PIK has assisted in 
reducing the level of police misconduct, and how you believe that such misconduct can be best 
tackled. Your personal details will NOT be recorded and the researcher will ensure that the 
responses you provide remain anonymous. Your responses will form part of a Professional 
Doctorate dissertation submitted to the University of Portsmouth, UK, and will be presented in a 
way that will not allow you or your views to be identified. Thank you for your time and 
contribution. 
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3. How much do you disagree or agree with the following statement? 
“Police misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
 
4. How much do you disagree or agree with the following statement? 
“PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
 
5. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
“Complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent 
agency.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
 
6. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
“Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators of 
complaints against Kosovo Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers.” 
Strongly            Agree            Slightly            Slightly            Disagree            Strongly 
Agree                                      Agree               Disagree                                    Disagree 
                                                                                                                           
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7. Which of the following types of misconduct among KP officers causes you 
most concern? (Select only one option). 
 
 
(a) Excessive use of force     
(b) Abuse of human rights     
(c) Graft or taking bribes     
(d) Insubordination or poor performance   




Have you ever been investigated by the 
Police Inspectorate?      
YES                                                            NO 
Have you ever been investigated by 
Professional Standards Directorate? 
YES                                            NO 
Have you made a complaint against another 
Kosovo Police officer?   
 YES                                                           NO 
Have you provided evidence against 
another Kosovo Police officer in a 
disciplinary case?                                             






Many thanks for agreeing to take part in this survey! 
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APPENDIX A (ALBANIAN) 
 
Intervistë e strukturuar (Anketë e Policisë së Kosovës) - 













Intervistuesi dhe i intervistuari  
 




1. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Zyrtarët e Policisë së Kosovës ka gjasa të respketojnë më shumë të drejtat e qytetarëve për 
shkak të pranisë së Inspektoratit Policor?” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem       Pajtohem    Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem          Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                       nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                                
 
2. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Inspektorati Policor ndihmon zyratrët e PK-së të kryejnë detyrën sipas standardeve të 
larta të integritetit dhe sinqeritietit.” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem        Pajtohem   Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem           Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                       nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                                         
 
Ju lutemi kaloni në faqen 2  
Hyrje. Kjo intervistë është pjesë e një vlerësimi të gjërë mendimesh për rolin dhe efikasitetin e 
Inspektoratit Policor të Kosovës (IPK), që nga fillimi i veprimit në vitin 2006. Qëllimi i intervistës 
është të sigurohen pikëpamje dhe mendime të sinqerta për mënyrën se si IPK-ja ka ndihmuar në 
zvogëlimin e nivelit të sjelljeve të këqija të policisë dhe si këto sjellje mund të trajtohen më së miri. 
Të dhënat tuaja personale NUK DO TË  evidentohen dhe hulumtuesi do të sigurojë që përgjigjet e 
juaja mbesin anonime. Përgjigjet tuaja do të përbëjnë pjesën e një studimi më të gjërë të 
performancës së Inspetkoratit policor te dorëzuar ne Univerzitetin e Portsmouth-it, UK, dhe do të 
prezentohen në atë mënyrë që të mos shpalosin pikëpamjet tuaja apo identitetin tuaj. Ju faleminderit 
për kohën dhe kontributin tuaj. 
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3. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Numri i sjelljeve të këqija në Kosovë është zvogëluar viteve të fundit” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem        Pajtohem   Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem       Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                    nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                       
 
4. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Zyrtarët e IPK-së kryejnë hetime sistematike dhe profesionale” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem        Pajtohem   Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem           Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                       nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                      
 
5. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Ankesat ndaj personelit të PK-së duhet të shqyrtohen/trajtohen nga ana e një agjencie 
të jashtme/të pavarur.” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem       Pajtohem    Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem       Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                     nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                      
 
6. Sa pajtoheni apo nuk pajtoheni me pohimin e mëposhtëm? 
“Personeli i Drejtorisë së Standardeve Profesionale janë hetues më efektiv në raste të 
ankesave ndaj personelit të Policisë së Kosovës sesa zyrtarët e Inspektoratit Policor.” 
Fuqimisht         Pajtohem       Pajtohem    Nuk  pajtohem   Nuk pajtohem        Fuqimisht 
pajtohem                                    deri diku         plotësisht                                      nuk pajtohem 
                                                                                                                        





 Ju lutemi kaloni në faqen 3  
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7. Cila nga llojet e sjelljeve të këqija në vijim e zyrtarëve të PK-së ju brengos më 
së shumti? (Zhgjedhni vetëm një opcion). 
 
 
(a) Përdorimi i tepruar i forcës    
(b) Shkelja e të drejtave njerzore    
(c) Marrja e ryshfetit ose mito                            
(d) Mosbindja ose performanca e dobtë    
(e) Lloje tjera të sjelljeve të këqija    
 
 
A jeni hetuar ndonjëherë nga Inspektorati 
Policor?      
PO                                                           JO 
A jeni hetuar ndonjëherë nga 
Drejtoria e e Standardeve 
Profesionale? 
PO                                          JO 
A keni paraqitur ndonjë ankesë ndaj ndonjë 
zyrtari tjetër të Policisë së Kosovës?   
 PO                                                       JO 
A keni ofruar dëshmi ndaj ndonjë 
zyrtari tjetër të Policisë së Kosovës për 
një rast disciplinor?                                             





Ju faleminderit shumë për pjesëmarrjen në këtë anketë! 
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APPENDIX A (SERBIAN) 
 
Strukturni intervju (Anketa Kosovske Policije) - 












Ispitanik i ispitivač 
 




1. Koliko se slažete ili ne slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Pripadnici Kosovske Policije više poštuju pravo građana zbog prisustva Policijskog 
Inspektorata.” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 
                                                                                                                
 
2. Koliko se slažete ili ne slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Policijski Inspektorat pomaže pripadnicima KP-a da ostvare visoke standarde 
integriteta i poštenja.” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 






Molimo okrenite stranu 2 
 
Uvod. Ovaj intervju predstavalja deo široke ankete mišljenja o ulozi i efikasnosti Policijskog Inspektorata 
Kosova (PIK), od početka njegovog delovanja 2006. godine. Svrha intervjua je da se dobije vaše iskreno 
mišljenje o načinu na koji je PIK pomogao smanjenju nivoa lošeg vladanja policije i šta vi mislite da bi bio 
najbolji način da se okonča ovo loše vladanje. Vaši lični podaci neće biti evidentirani i ispitivač će obezbediti da 
odgovori koje nam budete dali ostanu anonimni. Vaši odgovori će obrazovati deo profesionalne doktorske 
disertacije dostavljene Univerzitetu Portsmut, VB, i predstaviće se na način da vi i vaše mišljenje nećete biti 
identifikovani. Hvala vam na uloženom vremenu i doprinosu. 
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3. Koliko se ne slažete ili slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Loše vladanje policije na Kosovu je smanjeno poslednjih godina.” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 
                                                                                                               
 
 
4. Koliko se ne slažete ili slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Pripadnici PIK-a obavljaju detaljne i profesionalne istrage.” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 
                                                                                                                
 
 
5. Koliko se ne slažete ili slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Na žalbama protiv KP-a treba da radi spoljna /nezavisna agencija” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 
                                                                                                              
 
 
6. Koliko se slažete ili ne slažete sa sledećom izjavom? 
“Osoblje Uprave za Profesionalne Standarde efikasnije vodi istrage žalbi protiv osoblja 
Kosovske Policije nego pripadnici Policijskog Inspektorata.” 
U potpunosti    Slažem se    Delimično      Delimično       Ne slažem se        U potpunosti      
se slažem                             se slažem        se ne slažem                                 se ne slažem 
                                                                                                               
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7. Koje od navedenih vrsti lošeg ponašanja među pripadnicima KP-a izaziva 
najviše zabrinutosti? (Izabarati samo jednu opciju). 
 
 
(a) Prekomerna upotreba sile    
(b) Kršenje ljudskih prava     
(c) Ucena ili primanje mita      
(d) Neposlušnost ili nezadovoljavajuće delovanje  




Da li ste nekada bili pod istragom 
Policijskog Inspektorata?      
DA                                                            NE 
Da li ste nakada bili pod istragom Uprave 
za Profesionalne Standarde? 
DA                                                            NE 
Da li ste nekad uložili žalbu protiv drugog 
pripadnika Kosovske Policije?  
 DA                                                           NE 
Da li ste nekad pružili dokaze protiv drugog 
pripadnika Kosovske Policije u displinskom 
slučaju?                                             
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Appendix B 
Notes on preparation of the interview guide 
 
B.1 Selecting an appropriate strategy  
The interview is identified as the most fundamental qualitative research method 
(Keegan, 2009, p. 73; Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 85; Ten Have, 2004, p. 5), 
offering the opportunity to probe deeply, uncover clues, open new dimensions of the 
problem, and secure inclusive accounts based on personal experience or biographies 
(Smith, 2009. p 115; Burgess, 1982, p. 107). Moreover, interviews can provide a 
vehicle for data about individual perceptions (Smith, 2009. p 116; Weinberg, 2002, p. 
117), and qualitative interviews are often used in conjunction with other techniques 
(Fontana & Prokos, 2007. p 112), thereby offering a potentially useful component of 
the present study.  
 
Semi-structured interviews offer a via media that has a number of potential 
advantages in the present study: use of open-ended questions balanced by a degree of 
pre-determined purpose (Smith, 2009. p 116; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 233); 
flexibility balanced by structure (Jupp, 1989, p. 68); greater opportunity to probe with 
follow-up questions (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 79). As a result, it can yield rich and 
often surprising data about perceptions, contradicting the assumptions of policy 
makers (Jupp, 1989, p. 68). Although costly in question/topic development, 
demanding interviewing skill/practice (Gillham, 2005, p. 79), and requiring more 
investment in analysis and interpretation (Gillham, 2005, p. 70), this approach holds 
out the promise of sufficiently rich data in relation to the research question about PIK 
efficacy. 
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The decision to adopt a particular research strategy, according to Noaks & 
Wincup, (2006, p. 78), should be influenced by a number of factors, including the 
characteristics of the target population, the sensitivity of the topic, location of the 
interview and the timescales. An exploration of senior KP perceptions about the 
impact of the PIK on their organization must go beyond highly structured interviews 
that are based on questionnaires and offer a limited and positivistic approach 
(Easterby-Smith-Smith et al, 2004, p. 86). Likewise, it helps to move beyond the 
inevitable assumptions that drive structured questions. Semi-structured interviews 
offer the benefits of both structure and opportunities to probe responses and explore 
ideas about the impact of external oversight. Finally, a semi-structured approach has 
the benefit of non-verbal clues, such as voice inflection and facial expression 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 86) - an important consideration when communicating 
with ethnic Albanian officers who sometimes feel reluctant to voice negative views 
about government organizations. 
 
B.2 Design and use of the semi-structured interview 
As noted by scholars, it would be a mistake to simply assume that conducting an 
interview is a variation on a life skill: it requires proper planning and preparation if it 
is to be effective, and based on prior knowledge of the area being researched (Rugg & 
Petre, 2006, p. 135; Gillham, 2005, p. 46). Shaw & Gould ( 2002, p. 143) observe that 
interview structure is a critical component of the planning stage. A good structure is a 
product of the properly planned questions that link back to the announced purpose of 
the interview, and the purpose of the research (Robbins, 1998, p.88). The purpose of 
this study is to understand how KP officers construct “the reality of their situation, 
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formed from the complex personal framework of beliefs and values” that are used to 
explain events in the world (Jones, 1985, cited by Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 87).  
 
Therefore, the semi-structured interview must be built with questions designed 
to elicit those beliefs and values that form individual (KP) perceptions of the impact 
of the PIK (Agee, 2009, p. 432). To that end, I found Gillham’s (2005, p. 19) advice 
useful and began by brainstorming the questions on paper, jotting down as many 
questions as occurred to me, then reviewing and reorganizing them into topic-based 
groups. This made it possible to construct the interview questions with a content that 
made sense (Gillham, 2005, p. 19). What resulted was what the literature describes as 
a semi-structured interview “guide” (or schedule), with predetermined topics and 
questions, and space to explore additional topics as they arise (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 
138; Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 88).  
 
The guide that I used in the semi-structured interviews with KP officers can be 
found in Appendix A. The design of the questions is deliberately ‘open’ – that is 
formulated in a way that will elicit free and unprompted responses (Robbins, 1998, p. 
90). The design also sought to use a style of language and vocabulary that the 
interviewee would readily identify with, thereby enhancing the potential for free-
flowing responses (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 139). Language proved to be a critical 
issue, since the questions had to be translated into both Albanian and Serbian, the 




                                                 
31
 Note that translated versions are also provided under Appendix A. 
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In terms of content, the guide falls into three parts: an introduction, some 
factual questions, and a series of open/opinion questions. There is agreement in the 
literature that it is important to explain to the interviewee the purpose and scope of the 
interview, as well as what will be done with the data (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 83; 
Coontz, 1998, p.11). It is also suggested that respondents are provided with a 
straightforward description of the goals of the research, since the purpose of the 
research is to “grant access to their lives, their minds, [and] their emotions,” (Crano & 
Brewer, 2002. p 203; Lofland and Lofland, 1984, p. 25). For this reason an 
introduction was added to the question guide to remind the interviewer to clarify the 
exact purpose of the interview and the use of the data provided, and to emphasise the 
anonymity of the participant (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p 343; Crano & 
Brewer, 2002. p 239). This note also makes clear that participation is conditional upon 
the person’s voluntary consent, an essential requirement of ethical research 
(Denscombe, 2003. p. 138; Coontz, 1998, p.7).  
 
The guide then lists 13 questions that are open in style and invite the 
respondent to express an opinion rather than merely state a fact (Robbins, 1998, p. 
91). The first four questions explore the respondent’s knowledge and understanding of 
the PIK, as well as his/her perceptions of its apparent strengths and weaknesses. The 
next five questions try to explore the respondent’s perceptions of the nature, extent 
and trends in KP misconduct. This is followed by two further questions exploring 
perceptions about the impact of the PIK, and two final questions on misconduct 
trends. Some questions deliberately overlap in an effort to check understanding and 
consistency in the responses. Following advice in the literature, a note is added to 
some questions to remind the interviewer to explore and probe the answers more 
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deeply where appropriate (Denscombe, 2003. p. 178; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 242). 
This deters the interviewer from an unhealthy emphasis on process, the how, at the 
expense of what is conveyed by the respondent (Weinberg, 2002, p. 114); it reminds 
researchers that interviewees are not passive subjects; they are active participants in 
the interaction (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 18; Denscombe, 2003. p. 167).  
 
Deciding how to record the interview data presented a particular challenge, in 
view of the divided opinions in the literature. For some, the decision to rely on written 
notes or a tape recorder appears to be largely a matter of personal preference. For 
example, Lincoln and Guba “do not recommend recording except for unusual 
reasons” (1985, p. 241), whilst others strongly urge that a tape recorder is 
“indispensable” (Patton, 1990, p. 348) and has the advantage of capturing data more 
faithfully than hurriedly written notes might (Denscombe, 2003. p. 175). My instinct 
was to follow Weinberg (2002, p. 101) and others and reject tape recording as a 
potential barrier, and opt instead for a system of jotting down notes that would serve 
as a memory aid (when full notes are later constructed), thereby avoiding the 
detrimental effects of writing too much (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 86; Denscombe, 
2003, p 175). Ardian Latifaj, a local Programme Office staff member, read the 
questions to the interviewees (in Albanian or Serbian) and simultaneously translated 
the responses. In some cases, the senior KP staff preferred to speak English. This 
approach allowed me to make notes while maintaining good eye contact and 
providing NVQs that signalled my interest to the interviewee. As soon as possible 
after the interview I created a fuller, typed manuscript that was based on the notes 
made during the interview. 
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B.3 Evaluation of the interview method  
Interviewing is easy to do badly and difficult to do well (Keegan, 2009, p.102; Rugg 
& Petre, 2006, p. 137). Evaluation, the process of learning to do better, means 
assessing the practical, theoretical and ethical issues that were raised in the use of this 
qualitative research method.  
 
Whilst the literature rightly points to the possibility of problems in gaining 
access to the data in the criminal justice arena (Noaks & Wincup, 2006, p. 56 Ten 
Have, 2004, p. 109; Gerson & Horowitz, 2002, p. 207), I did not find it overly 
problematic to gain access to the KP officers who might provide useful information. 
There was happily no evidence of the police hostility that some authors have 
encountered (Eijkman, 2006, p. 426). Following advice in the literature, I found that it 
was easier to gain access by making use of contacts that would help remove barriers, 
and by reducing unnecessarily wasting respondents’ time (by not questioning matters 
of public record), and by treating respondents with courtesy (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 55; 
Sommer & Sommer, 1997, p.121). Moreover, my professional role with EULEX (and 
previous work with OSCE) meant that I knew many, if not all the senior KP officers, 
and this provided a distinct advantage in gaining access.  
 
Since April 2008 I have been employed by EULEX – the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo - as the Programme Manager (Police). My work has 
involved the design and implementation of a staged police reform process for the KP, 
in cooperation with the EULEX Police Strengthening Department (PSD) - about 400 
police officers from contributing States. My work has given me access to all senior 
KP officers, as well as access to the considerable resources of EULEX (Programme 
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Office and PSD). In May 2011 both EULEX (Head of Programme Office, and Head 
of PSD) and Reshat Maliqi, Director General of the KP, welcomed my pilot project 
with enthusiasm and fully agreed to facilitate the proposed study. It was recognised 
that the research (once shared with EULEX and KP) would add to the growing pool of 
data on KP performance and the important issue of police accountability in Kosovo. 
EULEX agreed to provide translation support for the Interview Guide (English to 
Albanian and Serbian) and support of Ardian Latifaj, a local Programme Office staff 
member, to assist with the interviews. 
 
Perhaps the more important danger in my interviews with KP senior staff is 
what some scholars describe as the interviewees “telling the researcher what they 
think she wants to hear” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 90; Sommer & Sommer, 
1997, p.107). This would arguably be the natural result of two combined factors in my 
case: firstly, that some of the officers knew the researcher and, secondly, some of the 
officers knew that the researcher had a significant role in the creation of the PIK. In 
order to obviate this significant risk to the integrity of the data I decided that it would 
be prudent to voice my concern with each interviewee and emphasise that I welcomed 
an honest opinion even if the interviewee felt there was a risk of offending me. 
Following other good advice in the literature, I thought it best to conduct the 
interviews (where possible) away from the KP workplace (Easterby-Smith, 2004, p. 
92): this, I believed, would make it more likely that the officers would feel relaxed 
and more inclined to give honest views. 
 
The guide proved easy to use and the prompts to explore views had the desired 
effect of obtaining sufficiently rich data. Virtually all the interviewees proved most 
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helpful and required little prompting to offer free-flowing accounts of their beliefs 
about external oversight. Indeed, such was the volume of material in the average 
response I was reminded of the advice of Easterby-Smith (2004, p. 89) that an 
important skill of interviewing is that of recognising and recording what is relevant 
and avoiding the irrelevant. In some cases the officers tended to migrate into areas 
that were not directly relevant to the study, and it was necessary to bring them back to 
the original question. The volume did generate problems with note taking and I fear 
that my notes may have omitted some vital points in the substantial flow of data.  
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APPENDIX C 
Notes on the design and use of the questionnaire 
 
C.1 Choosing the best quantitative strategy 
At this juncture the study will critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of  
different quantitative research strategies, with a view to identifying the best option for 
the present study. As in qualitative research, the realm of quantitative research offers a 
range of methods. Easterby-Smith (2004, p.130) indicates that interviews, 
questionnaires, tests/measures and observation are the main ways of gathering 
quantitative data, alongside some less commonly used methods such as sourcing from 
archives and data banks.  
 
Questionnaires are measuring instruments that ask individuals to answer a set 
of questions, often about attitudes and opinions; if the questions ask for information 
about the individual respondents, they are called “self-report questionnaires” 
(Schwab, 2004, p. 39). This approach involves use of a series of precisely worded and 
standardized questions that are designed to cater for either factual answers or less 
precise answers where the respondent is uncertain (Denscombe, 2003. p. 166; 
Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.75). Where imprecise answers are anticipated, the 
interviewer is furnished with four or five alternative answers, into which a response is 
constrained (Denscombe, 2003. p. 166; Jupp, 1989, p. 63). Each of the potential 
responses is given a numerical code, so that the whole interview can be recorded as a 
series of numbers and the results fed into a computer for rapid analysis, using 
applications such as Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) (Blaxter, 2010. p 
222). Due to the design of the questionnaires, it is possible to conduct such interviews 
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either face-to-face or over the telephone. It is noteworthy, however, that – in spite of 
the highly structured design - quantitative data interviews are far from purely 
mechanical processes of extracting raw data.  
 
Whilst questionnaires are usually less expensive to administer than interviews, 
the respondents' abilities (i.e. reading, comprehension) and motivations (i.e. aversion 
to forms, questionnaires) may make the use of questionnaires problematic and suggest 
the need to take advantage of benefits of interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee (Brace, 2008, p 23, 26; Schwab, 2004, p. 41). In terms of the quest for an 
answer to Walker’s question, it is interesting to note that the technique of structured 
questionnaires has emerged in response to some doubts about the validity of the 
inferences drawn on the basis of qualitative interviewing alone (Bechhofer & 
Paterson, 2000, p.75). Thus the use of the questionnaire could, potentially, either 
defeat or corroborate the findings of the qualitative, semi-structured interview. 
Against that, there are serious conceptual or epistemological problems with systems 
that constrain the respondent’s answer. Formal questions are often criticised for 
imposing a cognitive world on the people being interviewed: that is, a view of the 
world shaped by social science theories more than by common experience (Bechhofer 
& Paterson, 2000, p.75). In a more sinister sense, the way a question is framed can 
induce a distorted response: we can, it is argued, make people feel at ease about 
socially unacceptable responses (Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.77).  
 
A decision was made to adopt the self-report questionnaire as the best strategy 
on the basis of a number of factors, particularly the size of the target population and 
the time constraints on all involved. Since the relevant population consists of over 
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7,000 police officers, a limited sample would have to be conducted rather than full 
census. A sufficient sample would nonetheless involve several hundred KP staff, and 
the appropriate strategy would have to make the task practically feasible among busy 
operational police staff. Having considered the options described earlier, it was 
decided that the best strategy would be to conduct a survey using a structured self-
report questionnaire, as a means of “obtaining information from, or about, a defined 
set of people, or population” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p.135). Quantitative 
questionnaires seemed to offer obvious advantages for the main aim of a survey: 
namely, to construct a subset of the KP population, which is fully representative in the 
main areas of interest (i.e. perceptions of the effectiveness of the PIK). Moreover, this 
strategy held out the possibility of making subsequent statistical inferences on the 
likelihood that patterns of beliefs and attitudes observed in the sample would also be 
replicated in the entire KP population. Finally, it is noteworthy that the mix of 
structured interviews and self-administered questionnaires has been used in similar 
studies of police perceptions (see for example de Guzman, 2007, p. 34). 
 
C.2 Questionnaire Design 
Self-report questionnaires are deemed appropriate methods of gathering data about 
attitudes and opinions (Schwab, 2004, p. 39). In terms of questionnaire design, it was 
decided that the most effective way of gaining responses relevant to Walker’s 
question would be a combination of ‘questions of fact’ and ‘questions of opinion’ 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 132; Schwab, 2004, p. 43). The former relate to issues 
such as age, occupation, level of education, police rank, and length of police service: 
these would be relevant to gauging the links between perceptions about external 
oversight and police misconduct on the one hand, and issues such as length of service, 
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policing experience and supervisory function on the other hand. Of all the approaches 
used to gather data directly from people, research suggests that people are more likely 
to give honest responses to sensitive questions when responding to a self-administered 
questionnaire (Johnson, 2002, p 94).  
 
As noted earlier, it is important to know and exploit the important distinction 
between open and closed questions: it was decided to avoid fully open questions in 
the questionnaire design, thereby facilitating the process of analysing the responses 
(Keegan, 2009, p. 113; Denscombe, 2003. p. 156). The distinction between open and 
closed questions is noted as being one of degree as much as kind (Gillham, 2005, p. 
115): in addition to fully open questions (such as, ‘in what respects is the PIK more 
effective?’), there are open questions that give some structure to the answers 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe, 2004, p. 133) and these could be used to good 
effect in the questionnaire design. 
 
It was decided to exploit the use of a closed-ended response format, involving  
questions that can be constructed in a way that provides more discrimination in the 
response than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Schwab, 2004, p. 44). The most common 
formula of structured closed questions is the Likert scale (Bell, 2005. p 142; 
Denscombe, 2003. p. 237; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 286; Robbins, 1998, p.90), and 
this was used extensively in questions such as the following: 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
The PIK is more effective in reducing police misconduct.    
Agree strongly (1) - Agree (2) - Undecided (3) – Disagree (4) - Disagree strongly (5) 
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The KP respondent is asked to select the most appropriate response by 
marking one of the five categories, thereby indicating the degree of agreement or 
disagreement with the main statement. Another form of closed question that requires 
the exercise of judgement is the ranking exercise, where the respondent is asked to 
indicate the order of importance of a list of attributes or statements: however, given 
the relative complexity of ranking long lists of items (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 
133), it was decided not to use this technique in the draft questionnaire. According to 
Johnson, questionnaires should be short and take no more than 30 minutes to 
complete (2002. p 94): it was decided, therefore, to seek a solution that employed 
closed questions that had the advantage of being quick to complete and analyse. 
Although open questions might allow the possibility of asking deeper questions and 
obtaining unanticipated views and perspectives on external oversight, they carried the 
considerable weakness that completion and - particularly analysis - would be difficult, 
complex and time-consuming.  
 
In addition to these considerations, it was decided to act upon a number of 
general principles advocated in the literature. These included the emphasis on clarity 
in the phrasing of the question, avoiding jargon, and avoiding negatives (e.g. do you 
dislike the PIK?) (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, K., 2007. p 334; Schwab, 2004, p. 43; 
Robbins, 1998, p.91). In addition, the scholars advocate that questionnaires avoid 
personal questions, multiple questions (i.e. more than one question in a sentence) and 
leading questions (i.e. where the response is potentially influenced by the phrasing of 
the question) (Robbins, 1998, p.93). In terms of the general format of the 
questionnaire, Easterby–Smith et al (2004, p. 135) offered some guidance that was 
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usefully built into the final draft that was used in a pilot survey. This included the 
provision of a short explanatory note, detailing the purpose of the research and why 
the respondent was selected; provision of instructions about how to complete the 
questionnaire; varying the type of question whilst grouping together questions that are 
broadly similar; and, finally, starting with simple, factual questions, then moving on 
to items of opinion or values.  
 
In view of the above considerations, it was decided to employ a survey 
methodology to measure the perceptions of PIK clients, both supervising officers and 
supervised officers (i.e. patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants). Although there are 
reservations about the use of surveys and respondent perceptions, other data collection 
procedures were not possible because of time and financial constraints, and would not 
allow for the collection of data in a substantial number of cases. For example, data 
would need to have been collected concerning the history and reasons why KP 
policies were enacted to see if they were implemented in response to PIK actions. 
Officers would need to be debriefed using protocol analysis on a regular basis to 
determine whether the existence of the PIK influenced their daily street-level 
decisions. It was clear that the costs involved in these types of data collection 
processes would have been beyond the scope of this limited research. 
 
It is acknowledged that the use of beliefs and perceptions to measure external 
oversight impact is not uncontroversial. There are concerns that, inter alia, 
respondents may forget, filter, or misinterpret events or that they might give socially 
desirable (rather than accurate) responses to questions. In short, there is concern that 
respondents might reconstruct their own reality concerning an issue about which they 
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are being questioned (Brace, 2008, p 13, 21). Against all this, there is good evidence 
in the relevant literature that indicates that perceptions are important determinants of 
actions (Smith, 2009. p. 58; Oskamp, & Schultz, 2004, p. 6); police officers, like other 
employment groups, tend to act upon the information that is at their disposal.  
 
A single survey instrument was prepared that would allow – at the analysis 
stage – for the study to differentiate between the responses of KP officers in ‘first-
line’ supervisor roles, and those KP patrol officers who are supervised by the ‘first-
line supervisors’. In 2012 the KP had a total of 7,076 police officers, of whom 5,778 
(81%) were patrol officers, 834 (11.7%) were Sergeants and 299 (4.2%) were 
Lieutenants (PIK Annual Report, 2012). The questionnaire consisted of two parts (see 
Appendix B). Following advice in the literature, the first part of the survey instrument 
provides an explanatory note that is designed to provide some explanation concerning 
the purpose of the interview and the research as a whole, as well as the issues of 
confidentiality (Gillham, 2005, p. 78; Crano & Brewer, 2002. p 350). The note makes 
clear that participation is conditional upon the person’s voluntary consent, an essential 
requirement of ethical research (Denscombe, 2003. p. 138; Coontz, 1998, p.7), and 
reassures the participant that his/her responses will remain anonymous (Crano & 
Brewer, 2002. p 239). In its first section, the study needs to ask what are called 
classification questions (Brace, 2008, p. 44; Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.79) to 
differentiate between supervisors and supervised, since patterns of belief held by 
officers on either side of this divide will be important in answering Walker’s question 
(see Row 1).  
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Expanding on the work of Perez (1994), the second portion of the survey 
instrument contains six items aimed at soliciting responses concerning the perceived 
impact of the PIK on the KP, at the individual and organizational levels. A six-point 
Likert-scale response option was provided with each statement. The response options 
were “strongly agree,” “agree,” “slightly agree”, “slightly disagree”, “disagree,” and 
“strongly disagree”. The six statements are: 
 
g) Kosovo Police officers are more likely to respect the rights of citizens because 
of the presence of the Police Inspectorate. 
h) Police Inspectorate helps KP officers perform to high standards of integrity 
and honesty. 
i) Police misconduct in Kosovo has decreased in recent years. 
j) PIK officers conduct thorough and professional investigations. 
k) Complaints against KP staff should be dealt with by an external/independent 
agency. 
l) Professional Standards Directorate staff are more effective investigators of 
complaints against Kosovo Police staff than Police Inspectorate officers. 
 
Question 7 takes the form of a multiple-choice question (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 323) 
and asks respondents to select one of the following as the type of misconduct among 
KP officers that causes the respondent most concern.  
 
 
(a) Excessive use of force     
(b) Abuse of human rights     
(c) Graft or taking bribes     
(d) Insubordination or poor performance   
(e) Other types of misconduct   
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Only one option can be selected. Responses to this question will be compared with 
data on recorded complaints, thereby allowing the study to check the degree of 
correspondence between the perceptions of KP officers about the dominant types of 
police misconduct and the recorded complaints. A high degree of correspondence or, 
as the case might be, disagreement may either lend weight or detract from the 
credibility of the earlier responses regarding PIK performance in tackling misconduct. 
 
The final section then collects information that allows the study to identify 
beliefs and views of officers with varying levels of involvement in the disciplinary 
regime. It consists of a series of four factual questions – i.e. questions for which there 
is, in principle, a true answer, rather than whether the answer is factual (Bechhofer & 
Paterson, 2000, p.78). The first two factual questions (see Row 1) are simple closed 
measures (yes/no), asking respondents whether (a) they have been investigated by the 
Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK); and (b) whether investigated by the Professional 
Standards Directorate. These are of course important indicators of both a heightened 
level of awareness or increased knowledge of the disciplinary regime, and will create 
an important subset of the survey that might contrast with the perceptions of those 
respondents who have not had direct contact with PIK or PSD. Questions three and 
four (Row 2) are also factual and closed (yes/no), and seek to identify those officers 
with experience of (a) making a complaint against another officer, and (b), those who 
have provided evidence against other officers. These categories have particular 
importance in the KP because of the unusually high incidence of complaints made 
against officers by other KP officers (Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, 2008, p. 5).   
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Acting on prompts in the literature, an effort has been made to achieve brevity 
and clarity in the phrasing of the statements, as well as constructing the interview so 
that the sequence and content of questions makes sense (Gillham, 2005, pp.19 - 21; 
Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000, p.74). The final version was achieved by brainstorming 
questions on paper, converting the questions into statements, and grouping them into 
the related topics (Cohen, et al, 2007. p. 319; Gillham, 2005, p. 19). Each question 
had to clearly link back to the research objective (Brace, 2008, p 11). Once the 
questions had been designed and assembled, I attempted to apply useful guidance on 
how to make the questionnaire’s appearance attractive, avoiding a cluttered and 
clumsy visual effect (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 338). 
 
As in the qualitative approach described earlier, the next important issue was 
that of translation into Albanian and Serbian, ensuring that the objectives of clarity 
and comprehension were carried over into the translated text. Following advice, it was 
decided to conduct a trial or pre-test (not a pilot) of the questions by testing them on 
(EULEX) work colleagues in both languages and obtaining their comments about the 
ease of comprehension and clarity of meaning (Cohen, et al, 2007. p 341; Bell, 2005. 
p 147; Schwab, 2004, p. 47; Gillham, 2005, p. 22; Robbins, 1998, p.96). This resulted 
in one or two changes of words in the translated texts. 
 
C. 3 Use of the questionnaire 
Once the design of the questionnaire was completed, the task of implementation had 
to be tackled. Before administering the full KP survey, it was appropriate to conduct a 
limited pilot survey of 20 KP officers: this would facilitate the process of testing the 
questionnaires and identify any survey problem issues (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 8; 
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Gillham, 2005, p. 25). This would create a number of advantages in terms of testing 
the assumptions that underpin the questionnaire, particularly those relating to the 
construction of the statements and use of language. Use of a pilot scheme is 
recommended as a means of allowing the researcher to check that items are easily 
understood and that there are no obvious problems concerning length, sequencing of 
questions, sensitive items (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004, p. 134). During the pilot, the 
KP officers were encouraged to make comments about the language, content and style 
of the questionnaire. Since the twenty KP officers involved in the pilot survey did not 
voice any significant concerns, the questionnaire design will be retained with slight 
modifications for the full survey.  
 
In terms of delivery, a number of options presented themselves, including: 
postal delivery, E Mails, telephone interviews, one-to-one interviewing and self-
administered (Brace, 2008, p 27). In some contexts, the postal questionnaire has the 
advantage of being relatively easy to administer, as the respondents have the 
completed document and can finish it in their own time. However, it was decided not 
to adopt this method for two reasons: firstly, research indicates that response rates can 
be as low as 10% (Swetnam, 2000, p. 54); and secondly, Kosovo’s postal system 
remains compromised, due to the lack of postal codes and ambiguous signs/street 
names – a legacy of the apartheid period in the 1990s. Telephone interviews can 
combine the virtues of survey sampling and in-depth interviewing; has some of the 
qualities of face-to-face interviewing; interviews not bound by geographical distance; 
and the range of levels of interview structure possible.  
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However, there is general resistance to the ‘nuisance’ factor i.e. unwanted 
communications; non-verbal elements missing (though this may change); and limited 
duration of interviews (Gillham, 2005, p. 106). E-Mail interviews offer instant 
communication access worldwide; acceptable to those reluctant to participate in a 
face-to-face interview; and extremely economical on time; response is at the 
interviewee’s convenience; and no transcription required. Against that, responses can 
be too colloquial for research purposes; responses can be very abbreviated or edited; 
and E-Mails can accumulate or be ignored (Gillham, 2005, p. 112). In addition to 
these reservations, the use of telephone interviews and E Mails was thought to be 
inappropriate for cultural reasons. Most of my frequent contacts in the KP – when 
asked – expressed a preference for face-to-face interviewing and persuaded me that 
many KP officers would prefer to avoid telephone interviewing. The majority made 
little or no use of an E Mail system of communication, for personal or business 
purposes.  
 
With the prior agreement of the KP General Director, General Reshat Maliqi, 
and the Head of EULEX Police Strengthening Department (PSD), the forms (see 
translated versions under Appendix B) were distributed by KP Station Commanders 
in several regions, with instructions that the respondent officers should complete the 
questionnaires within a shift period and handed back to the Station Commander. The 
questionnaires were completed at the convenience of the officers who proved very 
positive and helpful. It was explained to the officers that the research data would be 
treated confidentially and that the researcher was not in any way connected with a 
government agency. It was also explained that the survey instrument contained no 
identifiers that might link the respondent to the recorded data. In all cases the 
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questionnaire was administered to the respondents with their explicit agreement.  
Feedback from EULEX advisers suggested that the KP respondents found the 
questionnaires, in general terms, easy to use and not time-consuming. Virtually all the 
respondents were eager to participate and indicated that they appreciated the 
opportunity to express their views about the PIK. 
 
Once the questionnaires had been returned, I was faced with the challenge of 
studying the results and identifying patterns in response to Walker’s question. 
Analysis is about drawing out distinct and potentially generalizable features of the 
data (Gillham, 2005, p. 131). I found that the task of quantitative analysis was made 
much easier by use of a version of SPSS
32
 software; as recommended in the literature, 
this made the process of identifying dominant patterns from the limited responses 
much easier (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2006, p. 203, 211; Gillham, 2005, p. 144; 
Denscombe, 2003. p. 242).  
 
                                                 
32
 Originally known as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
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APPENDIX D 
LAW No.03/L –231 
 
ON POLICE INSPECTORATE OF KOSOVO 
The Assembly of Republic of Kosovo; 
 
Based on Article 65 (1) of the Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, 
Adopts: 






This law establishes the mission, organization, functions, duties and responsibilities of 




1. The scope of PIK activity is: 
1.1. Prevention, detection, documentation and investigation of the criminal 
offences committed by Kosovo Police employees, regardless of rank and 
position while on duty or off duty; 
1.2. Inspection of the structures and functions of Kosovo Police to ensure 
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of applicable 
laws, sub-legal acts and standard operational procedures that are in force; 
1.3. investigation and/or inspection of high profile disciplinary incidents, 
involving KP employees, as defined in Article 4, paragraph 1, and sub-
paragraph 1.11 of this law; 
1.4. investigation of all alleged disciplinary offences of police officers having 
the highest rank of the senior police management level and senior appointed 
police positions; 
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1.5. when there is a based suspicion that the General Director of Police has 
committed disciplinary violation, the Prime Minister may authorize the PIK to 
conduct the disciplinary investigations. Upon completion of disciplinary 
investigation the PIK shall report on findings to the Prime Minister; 
1.6. to receive all citizens complaints, as well as to review and determine where 
the complaints will be disseminated for investigation, either to the Kosovo 




The Mission of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo is that through exercising its duties 
to ensure an accountable, democratic and transparent police service in accordance to 





1. Definitions used in this Law have the following meaning: 
1.1. Investigator - the personnel of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo who 
perform criminal investigations involving Kosovo Police employees, including 
investigations into high profile disciplinary incidents and disciplinary 
investigation of police officers having the highest rank of the senior police 
management level and senior appointed police position; 
1.2. Inspectors - the personnel of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo that perform 
inspections of the Kosovo Police; 
1.3. MoIA - the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 
1.4. The Minister - the Minister of Internal Affairs; 
1.5. PIK - the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo; 
1.6. Kosovo Police Employee - all personnel that includes the police officer and 
the civilian staff of Kosovo Police; 
1.7. Police - the Kosovo Police; 
1.8. Law Enforcement Agency - all law enforcement agencies that have police 
powers; 
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1.9. Integrity Investigation - a technique or method used to verify the ethics and 
integrity of Kosovo Police employees. 
1.10. Inspection - evaluating Kosovo Police performance in achieving objectives 
in accordance with required legislation and standards; 
1.11. High Profile Disciplinary Case - a case or patterns of events attracting 
significant public attention, including but not limited to allegations of: 
1.11.1. direct conflict or incidents between the police and communities that 
relate to racial, ethnic or discriminatory acts; 
1.11.2. an acute problem of a direct conflict between the police and the 
community. The conflict may take the form of police harassment, brutality 
or excessive force; 
1.11.3. all use of lethal force incidents; 
1.11.4. death in police custody; 
1.11.5. fatal traffic accidents involving police employees; 
1.12. Service complaints - complaints made about police standards, operational 
instructions or the principles of police service; 
1.13. Criminal conduct complaints - the complaints regarding criminal conduct 





1. PIK employees shall respect the PIK Code of Ethics and principles as stated in 
Code of Conduct for Civil Servants. 
2. PIK employees while conducting their duties shall respect applicable law, human 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and 
shall contribute in their promotion. 
 
3. PIK is guided by the principles of professionalism, objectivity, political impartiality 
and nondiscrimination. 
 
4. PIK will reflect the multi-ethnic character of the Republic of Kosovo along with the 
principles of gender equality and human rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo. 
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5. During the exercise of its activity PIK is independent. 
 
6. Consistent with applicable law, PIK is authorized to gather information and 
evidence during an investigation in order to determine the conduct of the Police 
employee, against whom the case is initiated. 
 
7. PIK shall conduct its investigation promptly and in an expeditious manner in order 
to maintain confidence in the rule of law. 
 
8. While performing their duties, PIK investigators shall comply with the Criminal 
Code and Criminal Procedure Code. 
 
9. Procedures and decision-making by the PIK should be open and transparent unless 
this will endanger or impede the course of the investigation. 
 







1. PIK is an executive institution under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, independent 
from the Kosovo Police and under direct subordination of the Minister. 
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Identification documents 
1. Employees of PIK are equipped with an identification document that serves as an 
evidence and authorization to act on behalf of PIK. 
 
2. The form, issuance and rule of use of the identification document are established by 




1. PIK has its own budget, which is a separate line within the budget of the MoIA and 
is subject to audit.The Chief Executive Officer of PIK is responsible for the effective 
and proper management of the approved budget. 
 
2. PIK within its budget frame shall maintain a special fund to support the purpose of 
information activity and criminal procedures. The use of this fund is not subject to the 
internal auditing rules. However this fund will be subject to auditing from the office 





1. PIK functions under the authority of the Minister and under the control and 
supervision of the PIK Chief Executive. The authority of the Minister does not 
include the operational management of the PIK. The Chief Executive of PIK reports 
and is responsible directly to the Minister regarding the PIK administration and 
management. The PIK Chief Executive cooperates and offers the necessary 
information and reports to the Minister. 
 
2. The Minister: 
2.1. establishes PIK’s annual strategic objectives in line with the state policies; 
2.2. ensures the coordination between PIK and Kosovo Police and other 
structures of the MoIA as well as cooperation with any other institution which 
provides information, state institutions and counterpart institutions from other 
countries based on agreements; 
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2.3. issues sub-legal acts for the organization and functioning of PIK in 
accordance with this Law and other applicable laws; 
2.4. requests reports, information and other documents related to PIK duties. 
 
3. PIK will not disclose to the Minister, public authorities or other person any 
information related to its investigations including but not limited to information 
related to witnesses, collaborators or informants. This type of information shall be 






ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS 
Article 11 
PIK organizational structure 
 




Chief Executive of Police Inspectorate of Kosovo 
1. The Chief Executive is the non-political executive authority of PIK and is the 
highest administrative, technical and operational authority of PIK. 
 
2. PIK Chief Executive is responsible for: 
2.1. the overall administering/managing and ensuring the implementation of 
functions entrusted to PIK; 
2.2. organizing and employing of personnel, adopting administrative instructions 
and issuing decisions related to the functions of the PIK; 
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Criterion for appointment and selection of the Chief Executive 
1. The criteria for appointing the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PIK are: 
1.1. to be a citizen of the Republic of Kosovo; 
1.2. to have graduated from an approved university, in areas related to policing, 
law, security or public administration; 
1.3. have at least (3) three years of experience in a high management position in 
fields related to police, criminal justice, law, security or public administration; 
1.4. has not been convicted of a criminal offense by final decision; 
1.5. has not been punished for serious discipline violations equivalent to 
violations established by the discipline regulation of PIK, in the last ten (10) 
years, during which has worked in state institutions; 
1.6. does not have a conflict of interest with the position or as determined within 
the Law on Preventing Conflict of Interest in Exercising Public Function. 
 
2. Minister shall establish a special commission for selection of Chief Executive. 
 
3. Upon selection the Commission, from paragraph 2 of this Article, shall propose 
three (3) candidates for the PIK Chief Executive to the Minister. The Minister will 
appoint the Chief Executive based on the candidacies proposed by the Commission. 
 
4. The composition of the Commission and the selection procedure is regulated by a 
sub legal act issued by the Minister. 
 
Article 14 
The mandate of the Chief Executive of PIK 
1. The Chief Executive of PIK is appointed for a term of five (5) years with the 
possibility of renewal every five (5) years. 
 
2. If the Chief Executive of PIK term of office renewal comes within a general 




Termination of mandate and dismissal from the duty of the PIK Chief Executive 
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1. The mandate of chief executive shall end for one of the following reasons: 
1.1. due to the termination of a mandate; 
1.2. reaches the retirement age; 
1.3. resigns; 
1.4. is convicted of a criminal offence by a final court decision; 
1.5. due to death or an inability to perform the functions for a period of time 
longer than six (6) months; 
1.6. due to dismissal from the position. 
 
2. The Minister, imposes to the Chief Executive of PIK the disciplinary measures of 
written warning or dismissal from the position, for one of the following reasons: 
2.1. commission of a serious disciplinary offence, as set forth in the 
disciplinary regulation; 
2.2. upon a negative documented work assessment, for a violation of rules of 
integrity or a failure to comply with sub-legal acts on discipline and personnel; 
2.3. has shown a significant documented lack of commitment in meeting 
strategic objectives and in performing tasks designated to him/her by the 
Minister, according to Article 10 of this Law. 
 
3. When there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that Chief Executive of PIK has 
committed a criminal act or for any reason set forth in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
Minister may immediately suspend the Chief Executive Officer of PIK. 
 
4. In cases of termination of the mandate, dismissal or suspension of the Chief 
Executive of PIK, Minister shall immediately assign one of the Department Heads of 





1. PIK personnel are divided into four (4) categories: 
1.1 investigators; 
1.2 inspectors; 
1.3 support personnel; 
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1.4 part-time contracted personnel. 
 
2. Procedures and conditions for work and employment of the PIK personnel are 
regulated by a sub-legal act by the Minister, which will include but not limited to the 
promotion, training and conflict of interest. 
 
3. PIK employee shall not have the right to strike or any other action which impedes 
or interferes in performing the PIK activity. 
 
4. The PIK employee shall not express attitudes or undertake activities that violate the 













1. PIK investigators, while performing their duties, have police powers and shall 
exercise them in accordance with the Constitution, Criminal Code, Criminal 
Procedure Code, this law, other laws and sublegal acts in power. 
 
2. The investigative scope of PIK is prevention, detection, documentation and 
investigation of the criminal offences committed by Kosovo Police employees, 
regardless of rank and position, during the exercise of their official duty or off duty, 
including investigations of high profile disciplinary incidents and disciplinary 
investigations of police officers having the highest rank within the senior police 
management level and senior appointed police positions. 
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3. PIK Investigators are entitled to carry and use weapons as well as force in 
accordance with the Law on Police, relevant applicable laws and sub-legal acts issued 
for their implementation. 
 
4. The type of weapons and other means of use of force by the PIK will be determined 
in compliance with respective law. 
 
5. While enforcing their legal authority, PIK may seek assistance from the Police and 
other Law Enforcement Agencies. 
 
6. Upon receiving information that a police employee is involved in a criminal 
offence which is prosecuted ex officio, the Police will immediately undertake all 
measures to secure evidence and will take all initial actions including but not limited 
to, responding to the scene, securing the scene, arresting the suspect if legal 
conditions are met, ensuring that the medical units are present and identifying or 
detaining the witnesses. Police shall inform the Prosecutor regarding the case without 
delay and within the period of time determined by the Criminal Procedure Code and 
will immediately inform PIK. 
 
7. PIK Investigator, at the scene, shall direct the police officer responsible for the 
scene or the other responsible officer of law enforcement agency, to undertake the 
assigned actions regarding the scene management or investigation procedures related 
to the case. The police officer responsible for the scene or the other responsible officer 
of law enforcement agency is obliged to act in accordance with the lawful orders of 
the investigator regarding the specific case. 
 
8. For investigation purpose, PIK is authorized to use all services of specialized police 
units, equipment and buildings of Kosovo Police including but not limited to, 
forensics, laboratory, and interception devices. 
 
9. If during an investigation the Police discover that one or more Police employees are 
involved, they can investigate the case to its conclusion and shall notify PIK within 
(5) five working days. At the request of the police, PIK may join the ongoing 
investigation. 
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10. If during an investigation the PIK discover that one or more persons who are not 
Police employees are involved, they shall investigate the case to its conclusion. At the 
request of the PIK, Police may join the ongoing investigation. The Chief Executive 
may decide to refer the case to the Police for further investigations. 
 
11. In compliance with applicable law, police and other law enforcement institutions 
may conduct investigations and arrests of police employees. If it is determined that 
the police employee or officer committed a criminal act, the police and other law 
enforcement institutions are obliged to inform PIK at the earliest opportunity without 
damaging the investigations. 
 
12. When PIK considers it is in the interest of the investigation it shall recommend to 
the Police General Director a form of action that may include, but is not limited to, 
types of suspension with pay or transfer. 
The recommendation must be accompanied with a statement, which includes the 




1. If during a disciplinary violation investigation there is a reasonable suspicion to 
believe that a Kosovo Police employee has committed an act which amounts to a 
criminal offence, all case materials shall be sent to PIK within five (5) working days. 
PIK will proceed with their criminal investigation according to applicable laws. 
 
2. Except cases arising from Article 2, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph 1.3 and 1.4 of this 
Law, if during a PIK criminal investigation, there is insufficient evidence obtained to 
determine that a criminal offence has been committed, all case materials will be sent 
back to the Kosovo Police within five (5) working days from this decision. In this 
case, Kosovo Police can continue with disciplinary investigation. 
 
3. PIK shall register and archive case files from paragraph 2 of this Article separately 
from the criminal files. 
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4. If after the pre-charge criminal investigation, PIK determines that there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a police employee who was the subject of an 
investigation have committed a criminal offence, PIK shall prepare a criminal 
indictment and send it to the Prosecutor together with all the evidence. 
 
5. If the criminal investigations in a certain case are ceased or the criminal indictment 
has been dismissed by the prosecutor, and PIK discovers that there is new evidence, 
the Prosecutor shall be informed and PIK shall act according to the instructions of the 
Prosecutor. 
 
6. If the criminal investigation has ceased, the criminal indictment has been dismissed 
by the prosecutor or the Court has released the police employee from the charge, PIK 
shall send the case with all relevant documentation to the Kosovo Police for further 
disciplinary investigations, except cases from Article 2, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph 
1.3 and 1.4 of this Law. PIK has the right to withhold the confidential informant 
information from the Police. 
 
7. PIK will send each Court decision to the Police. 
 
Article 19 
Collection of Data 
1. In order to fulfill their duty, PIK investigators are authorized and responsible for 
using any lawful source of information for the collection, collation and protection of 
the data related to the investigation of criminal offences committed by Kosovo Police 
employees, regardless of their position or rank. 
 
2. The Police senior staff and MoIA shall cooperate with PIK in order to implement 
this Law. 
 
3. If the police employees, MoIA and other state institutions are aware of police 
employees’ involvement in criminal offences, they shall immediately inform the PIK. 
If any state institution has an ongoing investigation they may proceed to its conclusion 
or may notify PIK. At the conclusion of any investigation the state institutions must 
notify the PIK. 
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4. For the data obtained related to the involvement of police employees, subject of a 
PIK investigation, into criminal offences, the institutions providing information shall 
inform PIK based on a joint instruction of the Minister and heads of above mentioned 
institutions. 
 
5. In compliance with the applicable law and based on a probable cause to believe that 
a police employee is involved in a criminal act, the PIK may seek from police 
employees detailed statements on external activities such as, secondary employment, 
investments, assets and gifts or privileges. 
 
6. For data collection, PIK may use and compensate confidential informants for 
providing information. 
 
7. PIK has the right to control, seize analyze and maintain documents, evidence and 
information, in written or electronic, from all offices, secretariats, archives or any 
other source of information, in compliance with the law in force. 
 
8. Public Administration bodies, private and legal persons and entities are obliged to 
present identification data and available information upon a lawful request by PIK. 
 
9. In compliance to the law in force, a person providing cooperation with PIK must 
preserve the secrecy of such cooperation and classified information until the legal 
obligation for preserving such secret is ceased. 
 
10. Collection, retention, processing, analysis, use, transfers and removal of data shall 




Special measures for data collection 
1. When based on the available data, there are suspicions that a Police employee, who 
is the subject of a PIK investigation according to this Law, has committed a criminal 
offence or is planning or organizing to  commit a crime and this activity can not be 
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detected or prevented in other ways, PIK investigators may use covert and technical 
measures of surveillance, investigation and the foreseen procedure as set out in the 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
 
2. In order to exercise its activity and function and based on “reasonable suspicion” 
and as authorized by the prosecutor, PIK is entitled to conduct the integrity 
investigation of police employees. 
 
3. Integrity investigation aims to develop the proactive capacity in maintaining the 
ethics and integrity in the framework of high professional standards within the Police 
contributing to the efforts of corruption control, raising the quality of service, and 
enhancing public confidence towards Kosovo Police. Rules and procedures for 
conducting this investigation shall be established by a sub-legal act approved by the 
Minister. 
 
4. PIK may use the tools, equipment and personnel of other law enforcement 




1. PIK intelligence management in this Law means the process of collection, 
collation, assessment, analysis, dissemination and use of information for discovering 
criminal offences committed by Police employees. 
 
2. Intelligence management is conducted in compliance with the applicable law and 




1. Upon completion of a disciplinary investigation from Article 2 paragraph 1 sub-
paragraph 1.3 and 1.4 of this Law, if the PIK determines there has been a violation of 
the Law on Police or sub-legal acts issued for its implementation, PIK shall submit to 
the General Director a recommended discipline for the Police employee. 
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2. The Director General of Police shall issue a written detailed decision with 
justification for the action taken on the recommendation from paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 
 
3. Upon receiving the decision, the Police employee may appeal the decision of the 
General Director of Police to the Minister within eight (8) working days. Upon 
receiving the complaint, the Minister shall respond within thirty (30) days. 
 
4. The Decision of the Minister is the final administrative procedure. The Police 











PIK conducts inspections on Kosovo Police. 
 
Article 24 
Authorization for conducting inspections 
1. The PIK may initiate an inspection of the Police on their own initiative or upon 
order of the Minister. 
 
2. The PIK Chief Executive officer shall authorize in writing the conducting of 
inspections as mentioned in the paragraph 1 of this article. The Authorization shall 
include the reason and the objective of inspection. 
 
3. Absent exigent circumstances, the order of the Minister shall be in writing. In the 
event of exigent circumstances a verbal authorization may be issued in which case, 
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the Minister shall issue the written authorization at the earliest opportunity but not 




1. At the first quarter of each calendar year, the Director of Inspections Department, 
submits the annual plan for ordinary inspections to the PIK Chief Executive for 
approval., 
 
2. The annual ordinary inspection plan need not specify the exact number of areas to 
be inspected during the calendar year. This plan may be flexible, however further 
amendments shall be pre-approved by PIK Chief Executive Officer. 
 
3. PIK drafts the Administrative Instructions regarding the procedure of the 
inspections which are approved by the Minister. 
 
4. Inspections include but are not limited to the following areas: 
4.1. police buildings, infrastructure and all related assets; 
4.2. budget, finance, logistics and procurement management; 
4.3. vehicle fleet and police equipment management; 
4.4. human resources management; 
4.5. management of firearms, ammunition and other equipments; 
4.6. escort, detention and arrest procedures; 
4.7. traffic patrol and road safety management; 
4.8. crime detection, investigation, and case management; 
4.9. management of complaints and disciplinary investigations; 
4.10. border control, protection and migration management; 
4.11. management of local policing planning, community safety and initiatives 
of community policing; 




Data collection during inspections 
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1. Inspections shall not interfere with the police operations in progress. 
 
2. For data collection within the scope of inspections, PIK conduct for inspection 
includes but is not limited to the following actions: 
2.1. checking the condition of buildings, vehicles and equipments; 
2.2. checking the records and files, including either hard copy of the documents, 
electronic, or audio or video records; 
2.3. interviewing employees and members of the public; 
2.4. interviewing escorted and arrested persons; 
2.5. using questionnaires completed by the employees or citizens. 
 
3. PIK inspectors during an inspection can obtain documents or their copies, in written 
or electronic and video/audio records if it is considered necessary for preparing 
inspection reports. 
 
4. Inspectors shall act in accordance with all laws and sub-legal acts, for retaining 
secrets and data. 
 
5. The head of the inspected structure shall provide access to all facilities, structures 
and all related documents and equipment where the inspection is to be conducted and 
instructs the personnel to fully cooperate with the inspectors of PIK. 
 
6. If during an inspection, the supervisor of the certain police structure hinders the 
inspection process without a lawful cause, PIK inspectors shall report this to PIK 
Chief Executive Officer, who shall decide whether the case will be sent to the 
Minister or General Director of Police for further action. 
 
7. If during an inspection, inspectors note any evidence of possible criminal offence 
involving Kosovo Police employees, they may take the following actions: 
7.1. secure the evidence and protect the area where the evidence was found; 
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Preparation and publication of the inspection reports 
1. Upon completion of an inspection, an objective report of the inspected area shall be 
prepared. 
 
2. The inspection reports shall highlight clearly objective criteria on of conditions and 
contain recommendations to address any circumstances that negatively impact police 
effectiveness and performance. 
 
3. Chief Executive shall ensure that PIK reports do not consist of any material which 
might endanger the security of any person or compromise national security or in 
unnecessary manner endanger criminal investigations. 
 
4. PIK Chief Executive shall ensure that the reports are in line with the highest ethical 
standards and integrity and achieve the objective of police effectiveness and 
performance. 
 
5. Final reports shall be reviewed and signed by Chief Executive Officer of the PIK, 
or in his absence by an authorized person, and delivered to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs and the Kosovo Police General Director no later than two (2) months from the 
initial submission of the report. 
 
6. After review by the Minister and the Kosovo Police General Director, the 
inspection reports shall be published on the PIK website. Dissemination of these 
reports is subject to paragraph 3 of this Article. 
 
7. The Minister and the General Director of Police will meet at least twice a year to 
review the recommendations in the inspection reports and to develop a strategy to 




THE RIGHTS OF PERSONNEL 
Article 28 
The right to salary and reward 
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1.Basic salary, salary supplements, allowances and benefits including pension scheme 
and insurance of the PIK employees, shall be determined in an sub legal act issued by 
Minister, which shall include, but is not limited to, hazard pay, pay for overtime and 
holiday work, , meal and clothing allowances. 
 
2. PIK employees who have received a satisfactory evaluation and who have not been 
the subject of any disciplinary action shall receive a reward of one month’s salary at 
the end of the financial year. 
 
3. In the event of a death on duty or if a PIK employee is killed as a result of the 
performance of PIK duties, the Ministry shall pay the family of the deceased 
employer or the legal heir(s) the PIK employee’s monthly compensation for a period 




The leave from the working relationship of PIK personnel are the same with the leave 
of civil servants. Regarding the use of leave shall apply the relevant provisions of the 








PIK disciplinary measures 
1. Violations, disciplinary measures, suspension with pay and disciplinary procedures 
for the PIK employees are regulated by a sub legal act from the Minister. 
 
2. When the investigation reveals that the conduct of the PIK employee constitutes a 
criminal offence, the case will be referred for prosecution to the prosecutors’ office. 
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Drafting of sub legal acts 
1. For implementation of this Law the Minister, shall adopt the sub legal acts to 
establish: 
1.1. the identification emblem of PIK; 
1.2. the form, the issuance and the rules for the use of the identification 
document; 
1.3. the condition and the criterion for the use and control of the special fund; 
1.4. the organizational structure of the PIK; 
1.5. the composition of the Commission appointing the PIK Chief Executive and 
the procedure form the selection of the PIK Chief Executive; 
1.6. the procedures pertaining to the employment and working procedure and 
conditions for PIK employees; 
1.7. the types of weapon and other means of use of force by the PIK in 
compliance with respective law; 
1.8. the rules and procedures for conducting the integrity investigation; 
1.9. inspections of the Kosovo Police; 
1.10. determination of basic salary, salary increases, supplements, and other 
benefits for the PIK employees; 
1.11. violation and disciplinary measures, suspension with pay and the 
disciplinary procedure; 
1.12. the procedure for initiating a criminal investigation; 
 
2. For implementation of this Law, the Chief Executive of PIK, shall adopt the 
following sub-legal acts: 
2.1. budget administration of PIK; 
2.2. the procedure for exchanging information between PIK and other state 
institutions; 
2.3. the procedure on evidence management; 
2.4. the procedure on the implementation of covert measures and false identity. 
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1. Once this law enters into force, the Law on Kosovo Police Inspectorate No.03/L-
036, sub-legal acts that derive from it and all provisions of the Law on Police related 
to PIK are abrogated and also all other legal provisions that are in contradiction to this 
law. 
 
2. Upon entry into force of this law, all submitted disciplinary violations will be 
investigated by Kosovo Police, except disciplinary violations from Article 2 
paragraph 1 sub-paragraph 1.3 and 1.4 of this Law. 
 
3. All serious disciplinary violations are subject to the legislation that was in effect at 
the time of the conduct. 
 
4. All disciplinary cases in the PIK that are pending a court decision at the time this 
Law comes into force will be transferred to the Police for further disciplinary 
proceedings 
 
5. All ongoing criminal investigations by the Police which are pending when this Law 
becomes effective shall remain with the Police until completed. 
 
6. Criminal investigations by PIK towards Police employees shall begin to be 
implemented six (6) months after entrance into force of this law. 
 
7. The Minister during the six (6) months period shall issue sub-legal acts for 
implementation of this law and till their issuance legal provisions in force shall be 
applied. 
 
8. During the six (6) months period the capacities within the PIK personnel shall be 
developed and necessary personnel shall be recruited. 
 
Article 33 
Entry into force 
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This law enters into force fifteen (15) days after publication in the Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Kosovo. 
 
 
Law No. 03/L-231 
14 October 2010 
 
 
Pursuant to the article 80, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosovo, Law shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Kosovo. 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.2: Overall results of the questionnaire study (all ranks/categories) 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 553 Frequency 34 115 176 56 111 61 
 % 6.1 20.7 31.7 10.1 20 11 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 553 Frequency 27 140 182 64 95 43 
 % 4.9 25.2 32.7 11.5 17.1 7.7 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 527 Frequency 37 178 202 50 42 18 
 % 6.7 32 38.3 9.4 7.9 3.4 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 526 Frequency 28 154 208 47 61 28 
 % 5.3 29.2 39.5 8.9 11.5 5.3 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 529 Frequency 42 105 86 57 161 78 
 % 7.9 19.8 16.2 10.7 30.4 14.7 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 526 Frequency 31 114 182 70 107 22 
 % 3.8 21.6 34.6 13.3 20.3 4.1 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.3: KP officers who indicated that they had been investigated by PIK 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 106 Frequency 7 19 27 8 23 22 
 % 6.6 17.9 25.4 7.5 21.6 20.7 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 105 Frequency 4 25 31 14 18 13 
 % 3.8 23.8 29.5  4.1 2.9 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 98 Frequency 5 40 34 4 10 5 
 % 5.1 40.8 34.6 4 10.2 5.1 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 104 Frequency 7 34 34 5 16 8 
 % 6.7 32.6 32.6 4.8 15.3 7.6 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 99 Frequency 9 23 12 10 28 17 
 % 9 23.2 12.1 10.1 28.2 17.1 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 97 Frequency 6 22 33 12 19 5 
 % 6.1 22.6 34 12.3 19.5 5.1 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.4: KP officers who indicated that they had NOT been investigated by PIK 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 440 Frequency 27 95 148 48 85 37 
 % 6.1 21.5 33.6 10.9 19.3 8.4 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 438 Frequency 23 114 150 49 74 28 
 % 5.2 25.9 34.2 11.1 16.8 6.3 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 421 Frequency 32 137 163 46 31 12 
 % 7.6 32.5 38.7 10.9 7.3 2.8 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 421 Frequency 21 120 173 42 45 20 
 % 4.9 28.5 41 9.9 10.6 4.7 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 423 Frequency 33 82 72 47 131 58 
 % 7.8 19.3 17 11.1 30.9 13.7 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 422 Frequency 25 91 145 57 87 17 
 % 5.9 21.5 34.3 13.5 20.6 4 
 
University of Portsmouth - Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Holding police accountability theory to account                                                     Frank Harris 259 
 
Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
Table 6.5: KP officers who indicated that they had been investigated by PSD 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 175 Frequency 11 30 48 15 38 33 
 % 6.2 17.1 27.4 8.5 21.7 18.8 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 175 Frequency 7 47 46 20 34 21 
 % 4 26.8 26.2 11.4 19.4 12 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 163 Frequency 11 69 51 13 14 5 
 % 6.7 42.3 31.2 7.9 8.5 3 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 163 Frequency 8 44 64 14 19 14 
 % 4.9 26.9 39.2 8.5 11.6 8.5 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 164 Frequency 15 40 19 19 48 23 
 % 9.1 24.3 11.5 11.5 29.2 14 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 162 Frequency 12 30 55 22 36 7 
 % 7.4 18.5 33.9 13.5 22.2 4.3 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.6: KP officers who indicated that they had NOT been investigated by PSD 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 365 Frequency 23 82 124 40 71 25 
 % 6.3 22.4 33.9 10.9 19.4 6.8 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 363 Frequency 20 89 134 42 59 19 
 % 5.5 24.5 36.9 11.5 16.2 5.2 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 352 Frequency 26 107 144 36 27 12 
 % 7.3 30.3 40.9 10.2 7.6 3.4 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 351 Frequency 20 106 141 33 38 13 
 % 5.6 30.1 40.1 9.4 10.8 3.7 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 353 Frequency 27 64 64 36 109 53 
 % 7.6 18.1 18.1 10.1 30.8 15 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 352 Frequency 19 82 119 47 70 15 
 % 5.3 23.2 33.8 13.3 19.8 4.2 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.7: Officers who indicated that they had made a complaint against another 
officer 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 82 Frequency 9 13 23 8 18 11 
 % 10.9 15.9 28 9.8 22 13.4 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 82 Frequency 8 20 22 7 15 10 
 % 9.7 24.3 26.8 8.5 18.2 12.1 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 78 Frequency 5 27 29 4 7 6 
 % 6.4 34.6 37.1 5.1 8.9 7.6 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 79 Frequency 4 17 30 7 12 9 
 % 5 21.5 37.9 8.8 15.1 11.3 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 80 Frequency 8 17 15 8 18 14 
 % 10 21.2 18.7 10 22.5 17.5 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 80 Frequency 7 18 18 10 22 5 
 % 8.7 22.5 22.5 12.5 27.5 6.2 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.8: Officers who indicated that they had NOT made a complaint against another 
officer 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 456 Frequency 25 98 149 48 89 47 
 % 5.4 21.4 32.6 10.5 19.5 10.3 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 454 Frequency 19 114 158 57 76 30 
 % 4.1 25.1 34.8 12.5 13.9 5.5 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 434 Frequency 32 149 166 43 33 11 
 % 7.3 34.3 38.2 9.9 7.6 2.5 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 432 Frequency 23 134 174 39 45 17 
 % 5.3 31 40.2 9 10.4 3.9 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 434 Frequency 32 87 68 48 139 60 
 % 7.3 20 15.6 11 32 13.8 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 431 Frequency 22 94 158 57 83 17 
 % 5.1 21.8 36.6 13.2 19.2 3.9 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.9: Officers who indicated that they had given evidence against another officer 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 158 Frequency 14 29 43 18 34 20 
 % 3.1 6.3 9.4 3.9 7.4 4.4 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 158 Frequency 12 34 49 23 28 12 
 % 2.6 7.4 10.7 5 6.1 2.6 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 150 Frequency 15 51 53 8 14 9 
 % 3.3 11.1 11.5 1.7 3.1 2 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 150 Frequency 10 33 68 11 15 13 
 % 2.2 7.2 14.8 2.4 3.3 2.8 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 151 Frequency 18 33 23 18 36 23 
 % 11.9 21.8 15.2 11.9 23.8 15.2 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 150 Frequency 12 33 39 19 38 9 
 % 8 22 26 12.6 25.3 6 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Results 
 
Table 6.10: Officers who indicated that they had NOT given evidence against another 
officer 








Q.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? - “Kosovo Police officers are 
more likely to respect the rights of citizens because of the presence of the Police Inspectorate.” 
n = 376 Frequency 20 82 127 37 73 37 
 % 5.3 21.8 33.7 9.8 19.4 9.8 
Q.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police Inspectorate helps KP 
officers perform to high standards of integrity and honesty.” 
n = 374 Frequency 15 100 130 39 63 27 
 % 4 26.7 34.7 10.4 16.8 7.2 
Q.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Police misconduct in Kosovo 
has decreased in recent years.” 
n = 359 Frequency 22 124 140 39 26 8 
 % 6.1 34.5 38.9 10.8 7.2 2.2 
Q.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “PIK officers conduct thorough 
and professional investigations.” 
n = 358 Frequency 17 117 135 35 41 13 
 % 4.7 32.6 37.7 9.7 11.4 3.6 
Q.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Complaints against KP staff 
should be dealt with by an external/independent agency.” 
n = 360 Frequency 22 71 60 37 119 51 
 % 6.1 19.7 16.6 10.2 33 14.1 
Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Professional Standards 
Directorate staff are more effective investigators of complaints against Kosovo Police staff than 
Police Inspectorate officers.” 
n = 358 Frequency 17 78 135 48 67 13 
 % 4.7 21.7 37.7 13.4 18.7 3.6 
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